Applications in Agent-Based Computational Economics. by Schuster, Stephan.
Applications in Agent-Based  
Computational Economics
Stephan Schuster
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences 
University of Surrey
January 2012
@2012, Stephan Schuster
ProQuest N um ber: 27721063
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is d e p e n d e n t upon the quality of the copy subm itted.
In the unlikely e v e n t that the author did not send a c o m p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing p a g e s , these will be n oted . Also, if material had to be rem oved,
a n o te  will ind icate the deletion .
uest
ProQuest 27721063
Published by ProQuest LLC (2019). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C o d e
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 -  1346
Abstract
A constituent feature of adaptive complex systems are non-linear feedback mechanisms 
between actors. These mechanisms are often difficult to model and analyse. One pos­
sibility of modelling is given by Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE), which 
uses computer simulation methods to represent such systems and analyse non-linear 
processes.
The aim of this thesis is to explore ways of modelling adaptive agents in ACE 
models. Its major contribution is of a methodological nature. Artificial intelligence 
and machine learning methods are used to represent agents and learning processes in 
economics domains by means of learning mechanisms.
In this work, a general reinforcement learning framework is developed and realised 
in a simulation system. This system is used to implement three models of increasing 
complexity in two different economic domains. One of these domains are iterative 
games in which agents meet repeatedly and interact. In an experimental labour market, 
it is shown how statistical discrimination can be generated simply by the learning 
algorithm used. The results resemble actual patterns of observed human behaviour in 
laboratory settings. The second model treats strategic network formation. The main 
contribution here is to show how agent-based modelling helps to analyse non-linearity 
that is introduced when assumptions of perfect information and full rationality are 
relaxed. The other domain has a Health Economics background. The aim here is to 
provide insights of how the approach might be useful in real-world applications. For this,
a general model of primary care is developed, and the implications of different consumer 
behaviour patterns (based on the learning features introduced before) analysed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economies can be seen as complex dynamics systems: Many autonomous agents in­
teract locally, giving rise to global phenomena such as price levels, growth rates, etc. 
As Tesfatsion (2006) notes, the study of these macro phenomena require strong ab­
stractions and simplifications, which, if removed, quickly make the system intractable. 
For example, what would happen if the Walrasian Auctioneer would be removed in 
a standard Walrasian model? Because of this ‘small’ perturbation, the modeller now 
has to ‘come to grips with challenging issues such as asymmetric information, strategic 
interaction, expectation formation on the basis of limited information, mutual learning, 
social norms, transaction costs, externalities, market power, predation, collusion, and 
the possibility of coordination failure (convergence to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium)’ 
(Tesfatsion 2006). Agent-based computational economics (ACE) is a method that has 
emerged as a novel way to look at the evolution of such equilibria and global phenom­
ena by generating, or ‘growing’ them endogenously (Epstein and Axtell 1996). It is a 
way to computationally study artificial worlds modelled as dynamic systems of interact­
ing entities. The entities are typically individuals or social groups such as consumers, 
firms or players in games. Furthermore, physical entities such as infrastructure or spa­
tial settings might be represented in a computational model. Models are analysed by 
simulating them in a computer, and interpreting the results that are generated.
1
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A system is called complex if it is composed of interacting units and if has emergent 
properties, that is, properties arising from the interactions of the agents. Following 
Tesfatsion (2006), a system is complex adaptive if the units of the system have some 
form of pro- and reactive capabilities. There are basically three definitions of complex 
adaptive systems:
Definition 1. A complex adaptive system is a complex system that includes reactive 
units, i.e., units capable of exhibiting systematically different attributes in reaction to 
changed environmental conditions.
Definition 2. A  complex adaptive system is a complex system that includes goal-directed 
units, i.e., units that are reactive and that direct at least some of their reactions towards 
the achievement of built-in (or evolved) goals.
Definition 3. A complex adaptive system is a complex system that includes planner 
units, i.e., units that are goal-directed and that attempt to exert some degree of control 
over their environment to facilitate achievement of these goals.
Essentially, economic systems can be defined as complex adaptive systems, composed 
of intelligent agents. Some form of cognition and goal-directedness is essential to most 
models. However, the degree of goal-direction and cognitive capabilities of agents varies 
strongly. The simplest models, for example, represent only reactions to neighbouring 
agents’ states (e.g. Schelling 1971). In game theory, simple reinforcement learning (RL), 
as well as mixed systems, combining cognitive learning mechanisms with experience- 
based learning, have been widely applied (for details, see chapter 3; for an overview see 
Brenner (2006)). There is no simple rule which models should use which sort of learning; 
this typically depends on the nature of the domain. For example, in environments 
where habitualisation is a prominent feature, e.g. in repeated game situations, simple 
reinforcement learning matches actual behaviour usually reasonably well. On the other 
hand, if decisions are less frequent and more important, simple learning mechanisms are 
not accurate representations. For instance, it could be argued that choosing a doctor
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(see chapter 4) is a very conscious decision, thus RL would be inappropriate and some 
mechanism for representing beliefs and judgements would be the more natural choice.
While the role of ACE as a tool for simulating complex systems is straightforward, 
its role as a paradigm for economic modelling is controversial. Typical criticisms of ACE 
models regard the following points (e.g. Fagiolo et al 2007; Leombruni and Richiardi 
2005; Richiardi 2003):
-  The lack of standardisation and formalism of ACE models. The sheer mass and 
heterogeneity of models makes unclear what this approach actually stands for. 
In general, there are almost no standardised techniques to analyse agent-based 
models, for example, whether and when sensitivity analyses should be conducted, 
how timing should be interpreted and so on.
-  The lack or impossibility of empirical validation of many models. Many simula­
tions use some stylised facts to establish the validity of the model. Calibration is 
typically an iterative process where the modeller reduces the parameter space to 
smaller ranges which generate the most plausible results, or where detailed data 
exists, to a dataset. However, since one of the advantages of ACE models is the 
integration of more ‘realism’ in the form of exact agent specifications, there is 
always a trade-off between descriptive accuracy and analytical tractability. Nat­
urally, the more degrees of freedom a model has, the more difficult it is to map it 
to available empirical evidence (due to the number of parameters to calibrate).
-  The lack of generality and unclear approach to handle results. Whereas it is 
straightforward to estimate, say, reduced forms or calculate transition probabili­
ties on empirical data, artificial data can only be calibrated against some empirical 
benchmark. A result derived from artificial data can only be as good as the under­
lying simulation is able to replicate the actual real-world process. Furthermore, 
agent-based models are likely to underidentify actual trends. ACE models are 
richer, and therefore, create more noise. Another aspect of this problem is ‘equi- 
finality’. Equifinality describes the case when a number of different models may
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generate similar data, that is, they may equally well explain the same phenomenon 
but by different processes.
Some ACE modellers view agent-based modelling as a new way of doing science 
(Epstein and Axtell 1996). The main interest of researchers in this area is to discover 
new rules, theories and test hypotheses about the processes that generate certain phe­
nomena, and only later derive analytical better models that explain larger classes of 
phenomena (e.g. Edmonds and Moss 2005). As these modellers typically use their sim­
ulations on a mere qualitative basis, as thought-experiments or support for generating 
new hypotheses, there is no rationale for testing such models against empirical data. 
Although immunised against empirical falsification, some forecasting exercises might 
still be possible, but results have to be treated with caution. More importantly, there 
is a danger that ’one ends up building auto-referential formalisations that have no link 
to reality’ (e.g. Fagiolo et al 2007).
The aim of this thesis is to apply RL methods as a means to model adaptive feedback 
processes. The overall contribution is of a methodological nature. The models presented 
have the main purpose to demonstrate this method and show how it can be applied to 
a range of problems. In that sense, the models discussed in the thesis fall into the last 
category of models: They are mainly of a qualitative nature; empirical validation is not 
the main interest of the simulations.
Reinforcement learning is a very simple experience based learning approach; agents 
learn by trial and error. It has often been used in the ACE literature, but often ad- 
hoc or in simple models. Moreover, there are only few approaches which integrate 
experience-based learning with cognitive elements such as beliefs.
This thesis contributes to a more systematic way of representing learning. The 
objective are to
1. Develop a new computational approach that integrates RL with simple cognitive 
elements. It shall provide a new approach of modelling human decision processes.
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2. Apply RL to economic, mainly game-theory models and contribute to the learning 
literature in this field. As the use of simulations allows to build more complex 
models, an important aspect of this thesis is to build a ’bridge’ between pure game 
theory and empirical results of experimental game theory. A recurring topic is 
therefore the comparison with experimental evidence.
3. Analyse the impact of different learning approaches in more complex domains. 
Here, the question is how RL can be used to enrich the analysis of more applied, 
real-world models.
As the methodological basis, chapter 2 reviews RL in the economic literature and 
develops a general learning framework, combining reinforcement and rule learning. The 
motivation is to provide an alternative, generic way of representing agent decision mech­
anisms in a unified framework for several classes of models. It tries to go beyond simplis­
tic fomalisations of adaptive capabilities such as simple RL, but to keep computational 
complexity within bounds. Chapter 3 applies this approach to a model of statistical 
discrimination. It is shown that the framework is capable of reproducing patterns of 
actual human behaviour in game-theoretic experiments. Chapter 4 is an application 
of RL to network formation. Results of the learning process are compared with ax­
iomatic results for perfectly rational players. A modified version of the model is then 
used to reproduce an experiment and to compare its behaviour with observed human 
behaviour. A very different model is presented in chapter 5. While the purpose of the 
first chapters is to apply and analyse learning in rather simple settings, the purpose 
of this chapter is to use it in a complex setting with many influencing variables. The 
requirements for adaptation in this application are very different from that discussed 
before: In the model, doctors decide about treatment patterns, quality and their own 
workload. Patients choose doctors based on their own experience and recommendations 
of other consumers. Several simulations using different learning and choice scenarios 
are compared.
The models have been implemented in their own software framework, providing
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the learning features used in the thesis. Appendix A describes the architecture and 
implementation of the software.
This work contributes in several ways to the ACE literature:
-  It adds a novel algorithm for representing learning in artificial agents. This ap­
proach has been published in Schuster (2012).
-  It applies RL to statistical discrimination games. It belongs thus to the few 
dynamic models in this area, and is to the knowledge of the author the first using 
an RL approach.
-  It applies RL to strategic network formation games. So far, adaptation in the 
strategic network formation literature has received almost no attention. Here, 
adaptation is applied for the first time to the well-known connections model of 
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
-  It provides one of the first applications of ACE in the field of health care system 
modelling. So far, only few agent-based models in this area have been proposed, 
and in fact, there has been no ACE model of primary care.
Chapter 2
A Computational Framework for 
M odelling Learning
2.1 In troduction
The perfectly informed and rational homo oeconomicus has often been criticised as 
too unrealistic - humans would not have the computational power to calculate the 
best decisions, taking into account all information and all possible outcomes. Already 
Simon (Simon 1956b) argued to use simpler, psychologically more plausible algorithms. 
While the argument of bounded rationality is frequently used as critique of the standard 
economic model, the argument remains, however, vague (Simon 2000) - meaning usually 
everything that is not classical economics, ranging, for example, from systematic errors 
people make in judgements to the research on decision heuristics as an alternative form 
of decision making.
Common to all critiques of perfect rationality is that humans are not capable of doing 
the computations required by a homo oeconomicus, but are bound to commit errors 
and misjudgements. As some psychologists (e.g. Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Lopes 
1994) point out, most alternative models are still based on the fundamental assumption 
that expected utility and Bayesian reasoning are the basis for all human decision making
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under uncertainty. For example, subjective expected utility theory acknowledged that 
individuals are not fully informed, and replaced objective probabilities with subjective; 
however, the basis for reasoning remained the same.
In the sociological and psychological literature, a vast amount of evidence has been 
collected to show experimentally how this classical model can fail. Formalisation, how­
ever, is rare. An example is Prospect Theory (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979). The 
main argument of Prospect Theory is that people value future losses more highly than 
potential gains. Prospect theory proposes an ô-shaped value function that is concave 
for gains, and convex for losses. That is, individuals become risk avoiding the higher 
the potential losses, and risk seeking the greater the potential gains. Another aspect of 
the value function has been characterised by loss aversion, which is usually represented 
by a steeper slope of the curve in the loss area. These aspects have been used to explain 
apparently irrational, as well as loss avoiding behaviour in many psychological exper­
iments. Psychologists have also emphasised that humans process information not as 
the Bayesian paradigm postulates, but rather crudely by using decision heuristics and 
cues from their environment. In the field of cognitive psychology bounded rationality 
became almost exclusively associated with this perspective in cognitive psychology. The 
behavioural aspect of bounded rationality (like learning by doing) has been neglected 
or not seen as a subject for this discipline (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996).
In the economic literature, the most common way of modelling bounded rationality 
is to postulate deviations from perfect rationality - for example, by introducing an error 
term or some random noise (Auman 1997). With RL approaches a more behavioural di­
mension has become available in (behavioural) game theory. In pure stimulus-response 
models, agents learn by trial and error without any explicit knowledge representation 
(e.g Roth and Erev 1995). Some authors combine experience learning with foresight 
in mixed models as in fictitious play (Camerer and Ho 1999). Some ACE models are 
based on similar concepts (see Brenner (2006) for an overview); especially classifier 
systems have received interest to represent a simple form of rule learning (e.g. Kirman 
and Vriend 2001a; LeBaron et al 1999).
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Another angle of decision making can be seen in cognitive architectures. Archi­
tectures such as ACT-R (e.g. Anderson 1993) and Soar (e.g. Lehman et al 2003) try 
to simulate human decision-making as a computer program. Most of them focus on 
the working of the mind when solving, say, mathematical problems and model in detail 
what processing steps are involved in solving such problems. More recently, Sun showed 
how his cognitive architecture CLARION (Sun and Slusarz 2005) can be connected with 
social simulation. In this approach, the environment of an organism can, in contrast to 
the classical architectures, be represented in an agent’s mind (Sun and Naveh 2007).
In this chapter, a computational model of bounded rationality is developed that 
addresses the tension between simplifying representations as pure stimulus-response 
learning on the one end of the spectrum, and often complex higher levels of cognition 
on the other end. It is most closely related to mixed models and classifier systems, and 
has analogies with Sun’s application of CLARION. However, there is no distinct social 
or economic approach to individual learning. The algorithm described in this paper 
attempts to fill this gap.
In the remainder of the chapter, the related literature is reviewed in some detail. 
Then, a simple conceptual framework based on Simon’s concept of bounded rationality 
(Simon 1956b) is described, before outlining concept and algorithm in more detail. 
The algorithm is then related to the existing approaches in the literature. A simple 
simulation illustrates how the algorithm works. The conclusion also outlines how the 
framework is related to the learning problems in the applications in chapters 3 to 5.
2.2 E xperience-based  Learning
Humans learn through a variety of sources, such as own experience, observation, imi­
tation or cognition. According to Brenner (2006), learning in Economic models can be 
distinguished according to the degree of consciousness in decisions. On the one end of 
the spectrum, humans learn in a very simple way by reacting to stimuli. This type of 
learning happens automatically on an unconscious level; in routine situations, humans
Chapter 2. A Computational Framework for Modelling Learning 10
are often incapable of explaining why they are doing things in a certain way. On the 
other end, learning happens in a conscious way by reflecting, e.g. about own experiences 
or about observations. Actions resulting from such deliberation originate from the men­
tal model humans have about the world, and is disconnected from immediate stimuli. 
In between, there are several modes of learning, which can be characterised as routine 
learning. They have in common that they usually use some kind of experience. Bren­
ner subsumes many kinds of learning under experience-based learning: Reinforcement 
learning, learning by imitation, satisficing (searching for satisfactory problem solutions) 
or collecting and analysing experience. Fictitious play, a common learning technique in 
game theory, is the typical example for the latter. In fictitious play, players remember 
their payoffs and strategies and compare them with payoffs and strategies of other play­
ers in the game. Using this information, they compute what they would have earned 
if they played the other strategies. If the other strategies fare better, the player can 
then switch his behaviour. While experience is necessary to learn in fictitious play, it 
requires also a cognitive component, namely the reflection upon other players’ actions. 
Pure belief-based approaches do not use the feedback coming from own activities. A 
typical example is Bayesian learning, which updates beliefs about future states an agent 
will be in. Cognitive architectures from Psychology can be seen as a similar example. 
These approaches aim to model mental processes in the brain, and as such are typically 
independent of concrete experience.
The aim of this chapter is to develop an algorithm that can be applied to a wide 
range of ACE modelling problems. Thus, approaches that do not require prior knowl­
edge about the domain are the most relevant. Experience-based learning methods are 
a natural candidate for this, since they acquire knowledge incrementally and base deci­
sions on that knowledge. The literature reviewed here looks therefore mainly at experi­
ence learning, in particular reinforcement learning, but not pure belief-based learning. 
Furthermore, throughout the thesis, RL will be used as a synonym for any experience- 
based learning method that is based on RL.
In RL, agents learn to choose actions that were successful in the past more often,
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while they avoid actions that led to unsatisfactory outcomes. This is referred to as the 
‘Law of effect’. A basic learning model was first formalised by Bush and Mosteller (BM) 
(Bush and Mosteller 1955). According to BM, the choice probabilities p of an action at 
a given time can be computed according to
Qp = p + a ( l - p ) - b p  (2.1)
where a , 0 <  a <  1 describes rewards, and b,0 < b < 1 punishments. Q is a mathe­
matical operator that describes the new quantity of p after the reward is applied. It is 
a short form to describe the stepwise update of reinforcements. Most learning models 
generalise the BM idea to a time-discounted version. The main components typically 
are:
-  An action set A  from which an action a is chosen, and payoffs n associated with 
them;
-  An action strength function that updates the experience over time. The typical 
function is introduced in Roth and Erev (1995):
qk(t +  1) =  qk(t) +  7r(t) (2.2)
which updates the strength q of the fc-th action with the current payoff (Roth and 
Erev 1995).
-  A selection function that selects successful actions based on the qk. This selection 
function is usually based on Luce’s choice theorem (Luce 1959):
Pk =  yT— (2.3)
This function computes the choice probability of action k relative to its strength
qk-
Thus, BM-type models accumulate experience. There exist several problems with 
this simple type of learning. For example, after long periods of playing a single action,
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the learner will react to a change in payoffs extremely slowly, and hence possibly play 
inferior actions. On the other hand, if the learner reacts reasonably fast, it might be 
that it never locks in into optimal choices. Several RL models have addressed these 
problems differently. They can roughly be characterised as follows:
-  Cumulative RL without aspirations (Roth and Erev 1995; Erev and Roth 1998; 
Laslier et al 2001; Laslier and Walliser 2005; Beggs 2005; Rustichini 1999; Camerer 
and Ho 1999), which are all based on the original BM model described above. 
Many analytical approaches use the simple version in combination with simple 
decision problems where adjustment to changing environments does not play a 
role; the problem does not exist in this case. Other models, mainly of are more 
empirical nature, vary the base model by adding forgetting and experimentation 
parameters (Erev and Roth 1998) or simple beliefs (Camerer and Ho 1999) to 
counterbalance the effect of excessive cumulation.
-  Averaging mechanisms (Karandikar et al 1998; Mookherjee and Sopher 1994; 1997; 
Sarin and Vahid 2001; Gilboa and Schmeidler 1996). In principle, average rein­
forcements can be interpreted as a form of belief learning, namely as an expected 
future reward. The advantage is that agents can adjust reasonably fast to changes 
in the environment.
-  Aspiration level models with cumulative RL (e.g Boergers and Sarin 2000) or 
averaging mechanisms (e.g. Karandikar et al 1998; Bendor et al 2001b; Napel 
2003; Gotts et al 2007); see also Bendor et al (2001a) for an overview. In models 
of this type, action strengths are updated with respect to the difference to an 
exogenously set or endogenously evolving aspiration level. If the payoff is below 
this level, the reward is subtracted, otherwise added. Some models base the 
calculation of action probabilities on the distance from the actual payoff to the 
aspiration level. The probability distributions that determine action selection can 
be skewed to choose an action with a probability close to 1 if the reward is above, 
or close to 0 if the reward is below the aspiration level. When payoffs decrease,
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agents tend to play strategies proportional to their expected payoffs, thereby 
achieving a similar exploration effect once their environment changes and payoffs 
decrease. The advantage of this approach is that lock-in into optimal choices 
is supported, at the same time not being deterministic if payoffs fall below the 
aspiration level.
2.2.1 Experim ental Gam es U sing Sim ple RL M odels
One main motivation of many models has been the search for learning rules that predict 
experimental data better than the standard equilibrium prediction under full informa­
tion (e.g. Roth and Erev 1995; Erev and Roth 1998; Mookherjee and Sopher 1994; 1997; 
Chen and Tang 1998).
In their seminal work, Erev and Roth (Roth and Erev 1995) consider three variants 
of the base model (equations (2.2) and (2.3)); later referred to as ER models). The 
first uses cutoff parameters for high and low selection probabilities: Actions above the 
upper cutoff are played with probability 1, below the lower with probability 0. In 
the second model, a parameter e sets the probability with which a random action is 
chosen. This allows for persistent experimentation. The third variant includes a recency 
parameter <f>,0 < <f> < 1, which weights the importance of past payoffs whenever the 
action strengths are updated: g&(f +  1) =  qk{t)(f> +  7r(t). These models are applied 
to a large number of games, as the main motivation for RL here is to find a learning 
model that predicts well over as many classes of games as possible. Erev and Roth use 
ultimatum games, bargaining (market) games, and simplified best-shot games. Except 
for ultimatum games, they find that all three RL models predict actual behaviour well, 
which also happens to converge to equilibrium predictions. In the ultimatum games 
however, subgame perfect equilibrium (where the first mover demands the greatest 
possible share for himself) is not reached. Predicted as well as actual behaviour did not 
converge to equilibrium. Moreover, experimental data showed differences in medium- 
and long-term outcomes. The RL model could replicate such switches.
Later, in Erev and Roth (1998), they apply simple RL to a wider collection of ex­
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perimental data based on mixed-strategy games; this makes convergence more difficult, 
since no player has an incentive to stick to a pure strategy. Additional to the simple 
model, they allow for alternatives with more sophisticated learning. Three models are 
compared: Model (1) is simple RL as in equations (2.2) and (2.3). Model (2) combines 
forgetting and generalisation, i.e. qk(t+l) = ( l —(j))qk(t)+Ek(j, 7 r ( t ) ) ,  where E  is a func­
tion determining how playing strategy k affects similar strategies j .  In the considered 
2-player games, they set E k(j, 7r(t)) =  7r(l — e ) i i j  = k and Ek(j: 7r(t)) =  7r(t)e/(M — 1) 
(where M  is the number of pure strategies) otherwise. That is, depending on e, players 
generalise rewards in a way that leads to experimentation among similar strategies. In 
model (3) some simple beliefs are integrated in the form of limited (only own payoffs 
are known) and full information (also opponents’ payoffs are known) fictitious play. 
In the first case, the update function is augmented by an expected payoff parameter, 
in the latter the action probability is determined considering the value of alternative 
strategies. After fitting the data, they find that adding more knowledge in the form of 
beliefs and expectations does not add to the predictive power of RL. Usually, the sim­
plest models predict behaviour accurately. Adding adaptation parameters like recency 
and experimentation improves the fit of simple RL, but fictitious play does not.
Sarin and Vahid (1999) describe the Payoff Assessment learning model (PA), which 
uses average payoffs instead of cumulative payoffs, and chooses deterministically the 
action with the highest expected payoff. Applying it in Sarin and Vahid (2001) to the 
same data as Erev and Roth did in Erev and Roth (1998), they find that this model 
predicts the data at least as well as simple RL.
Mookherjee and Sopher (Mookherjee and Sopher 1994; 1997) conducted experiments 
with constant sum games. In their early experiment only two choices were available. 
Players learnt to play their minimax strategies. In Mookherjee and Sopher (1997) 
they find that experimental results deviate considerably from equilibrium predictions 
in games with at least four strategies. Instead of cumulative payoffs, here qk is some
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average measure of action k. Furthermore, they use the exponential selection function
gAtffc
pk(t +  1) =  ^  eXqj (2.4)
(where À is a choice parameter). After comparing also belief-based learning rules, they 
further conclude that the RL predictions match the reality closest. Using different 
averaging mechanisms, their data suggest that players’ memory is rather short, and 
that they form expectations about future payoffs.
Chen and Tang (1998) use a cumulative reinforcement function as in equation 2.2 
with an exponential selection rule as in equation 2.4. Applying it to public good provi­
sion games, they compare its performance in predicting experimental data with fictitious 
play as well as the equilibrium prediction. They find that the empirical results deviate 
from the equilibrium prediction, which predicts the data worst. The RL mechanism fits 
data better than fictitious play.
Arthur (1993) proposes a model similar to the ER type of models. The action 
strengths q are updated according to equation 2.2. Actions are chosen according to 
2.3. However, the sum of probabilities in the denominator is normalised to a pre-chosen 
constant C. Let et be the random unit vector defined as
II, x is played at t  0, x is not played at t,
. The cumulative update function in equation 2.2 can be written as
qk(t +  1) =  qk{t) +  Tr{t)et (2.5)
Then, let the cumulative payoff until time t h e v t = Yls<t Let Ap(t) =  p(t + l) — 
p(t) denote the incremental change in the probability vector e at time t. Because of 
equations 2.5 and 2.3 one can write Ap(£) =  (7rt/vt)(et —p(t)), that is the incremental 
impact of new experience diminishes over time at a rate of the order of 1/t. Arthur 
proposed a model of the form Ap(t) = [7r(t)/(CtL' +  n(t))][etp(t)]. In that model, the
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incremental impact of the current payoffs on the action probabilities decreases over 
time at a rate of the power of t, which is estimated from data. This is another way of 
solving the problem of just accumulating experience over time without possibilities to 
revise choices. Arthur fits the model to single person multi-armed bandit experimental 
data and finds no systematic differences between simulated and human learning (from 
Young (1993),pp. 11-13).
2.2.2 Experim ental Games U sing Combined B elief and RL 
m odels
Camerer and Ho (1999) argue that there are two fundamental types of learning, experience- 
and belief-based learning. They propose a more complex approach to experience learn­
ing by combining fictitious play with RL. Their experienced-weighted attraction model 
(EWA), is described by two central equations:
N(t) = p * N ( t - l )  + l  (2.6)
and
<f>N(t — l)A{(t — 1) +  [Æ +  (1 — ô)I(s3i ,s i(t))\7r(s3i , s j(t)) ( -x
JV(Z) l  /
N(t) denotes the experience weight, and Al (t) the attraction of strategy j  for indi­
vidual i. Si(t) is z’s strategy at time £, and s j  are the strategies of all other players. 
The function I  (si, s*(t)) is an indicator function and equals 1 if sj = Si(t), and 0 other­
wise. The payoff tt is obtained by player i if he chooses sj, given the behaviour of the 
other players s j ( t ) .  p, (j), and 6 are the parameters of the model. The initial values of 
N(t)  and Aj (t) are priors and may be initialised with some experience level the players 
already have.
For A'(O) =  1 and p = 6 = 0, the model reduces to pure cumulative reinforcement 
learning. For 5 > 0, experience collection is expanded to actions not played by observing 
the other players in the game. ïî  p = (f) and 5 =  1, the model reduces to weighted
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fictitious play; for other parameters, the learning represents a mix of RL and fictitious 
play.
The action selection function has an exponential form and is given by
Pi (^  +  !) =  (2-8)
Z -v /c= l
where the choice parameter À determines how strongly differences in the attractions 
translate into choice probabilities, and m; is the number of possible actions player i 
can use. If À is very large, small differences result in a high probability relative to the 
smaller attractions. If A is small, differences are ignored until the distance becomes 
reasonably large.
Camerer and Ho test this model with data from constant-sum games, among them 
the games from Mookherjee and Sopher (1997), and compare EWA with random, simple 
RL and belief-based outcomes. The results show that belief-based learning predicts 
better than EWA in the simpler 4-strategies games, but worse in more complex 6- 
strategy games. Contrary to Mookherjee and Sopher (1997), they find that belief-based 
learning converges better than RL learning, which they attribute to differences in the 
model. For example, Mookherjee and Sopher allowed similar strategies to influence 
each other, and they used average instead of cumulative reinforcements; both factors 
favour their RL rule, while in EWA, these aspects are reflected in the belief component.
EWA has been criticised as being too complex and requiring overly many parameters. 
Therefore, Camerer and Ho developed in Camerer et al (2007) a simplified version of 
EWA, ‘self-tuning EWA’, by fixing most of the parameters and only estimating (f) and 
6 with dynamic functions. If a player detects a change in opponents’ play, <f) is adjusted 
to allowing more experimentation, and vice versa (becoming pure RL in stationary 
environments). The attention function sets J to 1 if the foregone payoffs are higher 
than the actual received payoff, so that alternative strategies are reinforced, and the 
agent eventually may switch to one of the superior actions. If there is no better choice 
available, 6 is set to 0, thereby supporting an RL-like lock-in into the best response 
strategy. Comparing the predictive power of full and simple EWA, they find that self­
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tuning EWA is not as good as the original approach, but produces very similar results. 
This applies especially if parameters are estimated for the same class of games. Self- 
tuning EWA predicts better if parameters are estimated jointly for different games.
Chen and Khoroshilov (2003) compare different learning models - EWA, the PA 
model and simple ER learning - in coordination and cost-sharing games with two play­
ers. They find that PA fits best to the data, followed by EWA and RL. When estimating 
parameters over different games (pooling) PA does best. An exception is cost-sharing 
games with an average-cost distribution among players. Under this mechanism, the cost 
is distributed evenly, and thus experimentation in one agent triggers experimentation 
in the other players. None of the models converged to the observed data.
Stahl (2000) develops a model in which players learn to choose among different 
strategies following simple decision rules. Players know the strategies played by their 
opponents. Analogously to other learning models, rules in the rule space that were 
successful in the past are more likely to be selected. The rule space can be thought of 
as composed of basic, or ‘archetypical’, rules, from which more complex behaviour can 
be constructed. The evidence of every rule is assessed, and the probability of choosing 
that rule is derived using an exponential selection rule. This evidence is, e.g., the 
expected payoff given the opponent’s strategy in t-1. Based on such reasoning, Stahl 
defines five strategies (e.g. strictly dominated vs. Nash equilibrium strategies) which 
are first tested in experiments, and then fitted to the data. He finds that the model 
fits the data better than the equilibrium prediction and random outcomes. The model 
uses nine parameters, which is found to be the required minimum to fit the data well. 
Furthermore, evidence from the experiments suggests that real humans do not gather 
evidence about all rules as proposed by the model, but rather focus on subsets.
2.2.3 A nalytical Approaches w ith  Sim ple RL M odels
Many authors have analysed the properties of learning rules, and try to establish condi­
tions under which the actions of players converge to the optimal action (in single-player 
decision problems) or equilibrium (in games). Typically, the proofs for convergence rely
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on stochastic approximation theory. Early work mostly established results for limited 
classes of games or simple one-player decisions. Only more recent articles (e.g. Beggs 
2005; Hopkins and Bosch 2005; Gotts et al 2007) could state more general results for 
the boundary behaviour for the process, and larger classes of games.
E R  m odels Some authors have analysed the ER learning rule (Rustichini 1999; 
Laslier and Walliser 2005; Beggs 2005; Rustichini 1999; Hopkins and Bosch 2005) in 
single decision and game contexts.
Rustichini (1999) considers optimal properties of selection rules under full and par­
tial information in a single player context. Under full information the player knows 
opponents’ strategies, under partial information only its own actions. He finds that 
with a linear rule (as in equation (2.3)), convergence to the optimal choice is guar­
anteed. It is not with the exponential rule, which weights differences between payoffs 
higher and thus might speed learning up. Moreover, exponential procedures (as in equa­
tion (2.4)) are best in the full information case, but not for partial information: Linear 
learning is too slow in full information environments, so the process is more likely to 
lock into sub-optimal interior points of the strategy space, rather than the optimum.
According to Laslier et al (2001) the cumulative RL problem can be seen as an urn 
model, from which balls are selected with unequal probability over the repetitions of 
the game. Describing this process with ordinary differential equations (ODE), they first 
analyse the resulting stochastic process for single player situations and show that the 
process converges to choosing only payoff maximising actions. For 2x2 games they state 
that the ER rule converges with positive probability to a Nash equilibrium. If the game 
has two pure equilibria, the process converges with positive probability to any one of 
them, but not to a mixed equilibrium. However, they cannot prove that the process 
converges with probability 1.
Building on stochastic approximation theory, Beggs (2005) considers 2x2 constant- 
sum games with unique pure or mixed equilibria and generalises Laslier et al (2001). 
Blayers using RL cannot be forced permanently below their minimax payoff, indepen­
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dent of their opponent’s strategy. Similarly, dominated strategies are always eliminated 
over the course of time. If both players play RL, the probability that both players 
converge to the unique equilibrium, tends towards 1.
Hopkins and Posch (2005) provide more general results about the relationship of the 
RL processes with the well-analysed replicator dynamics approach from evolutionary 
game theory (Smith 1982). They find that Arthur’s model (Arthur 1993) as well as 
ER-type models converge only to boundary points which are a Nash equilibrium. This 
is easier to show for the Arthur model because the action strength updates (step sizes) 
are of the same size, while the reinforcements in ER can change at different rates. They 
show that RL will not converge to boundary points that are linearly unstable under the 
replicator dynamics.
A veraging m odels In PA, a decision maker faces for a number of times an identical 
decision problem. The players assess expected payoffs myopically by estimating the 
expected payoff using average returns per actions. They choose the action with the 
expected maximum payoff (i.e. choice is deterministic). Sarin and Vahid (1999) show 
that this model converges to choosing the objective maximin strategy if learning is slow. 
If players are more likely to experiment, players converge to the strategy yielding the 
maximum possible payoff.
A sp ira tion  level m odels The reinforcement problem in aspiration level models has 
been also been studied by several authors, and has been surveyed in-depth by Bendor 
et al (2001a). Here, some representatives of this approach are described.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) present a case-based reasoning (GBR) approach. The 
decision maker faces a number of different situations or ‘states’, and must make a choice 
in such situations. In dynamic environments, aspiration level (AL) updating rules have 
to be ambitious enough to search for the best result in various situations. In more 
static environments, it must be realistic, i.e. close to actual payoffs. Both properties 
must be combined, as a way to search ambitiously for a best strategy, and then to
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stick to this choice after the expected values of the strategies can be estimated. They 
show that under these conditions, a case-based decision-maker can learn to become an 
expected-utility maximiser.
Extending their work on RL with fixed AL, Boergers and Sarin (1997) develop a 
model with endogenous aspirations and cumulative rewards. In Boergers and Sarin 
(2000), a single player chooses between two strategies. They show that the process can 
converge to the optimal choice. Endogenous aspiration levels improve performance by 
avoiding high dissatisfaction with even the best available strategies, but can lead to 
probability matching. During probability matching, both strategies are played at the 
same probability at which they generate benefits, whereas optimal strategies should be 
played with probabilities close to 1 for behaviour to be considered ‘rational’. This can 
happen when the initial aspiration levels are too high, so that also dynamic adaptation 
of the aspiration level cannot lead to a lock-in.
While Boergers and Sarin and Gilboa and Schmeidler establish results for single 
player decision problems, other authors extend the results to games. Karandikar et al 
(1998) first analysed a prisoner’s dilemma. The aspiration levels of both players are 
updated simultaneously with the received reward, and approximate long-run averages. 
The main result is that cooperation is sustained if there are no trembles (i.e., externally 
imposed changes or noise on the AL’s) to the AL’s and the speed of updating the AL’s 
is low. Introducing perturbations into the AL changes the process, and may lead to 
different equilibria. However, in the long run, the process returns to the cooperation 
path. The intuition behind these results is that the mutual dissatisfaction with non- 
cooperative payoffs triggers experimentation until some state is achieved that yields 
high enough satisfaction (the point where AL and current payoff converge).
Karandikar et al (1998) is modified and extended to arbitrary games and a larger 
class of learning rules in Bendor et al (2001b). Similarly, Nap el (2003) applies the 
model to an ultimatum game and shows that in the long run players almost surely 
achieve the equilibrium state. Which equilibrium depends on the initial conditions and
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the stability of aspirations, which are allowed to vary randomly. If such trembles are 
rare and learning is slow, the available surplus will be shared efficiently. If there are 
perturbations in the aspiration level, any equilibrium is supported.
Gotts et al (2007) look at the behaviour of the BM rule with aspirations in a pris­
oner’s dilemma, generalising earlier insights of Flache and Macy (2002). They show 
that the system has two attractors - either a mixed strategy equilibrium (a so-called 
self-correcting equilibrium SCE) or both players cooperate with probability 1. If learn­
ing is slow, the system converges in the long run to cooperation. In the medium run 
however, the process moves towards the SCE. RL thus can exhibit very different results 
depending on the length of the period considered.
2.2.4 Cognitive Approaches
This section reviews two approaches of a more cognitive nature stemming from Artifical 
Intelligence (Al). Still being based on own experience, they provide mechanisms to make 
the agent aware of different conditions in the environment.
C LA R IO N  The cognitive architecture CLARION (e.g. Sun and Slusarz 2005) was 
designed to capture implicit and explicit learning processes in humans. The main as­
sumption is that there are two different levels of learning: A subsymbolic ‘bottom’ 
level and a symbolic ‘top’ level. The ‘bottom’ level represents low-skill, often repeti­
tive tasks for which learning proceeds in a trial-and-error fashion. Knowledge on this 
level is typically not accessible, and it is difficult to express such skills with language. 
On the symbolic level, knowledge is directly accessible and can be expressed with lan­
guage. This level typically represents more complex knowledge. It can be acquired by 
experience, but also by explicit teaching.
The input state is made up of a number of dimensions, and each dimension may 
specify a number of possible value or value ranges. Action selection takes place using 
RL in the bottom level, or by firing production rules on the top level. Which level 
is used is determined stochastically. After the action was performed, top and bottom
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levels are updated with the feedback received from the environment.
At the bottom level, the RL mechanism is implemented with a neural net. The input 
layer is constituted of the values of the input state. Three intermediate layers are used 
to compute Q-values (allowing memory of action sequences), while the fourth layer 
chooses an action according to standard reinforcement learning (similar to equation 
(2.10)).
At the top level, the rule conditions are constructed out of the input dimensions, 
their consequents from actions available to the agent. The rules are, for compliance 
with the bottom level, implemented as network. Rule extraction, specialisation and 
generalisation are determined by feedback from the subsymbolic level: If there is no rule 
matching the current state and the action performed well according to some performance 
criterion, a new rule is created with the current state as the condition, and the performed 
bottom level action as consequent. If rules matching the current condition exist and 
the action was successful, the matching rules are replaced by a generalised version by 
adding another input element to the condition. The covered rules are deactivated, but 
might become reactivated if specialisation is applied to the new rule at a later stage. 
Conversely, specialisation means the removal of an input value from the condition and 
is triggered when the result of an action was not successful in the specified condition. 
Deactivated rules are reactivated if the specialised rule does not cover them any more. 
An information gain measure that estimates the performance of rules under different 
conditions serves as the success criterion.
This model is applied in Sun and Naveh (2007) to a ‘stone-age economics’ simulation 
in which agents belonging to a group collect and contribute food. An agent might cheat 
and not contribute, which is punished with some probability. They show that their 
adaptive agents are able to reproduce results of the same model with more deterministic 
strategies investigated before (Cecconi and Parisi 1998). They also investigate the 
properties of the emerged survival strategies. For example, it turns out that relying 
more strongly on the top level enhances performance, and that higher probabilities of
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rule generalisation are beneficial only when less importance rests with the bottom layer.
L earn ing  Classifier System s Learning Classifier Systems (LCS) also aim at the 
extraction of rules. The basic idea is to start with a set of initial rules (classifiers) and 
to evolve this set over time by application of mechanisms for modification, deletion and 
addition of new rules. Whereas earlier LCS, as introduced by Holland (1975), relied 
mostly on the Genetic Algorithms paradigm, newer versions have more in common with 
RL approaches and so have also been described as generalised RL (Sigaud and Wilson 
2007).
An LCS consists of a population of classifiers. A classifier contains a condition part, 
an action part, and an estimation of the expected reward. Typically, the condition part 
consists of the three basic tests 0 (property does not exist), 1 (property exists) and # . 
#  represents a generalisation and stands for both 0 or 1. A classifier has one action as 
a consequent, but typically several classifiers match a condition in the environment and 
hence compete with each other. The action to be executed is then selected according to 
some RL mechanism (e.g., the e-greedy policy, which selects the best-performing action 
at a rate of e, 0 < e < 1 tries a random action).
Many LCS use a Genetic Algorithm to create new rules by selecting and recombining 
the fittest classifiers from the population (where fitness is, e.g., the expected reward 
received from the environment). A covering operator is called whenever the set of 
matching classifiers is empty. The operator adds a classifier matching the current 
situation with a randomly chosen action to the population. Sophisticated systems may 
limit the population size, and add corresponding eviction and generalisation procedures.
Newer families of classifier systems, like anticipation-based classifier systems (ACS, 
Butz (e.g 2002)), do not rely on evolutionary methods. They extend the classifier rep­
resentation with the description of the next state and build a model of transitions. A 
specialisation mechanism is applied when the classifier oscillates between correct and 
incorrect predictions, indicating that a splitting of the condition might improve the 
match. Generalisation is based on complex algorithms that estimate whether generali­
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sation will result in an improvement (see also Sigaud and Wilson (2007) for an overview 
of LCS).
Applications in Economics have usually used Holland-type classifiers. Markets of 
different kinds have been modelled using LCS, for example, the market for electricity 
(Bagnail and Smith 2005), for fish (Kirman and Vriend 2001b), or stock markets (e.g. 
LeBaron et al 1999).
In Bagnall and Smith (2005), the UK electricity market is modelled. In the model, 
there are a number of electricity generating agents. Each agent must produce an offer 
bid per day for the amount of electricity it wants to produce. The strategies are de­
termined by three factors - capacity constraints, demand and capacity premiums (for 
particular time slots in a trading period). By this, a 10-bit vector of states, denot­
ing different demand, constraint and premium situations is constructed. The model is 
used to model various scenarios. For example, they reproduce actual, observed bidding 
behaviour.
Kirman and Vriend (2001b)’s model represents a wholesale fish market, in which 
buyers and sellers are matched. Buyers resell the fish, and their payoff is given by the 
difference of the prices they pay and a fixed price they receive. Analogously, sellers’ 
profit is determined by the difference of their costs and the selling price. Classifiers are 
used for several decisions, such as deciding stock levels, or buying and selling prices. 
Furthermore, buyers may become loyal by choosing to return to a seller; sellers remem­
ber their customers and may reward loyalty by lowering their ask price. It turns out 
that loyalty develops as buyers and sellers realise simultaneously the benefits: Return­
ing customers allow better planning of a seller’s stock and continuous profit flow, for 
which lower prices are accepted; because of these, customers learn to return.
The stock market model of LeBaron et al (1999) aims to reproduce actual stock 
market behaviour in an artificial stock market. In the market, there are trader agents 
whose task is to make forecasts about the future price of assets. The expected price is 
used in their demand functions, which then determines the amount of assets to purchase.
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The agents base their forecasts on hypotheses or candidate rules, of which a single agent 
maintains 100. These rules map conditions of the environment into forecasts. The state 
vector is 12 bits long. The conditions are given by dividend/price ratios and comparisons 
between current price and average prices, which describe the value of an asset given the 
market conditions. LeBaron et al (1999) are able to reproduce features of price time 
series taken from real markets.
Summarising, LCS are a way to represent learning where the environment is dy­
namic and unclear which possible rules are best for the agent’s performance. They 
are, in principle, a directed search among candidate rules: Starting from a large set 
of possible rules, those are selected that perform best in the environment the agent is 
in. Weaknesses of LCS have been handled in the newer approaches - for example, by 
modelling state transitions. However, the mechanisms when to apply generalisation and 
specialisation are complex. In this sense, LCS can become relatively ’heavy’ models of 
mental processes. It has been suggested that using simpler RL methods is sometimes 
easier and better tractable (e.g. Holland et al 2000).
2.3 C oncept
As the literature overview in the previous section showed, there is substantial litera­
ture, mainly in the area of simple games. Fewer authors attempted to develop cognitive 
strategic models. Each approach has its limitations with respect so ACE modelling. 
Thus, a cognitive architecture covers psychological details social scientists are often not 
interested in. LCS are a rather technical approach to learning. For some domains and 
problems, the representation system might not be adequate (Schuurmans and Schaef­
fer 1989). In particular, the representation of knowledge as bit strings may introduce 
problems. For example, it is difficult to represent more abstract knowledge like rela­
tional operators such as greater, smaller etc. To cover large value spaces, it would be 
necessary to represent each single value as bit in the string. Thus, representing fish 
prices from 0 to 1000 in Kirman and Vriend (2001b) would become difficult, or at least
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require implicit knowledge about the domain to set up the classifiers adequately.
The main contribution of the computational approach presented here is the formula­
tion of a learning model that covers simple as well as more cognitive modes of learning. 
From a theoretical point of view, it should be a mixed model. As a computer model,
it should be valid in the sense of reflecting simple, but realistic decision making, and
simple in the sense that it focuses only on decision mechanisms in social and economic 
contexts. It should therefore be more specific as a cognitive architecture, and have more 
natural and broader representation features as LCS.
A simple framework covering these goals is readily available since the early contribu­
tions to bounded rationality (Simon 1956a;b) and actually has not changed substantially 
since then. This framework is based on the following components:
-  The set of behaviour alternatives A
-  The set of choice alternatives A' for bounded rational or computationally less 
powerful individuals; this set may be only a subset of A.
-  Possible future states S
-  Payoffs connected with S, represented as a function of 5, V(s).
-  Probabilities for S. There is uncertainty which state occurs after a particular 
behaviour, i.e. there may be more than one.
Bounded rational individuals do not typically know the mapping from behaviour alter­
natives A  to future welfare V(s). A possible strategy to learn about the occurrence and 
the desirability of these future states is according to Simon: Start with a mapping of 
each action alternative a e A  to the whole set of S. Using a utility function such as 
V(s) G {—1,0, +1}, find S' C  S  such that (expected) V(s) =  1. Then gather informa­
tion to refine the mapping A —> S' (i.e., which actions lead to which result under certain 
conditions) and search for feasible actions A' G A that map to S' (Simon 1956b). In
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other words, an agent’s goal is to find the states which satisfy its needs, by exploring 
the state-action space by applying alternative behaviours.
The translation of Simon’s framework into an executable algorithm can be captured 
best with the concept of mental models. A mental model is an internal representation 
of an external reality. The agent builds it using experience, its perception, and its 
problem-solving strategies. A mental model contains minimal information, is unstable 
and subject to change and used to take decisions in novel circumstances. A mental 
model must be ‘runnable’ and able to provide feedback on the results. Humans must 
be able to evaluate the results of actions or the consequences of a change of state 
(Markham 1999). It is assumed that an agent is only interested in its own welfare, 
and its goal is to find suitable behaviour strategies that optimise utility under different 
conditions. Information processing and memory are costly, so that the internal model 
being built has to be minimal and efficient with respect to the agent’s welfare. The 
main principles an algorithm has to account for can roughly be summarised as follows:
E valuating  cognitive cues In any state of the environment, the agent must be able 
to choose an action. If low or even negative rewards are experienced, the agent can 
attempt to apply a different action. If this fails to improve the agent’s welfare, this 
is a hint to pay attention to more cues from the environment and distinguish better 
between situations.
D eciding w h a t to  know Paying attention to all cues is computationally expensive 
and memory limited; humans must filter out certain aspects of their perception in 
order to decide and act effectively. The agent has to ‘decide what to know’ (Rubinstein 
1998). What information is useful depends on how it helps to improve the agent’s 
welfare. This can only be tested by using the accessible information while acting. Since 
the usefulness is unknown initially, the decision procedure can be seen as a search 
over all possible state-action mappings. If the agent is satisfied with a mental model 
containing a subset of these mappings, it might stop searching for a better model or 
decrease its search intensity. As a rule of thumb the agent follows the most promising
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direction. If a certain configuration of mappings increases welfare, it tries to improve 
this configuration, e.g. by specialising the contained information.
U p d a tin g  a  cognitive m odel If the environment changes, some aspects of the in­
ternal model might become obsolete. The agent will then experience a change in utility. 
In certain states, learning a new behaviour might be sufficient. However, it might also 
be that the representation of the state is not accurate anymore (e.g. a new type of 
agent appears). In this case, the representation has to be changed, e.g. by removing 
old representations and start the search process anew for certain parts of the model.
A similar idea has been used in Gifford (2005). In this model, agents have limited 
information about future outcomes of opportunities (e.g. stock returns), and have to 
decide whether to evaluate new, or to stick to old behaviours (e.g. buying a new 
stock). Attention is a scarce resource, so that evaluating alternatives becomes costly. 
It turns out that the higher this cost is, the more ‘irrational’ the behaviour; if cost 
is neglected, and agents can spend more effort on evaluating future expected states, 
behaviour approximates more rational decision-making.
2.4 T he A lgorithm
The basic idea of the ‘Bounded Rationality Algorithm’ (BRA) is to build an internal, 
flexible model of the environment the agent lives in. The environment is accessible by 
the input state s defining the current ‘situation’ the agent is in. The input state is 
matched with an internal symbolic representation Q  6 C = { C i . . .  Cn} of the state. 
The agent then chooses an action according to the general form n  : Q  -4- A. A  is the 
action set, C  is the set of all possible conditions that can be generated from the input 
dimensions, and Q  is a collection of conditions derived from C.
The next paragraphs develop the algorithm in detail.
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2.4.1 Reinforcem ent Learning
RL is used to implement the dynamic aspect of knowledge generation in the model. 
In each state agents learn by trial and error which action to apply in a given state. 
Successful actions are rewarded. Actions which yield a higher reward are selected with 
a high probability in the future, whereas bad actions, receiving a lower reward, are 
selected less often. The history of these reinforcements is summarised as action strength 
q. Whenever an action a has been applied, the strength is updated with the reward 
p(t) observed for that action by the following equation (Sutton and Barto 1998):
q(at) = +  7(pOO -  tffat-i)) (2.9)
This action-value function updates the strength of the current action based on the 
weight 7 of previous experiences and the current reward. It is a method to approximate 
the true value of q(a) out of a sample of values. The smaller 7 , the stronger the impact 
of past experiences; conversely, for 7 =  1 only the reward of the last action is considered, 
and all previous experiences discarded. Thus 7 determines the speed of updates.
In the next step, the action probability is calculated according to the selection 
function:
e q ( a i ) /a
P r K w )  =  ^  (2-10)
This exponential selection function determines each action’s selection probability de­
pending on its own strength relative to the strengths of the alternative actions. The 
parameter a  is a parameter that determines the rate of exploration. The influence 
of the action strength on the selection probability decreases as a  grows. For large a, 
the selection probabilities approach uniform values. Sutton and Barto (1998) report 
that for many problems, a  values of about 0.1 turned out to achieve a good balance 
between exploration and exploitation of learnt behaviour. For many problems, a  val­
ues approaching 1 translate into selection probabilities smaller than the original action 
strengths, so that too large values quickly stop being useful for the learner. Finally, as 
a  —> 00, each choice becomes equally likely.
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2.4.2 S tate Space Partitioning
Learning by doing as described above happens for a given state s. This section describes 
how states are represented and perceived in the agent’s internal world model.
R ep resen ta tio n  The state s is represented internally as a collection of attributes 
{ a t t i . . .  atti}. Each attribute can have a number of possible values, for example nominal 
values such as ‘low’ or ‘high’, or numerical ranges, e.g. 0-1000. Attributes are connected 
by simple predicate logic. For example the predicate ‘(profit=low or proht=medium 
or profit=high) and (sales 0 < sales < 1000)’ could describe the situation of a firm in 
the dimensions profit and sales. This representation is called a ‘state descriptor’, and 
formally denoted Q . To each state descriptor actions are bound from which the action 
policy for this state can be learnt. In the firm example, actions could be an array of 
price levels. This binding constitutes formally the mapping : Q  -4- A.
The agent starts with a model covering all possible states. This initial model con­
tains a root state description or a set of disjunct root state descriptions; each root 
descriptor contains all attributes with their value spaces relevant for this partition, 
thus the coarsest representation possible. In consecutive time steps, specialisations 
are developed stepwise by the application of a heuristic search method. For this, the 
space of state descriptions is represented as a tree, where nodes at higher levels contain 
coarser, and nodes at a deeper level of the tree finer mappings. Finer grained descrip­
tions are ‘expanded’ from the predicates at higher levels. Coarser grained descriptors 
can be generalised again if the more detailed descriptors do not perform better than the 
parent. Which descriptions are expanded depends on a heuristic evaluation function, 
which here is the agent’s utility. Each state descriptor has a value that describes this 
utility. The task of the search process is thus to find the level of detail that describes 
the environment in such a way that generates the highest welfare for the agent.
D ep th -first search princip le The path the expansion mechanism takes follows a 
depth-first search paradigm. If finer grained descriptions increase welfare this path is 
followed further, that is, the mechanism assumes that the most accurate state descrip­
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tions are best. Using a tree-search approach, this corresponds to a process in which a 
single node on level h is expanded to level / i+ l  according to some performance criterion, 
while the siblings on level h are not taken into account. The path this process takes 
is represented by the ‘search path’. Each node the process expands is added to this 
path, and removed when it is generalised. The search path is thus a list which contains 
all nodes of the tree that are relevant for the model specialisation and generalisation 
methods. These methods are described in the next paragraphs.
S ta te  expansion  m echanism  Before the internal model is updated, the agent acts 
in its environment over a period p. During this period, the value of existing state 
descriptions R  = {n  . . .  rn} is updated using feedback from the environment. After 
each p  steps, the state expansion mechanism is applied: First the node rexpand with the 
highest value on the search path is selected. If the search path is empty, a root node 
is selected. From there, the next level of the tree is expanded by partitioning the value 
spaces of the attributes constituting the conditions of rexpand. For attributes having 
discrete values, one value is picked randomly. Attribute values representing numeric 
ranges are split in half. For each partitioned attribute a new condition is created 
containing the partitioned attribute values or value range, and the remaining original 
attribute values (i.e. the number of successor nodes equals the number of attributes 
x 2 in the original condition). The conjunction of the predicates of the resulting level 
(after reduction) is equivalent to the expression of the parent node. By mapping A  
to each newly created condition set the new descriptors R' are generated. The path 
from each r' G R! up to the root node is set as search path (without duplicates). The 
conjunction of state descriptions with no children in the tree is then equivalent to the 
initial state description. The RL mechanism selects actions only from the matching 
leaf descriptors. There might be, depending on the paths that have been expanded, 
overlapping descriptors. In this case, for deciding which state is activated some conflict 
resolution has to be applied. This could be the selection of random node, or the node 
with the highest value. In the implementation used for the models of the thesis (see 
also appendix A.2.3), a random node is selected.
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Initial s tate {v} ---------
Descriptor
profit{Iow,medium,high 
sales{0...1000} ^
Action se t  
set-price-1 {s. p} 
set-price-2 {s, p } ^
Low profit {v}
Descnptor 
profit{low} 
sales{0 .1000}
Action set  
set-price-1 {s, p} 
set-price-2 {s, p}
Medium to high profit {v}
Descriptor
profit{medium,high}
sales{0...1000}
Action se t  
set-price-1 {s. p} 
set-price-2 {s, p}
Low turnover {v} —
Descriptor 
profit{low,medium,high 
sales{0...500}
Action set
set-price-1 {s. p} 
set-price-2 {s, pL
High turnover {v}
Descriptor 
profit{low,medium,high 
sales{500...1000}
Action s e t  
set-price-1 {s, p} 
set-price-2 {s, p> ^
Medium profit {v} : : 
Descriptor 
profit{medium} 
sales{0...1000}
Action se t  
set-price-1 {s. p} 
set-price-2 (s. p } ^
: High profit {v} :-------
Descriptor
profit{high}
sales{0...1000} J
Action se t  
set-price-1 {s, p} 
set-price-2 {s, p} I
Medium to high profit, 
low turnover M
Descriptor
profit{medium,high} :
sales{0...500} ^
Action se t  
set-price-1 {s. p} 
set-price-2 {s, p} ^
Medium to high profit, : 
high turnover {v}
Descriptor 
profit{medium,high} ? 
sales{500.„1000} \
Action s e t
||||eï-p riœ ^ '|si;||;| 
set-price-2 {s, p ^ J
Figure 2.1: The agent’s representation of the state space after partitioning all possible profit 
situations. Each state is described by a set of attributes and an action set. Actions executed in 
this state are updated with strengths s and selected with probabilities p, which are determined 
by rewards. The rewards also determine the state value v.
For example, going back to the firm example above, of the initial, exhaustive descrip­
tion C'initial =  (profit=low or profit=medium or profit=high) and (0 < sales <  1000) 
the attribute profit is selected, and of its value range the value ‘high’. The value 
space of the attribute is divided into the expression ‘profit=low or profit ^ medium ’ 
and ‘profit=high’, respectively. The resulting specialised state descriptions are C[ — 
(profit=low or profit=medium) and (0 < sales < 1000) and 0^=  (profit=high) and 
(0 <sales < 1000). Analogously, the sales attribute is split in two intervals and two 
successor descriptors generated, so that four successor descriptors are created. Figure 
2.1 depicts how a search path is generated by this process.
M odel specialisation  an d  generalisation  With the state expansion mechanism 
it is possible to specialise the conditions in the state-action space in many ways. A 
heuristic evaluation function determines the direction of this process. This function is
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calculated as follows: First, the value of a state at time t is calculated as
v(r, t) = v(r, t  -  1) +  \(q(at) -  v(r, t -  1)) (2.11)
where q(at) is the reward of the executed action in the state described by r. The 
function approximates an average of the state description value; the speed of update is 
governed by the parameter A *.
Before an expansion happens, some constraints have to be satisfied: The parameter 
X limits the maximum number of nodes the tree can have, i.e. the maximum number 
of situations the agent can differentiate. New states can only be evolved at the cost 
of ‘forgetting’ other state descriptions (see below for deletion). Furthermore, since the 
deletion of nodes might occur, it is possible that state descriptions that were deleted are 
expanded again, so that endless cycles of generalisation and specialisation occur. The 
right balance has to be found depending on the stability of the environment; preventing 
many visits of identical descriptions too early can be harmful if the environment changes; 
on the other hand, the agent should be allowed not to become trapped into useless 
expansion/retraction cycles. So to speak, the agent is taught that constantly trying the 
same without effect is worthless. To tune this balance, a function with a cost parameter 
(, 0 < (  < 1 is used to compute a value determining whether the successor description 
should be developed or not: The better a state descriptor compared with the average 
performance (measured by the average reward at time £, gt =  K,(r(aijt) — gt_i) t) and the 
smaller (, the more frequent (recurrent) expansions beginning from that state descriptor 
are allowed (equation (2.12)).
*In the implementation used for the models of this thesis, A is fixed at 0.5. Since v represents a 
part of the environment, updates should be not too fast. The medium value has been chosen as the 
norm; reasons for adjusting this value in simulations might be given, but did not arise in this thesis.
tHere again, the update speed parameter k was set to 0.5 for the simulations in the thesis. Since g 
is supposed to be a representative value of reasonably large sample, the average value of the possible 
interval 0 . . .  1 has been chosen.
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expand(r) = <
true, if expansions(r) =  0 or
C x expansions(r) x g < v(r,t) (2.12)
false, otherwise
A state description might lead to a good solution strategy, but if only rarely visited 
is of limited value (they only use up scarce memory space and processing capabilities). 
Therefore, a heuristic function h used by the process is the state-value weighted by the 
number of its activations to account for the recency of the value:
K r,t)  = v (r , t )aCtiVatit Cms{r) (2.13)
The search process selects the node with the maximal heuristic h(r, t) in the search 
path, if the expand condition is satisfied. In accordance with depth-first principle 
described above, the expandable set of nodes in the search path are the leaf nodes. Zi(-) 
is only applied to those nodes.
Before new states are developed after p  steps, the state descriptions of the current 
level of the tree h may be deleted if they did not outperform the value of their parent 
states (performance could be, e.g., the average of the state description values). This is 
called rule generalisation. A rule generalisation is the reversal of a finer grained state 
back to its original parent state. Generalisations can thus only take place if at least one 
expansion has taken place, as the initial state is the all-encompassing state. Analogously 
to rule specialisation, the generalisation process sets in after a certain time z/. While 
y is a parameter, the difference between v and p  should be reasonably large to allow 
some re-sampling the state values v(r,t) of the parent node in case of a contraction. 
By this fine tuning feature, the algorithm can correct a wrong search direction before 
deciding on the next expansion at the higher level h — 1. If the |z/ — p\ is too small, 
cycles are more likely: Since the parent node has had the largest value in the past, the 
same ‘wrong’ expansion will be made again if there are to few updates, which possibly 
decrease the value to their current true value.
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Figure 2.2: Representation of the agent’s search space at a particular time. Leaf nodes are 
active nodes which are matched against s. The hashed nodes represent the search path along 
which generalisation and specialisation takes place. P . .. represent the predicates describing 
the state.
Figure 2.2 illustrates how the initial state is expanded and which states are matched 
against s. For clarity, predicates are only indicated.
As an example of the specialisation and generalisation process, figure 2.3 shows a 
possible path of expansion and retraction of nodes. For clarity, only the values of the 
nodes are depicted.
Avoiding local search o p tim a The search process proceeds in a certain direction. 
On its way down to more specialised descriptions, it becomes difficult to revert it. 
Since the environment is dynamic the search path may become suboptimal. There is 
no back-propagation of values, e.g. an update of the successor states with a discounted 
value of the current state, so that more general descriptions higher up in the tree or in 
other partially developed paths can have higher, although outdated values. To leave a 
certain path and develop different directions in the tree might be difficult; in the worst 
case, the current deepest level might decrease in value, become deleted and developed
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t=100 Kl
The middle node at level h=1 is selected for expansion and 
added to the search path (hatched area).
t=150
1.5 1.5
Expansion continues at the middle node as it remains the 
highest valued node in the tree. Children are created and 
added to the path.
t=300
After some more steps, the value of the deepest leaf nodes 
decreases, e.g. due to environment change, while the leaf 
node on the left increases its value. At the same time, the old 
expansion loses (possibly due to the same changes) in 
value.
t=400 The expanded nodes are generalised again to the parent node, 
because their value decreases. At the same time, the value of 
left node increases further, so that it becomes at h=2 the 
candidate for expansion.
t=450
1.2 1.7
zx
At the next expansion cycle, the search path changes, as 
the values remain similar as at t=400.
Figure 2.3: Example of the agent’s search space at particular time steps and when nodes 
are specialised and generalised. The hatched nodes represent the search path, the numbers 
describe the value of the state descriptions.
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again so that a circle develops. To get back to a better expansion node can take a long 
time or even be almost impossible. To prevent such situations, it is possible to switch 
the search path. Although node values higher up in the tree might no longer be up-to 
date, the agent uses these values as a hypothesis that they are more promising than 
the current path. Switching happens with probability p, 0 < p < 1, in which case the 
highest overall value in the tree is selected as the new expansion point. The path from 
the root to this node becomes thereby the search path.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the switching process. It shows that the result is similar to 
generalisation and specialisation. The difference is that the new path was not reachable 
because the deepest leaf nodes have a higher value than their (unchanged) parent. W ith 
the switching procedure, there is a chance that this trap is left.
The complete algorithm is summarised in pseudo-code in the next section.
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t=100
The middle node at h=1 is selected for expansion and added 
to the search path (hatched area).
t=150
1.5
Expansion continues at the middle node as it remains the 
highest valued node in the tree. Children are created and 
added to the path.
t=300 After some more steps, the value of the deepest leaf nodes decreases, e.g. due to environment change, while the leaf 
node on the left increases its value. Because the expanded 
children nodes have still higher values than their parent, 
reaching the highest node by specialisation 
is -  at least close to t=300 - not possible.
t=330
2.0 1.5
2.8 2.5
If the parametrisation allows it, the process deletes the current 
search path and continues at the highest valued leaf node. The 
process continues from there, provided the leaf nodes in the 
new path remain high valued.
Figure 2.4: Illustration of how BRA avoid local search optima. The hatched nodes represent 
the search path, the numbers describe the value of the state descriptions.
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2.4.3 The C om plete A lgorithm
This section summarises the algorithm in pseudo-code.
Table 2.1: Summary of notation
Name Description Value range
7 discount parameter for reward 0 . . .  1
n interval at which underperforming rules
can be deleted 0..  .p
F interval at which new rules can generated 0 . . .  00c cost parameter determining the frequency
of re-exploring already visited paths 0 . . . 1
X maximum number of nodes 1 . . .  00
p probability for switching the current search path 0 . . . 1
p payoff (reward) 0 . . .  00
9t average payoff (reward) until time t 0 . . .  00
A action set of actions a
Qat strength of action a e A 0 . . .  00
pr*, action selection probability of action a* 0 . . . 1
Q conditions that can be generated from 
input dimensions S
n A state-action mapping Q  —> A
%(r, 2) The state value function
h(r, t) =  /(u (r , t)) The heuristic selection function
(Setup and Initialisation}
Define the time discount for action updates 7
Define the update-cycle p
Define the delete-cycle v ,v  < p
Define the cost of expansion Ç
Define the maximum number of states descriptions %
Define the probability of switching the search path p
Define the search path search.path as a subset of R
Define expansions{r) as a function counting the number of expansions from r 
Define activations(r) as a function counting the times r matched a state 
Define parent(n) as the parent of a node n in the state-tree T{R)
Define children(n) as a function returning all children of a node n  in T{R) 
Define u n ifo r m (x .. .y) as a uniform random distribution in the interval x .. .y
Chapter 2. A Computational Framework for Modelling Learning 41
q(a) =  0, Va E A 
Ci 4—1 S
searchjpath r\ : {C\ —>■ A} 
rep ea t
{Reinforcement learning}
observe reward p(t — 1) received after executing at_i
9t =  Pt-i +  ^(p(£) — Pt-i)
g(at) 4— q{at-i)  +  7 (p(t) — ç(at_i))
u(r, t) E- u(r, t -  1) +  |(g (a t) -  v(r, t -  1))
activations(r) <— activations(r) +  1
compute situation s 5
find the most specific mapping r0 E searchjpath matching s
pQa^*a . . .
P ^ * Q i , t + l  ^  V '  pqaj * a 5 ^
select action at from the resulting distribution and execute at 
{State space partitioning}
{Expand}
if rest(^) =  0 and \R\ < % th e n
rexpand <— max/i(r, t), Vr E searchjpath 
i f  (  x gt x expansions(rexpand) < v(rexpand)) th e n  
partition rexpand according to expansion mechanism into R! {rj . . .  r'n} 
initialise the value of the new states with v{rexpand^ ) 
append R! as children of rexpand 
add R f to searchjpath, remove siblings of R 
expansions(rexpand) 4 expansionsÇrexpand) d* 1 
end  if 
end if
{Delete obsolete mappings} 
if rest(^) =  0 th e n
{determine the most recent expanded mapping rexpanded and its children CH}  
CH  <r— {chi, • • • chn} C searchjpath, children{chi) = 0
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Texpanded  ^ pCLTent^cH^
\ C H \
if v(rexpanded, t) > ^  ^  v(chi) then
i—0
delete CH  
end if 
end if
{Avoid local search optima} 
if un iform (0 ,1) > p then  
clear searchjpath
tmax <- maxv(r,t),\fr  G R, children(r = 0) 
add the path from ri to rmax to searchjpath 
end if
until end of simulation
2.4.4 Compact N otation
After the various mechanisms have been described in detail, the following conventions 
might be useful in describing the system in a more concise way:
An agent’s state of mind is represented by a set of state-action mappings R. There 
can be k distinct sets of state-action-mappings. Each state-action mapping R k Q R  
consists of a symbolic representation of the state, denoted by Ck. C is a simple preposi­
tional system £  of formulae Z  and logical operators Q, £ k — £(Z, ft), where a formula 
consists of terms (variables and constants) and relational operators. The operation 
succ(£k) partitions the formulae in £ k into m  subsets £ k( l . . .  m). By successive appli­
cation of succ, i new successors Ck can be generated, labelled Ck. The corresponding 
£ k is augmented by the index i to identify it uniquely: Ck := £ k. Denoting with I the 
number of succ operations applied from the initial representation, from each C ki=0 new 
symbolic representations can be generated until succ(Æ ) =  0. The action set remains 
constant per k.
Definition 4. A complete state-action-mapping during the process of state-space parti­
tioning can shortly be described with R kt : Ckt —> A k. R denotes the set of mappings, C 
the set of symbolic representations given by the system £ , and A the action set. There
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are k distinct sets of mappings, i denotes the i-th representation generated by the ap­
plication of operation succ(Ci) at the l-th level of successors of the root representation 
Co,o-
For example: Omitting the index kîork  =  1, the variables and constants {a, b, 0,1000} 
and operators {< , > }  make up the set Z  : {0 < a ■< 1000,0 < b <  1000} of formulae 
in £o,o. The logical connective A defines the set O. Thus C^o : £o,o =  (0 <  a <  
1000) A (0 <  6 <  1000) for the initial symbolic representation. The full mapping is 
described by i?o,o • Co,o {actioni, action2}
succ(Cop) is given by
£ 1,1 =  (0 < a < 500) A (0 < 5 < 1000)
A ,2 =  (0 < a < 1000) A (0 < 6 < 500)
£ 1,3 =  (500 < a < 1000) A (0 < 5 < 1000)
A ,4 =  (0 <  a < 1000) A (500 < b <  1000)
A corresponding successor representation would be denoted is simply Ci,i : £ 1,1, 
and the mapping written shorthand as R ^i  : C \i —> {actioni, action}.
This definition will be useful in the following sections and chapters to describe in 
a compact way the different modes of reasoning that can be implemented with the 
algorithm.
2.5 R elation  to  E x istin g  A pproaches
To conclude the formal section, BRA is briefly compared put into context with the 
existing models and methods given in section 2.2.
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BRA attempts to provide a mixed approach to learning by combining cognitive 
aspects (rule extraction) and learning by experience. With respect to the game theory 
literature, models discussed as mixed models are most closely related. In detail:
-  BRA uses the concept of state-space partitioning to balance experimentation and 
habitualisation. In new situations, agents find out by trial-and-error situational 
adequate behaviour (if it exists). For known situations, behaviour can become 
very stable. This is similar to CBR. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) find that rules 
that experiment in unknown cases and tend to habitual repetition in well-known 
situations are most efficient.
-  The update rule in BRA approaches the average reward; a discount parameter 
determines the speed of this approximation. This can be interpreted as calculat­
ing the expected payoff, and is thus similar to the rules used by PA, or in the 
experiments of Mookherjee and Sopher (Mookherjee and Sopher 1994; 1997).
-  Most simple RL and mixed models discussed in this chapter are explicitly designed 
for (behavioural) game theory. As a computer algorithm, BRA is more general 
(rather a framework), and can be applied to any sort of model.
As a computational method, BRA is closely related to CLARION and LCS. As in 
CLARION and LCS, RL is the most important aspect for generating action-centred 
knowledge. Differences exist in the way such knowledge is used to build the internal 
models of the environment:
-  BRA does not start with a psychological model of skill acquisition as CLARION 
or no explicit model at all as machine learning, but a sociopsychological model of 
bounded rationality.
-  BRA uses a pure symbolic representation of conditions with simple first- order 
predicate logic. CLARION has to transform them in a network structure, LCS in 
binary strings.
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-  CLARION modifies rules only after evaluation of bottom level actions; ACS com­
pares prediction errors. BRA is much less sophisticated here, using a simple 
generate-and-test procedure to decide whether a rule should be specialised or 
generalised. If the test phase fails (possibly only after a long time when the en­
vironment changes), the generated rule is deleted again. CLARION as well as 
ACS keep detailed statistics and perform complex estimations to decide about 
generalisation and specialisation of specific rules.
-  BRA starts with a state description covering all possible states and builds a 
model by searching heuristically through the space of these state descriptions 
that can be expanded logically from the initial descriptor. In CLARION as well 
as ACS, it is not necessary to describe the state space fully. If new states are 
encountered, new rules are created on the fly. BRA is thus much more sensitive 
to characteristics of the state space. For example, for state variables with large 
value spaces, specialised rules would be discovered only at later stages of the 
state expansion mechanism. Even if fine-grained differentiation is useful, they 
might never be developed because descriptions generated on the path might not 
be immediately more successful than more general rules, so that the path is not 
further explored. However, BRA could be extended to cover initially only a small 
range of conditions, adding new attribute values dynamically as they appear in s.
2.6 A n  E xam ple
To demonstrate the principle, a simple bargaining game was simulated using the algo­
rithm. The idea of bargaining games is that two players have to agree on a share after 
a finite number of offerings. If haggling takes too long, both players get nothing. A 
simplified version of such games with discrete shares is simulated here. In the game, 
agents can demand a low, medium or high share of a good. Table 2.2 shows the payoffs. 
This distribution of payoffs leads to situation where demanding a low share guarantees a 
certain, but low payoff, while demanding a high share may yield a higher, but uncertain 
payoff.
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low medium high
low 0.3 (0.3) 0.3 (0.5) 0.3 (1)
medium 0.5 (0.3) 0.5 (0.5) 0,(1)
high 1,(03) 0,(0) 0,(0)
Table 2.2: Payoffs of the demand game. The first number in a cell is the payoff of the row 
player, the second number the payoff of the column player.
In the first simulation, there are iV +  1 agents: N/2  agents always demand the 
highest share, N/2  always the lowest. One agent has no predefined strategy, but learns 
what share to demand from encounters with other players. Agents demanding a low 
share are green, agents demanding a high share are blue. Each time step, agents are 
paired randomly and play their strategy. With each encounter the learner is told which 
colour the opponent has. The agent can then use this information to build the state- 
action tree. In the second simulation, strategies are assigned randomly to the green 
and blue agents. Simulations were run with N  = 10 (i.e. the learner encountered with 
equal probability a green or blue agent) for 1000 steps. The model parameters were 
set at 7 =  1, £ =  0.4, p =  0.3, p = 25, i; = 19. The parameter % is not of interest 
here, because the question is which categories do emerge; any restriction would be 
counterproductive. So, % is set to the arbitrary high value 100. 7 is set to 1 to speed 
up learning since the environment is deterministic; £ =  0.4, p = 0.3 are set to moderate 
values to prevent excessive switching and cycling but still avoiding traps.
The aim of this simulation is to demonstrate the working of the algorithm, not to 
explain bargaining behaviour. Therefore, only the evolution of the state tree of the 
learner is analysed.
Figure 2.5 shows the result of the tree-building process: The agent has learnt that 
it is beneficial to distinguish between the colours of opponents. When it meets green 
agents, it demands over 80 % of the time a high share of the good, while it demands a low 
share if blue agents are encountered. The process thus converges to the optimal solution; 
in most encounters with each type of agent, the maximum payoff is obtained. W ith only 
two possible states, this distinction is easy to learn, and consequently discovered early
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Figure 2.5: BRA example 1. Colours correspond to actual strategies of the agents. The values 
are fractions of total activations of actions and encounters of state descriptions, respectively.
0 .9 -  D  High
H  Low
: □  M edium . : 
e s t a t e  frequency
colour= orange or blue : colour=b!ue : : : : : : : : : : colour=orange
Figure 2.6: BRA example 2. Colours are assigned randomly to strategy types. The values 
are fractions of total activations of actions, and encounters of state descriptions, respectively.
in the simulation. This is shown by the activation frequency of the state descriptors: 
In just about 50 steps out of 1000 the initial state description ’opponent is blue or 
opponent is green’ is used. The deeper levels ’colour is blue’ and ’colour is green’ is 
expanded quickly and remains stable.
Figure 2.6 shows the result if the colours are assigned randomly: Since there is 
nothing to gain from a distinction of colours, the agent does not pay attention to 
this attribute. As a result, the agent demands the low share irrespective of the other 
player’s colour 80% of the time. Furthermore, the most frequent state description is 
the initial state with no differentiation between colours. Thus, the process converges
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to the dominant strategy. Because it is impossible to use colour as an indicator for 
the opponent’s expected strategy, the learner chooses the action that yields always a 
positive payoff.
2.7 C onclusion and O utlook
In this chapter, an algorithm aiming to replicate simple decision processes of bounded 
rational actors has been described, formalised and demonstrated. BRA contributes to 
reinforcement learning in social simulation and combines elements of approaches already 
used by CLARION and learning classifier systems. However, it is different from these 
approaches as it is less general than a cognitive architecture and explicitly built upon 
a sociopsychological concept of learning. In that sense, the contribution is not the 
provision of a better or more efficient problem solution method than, e.g., classifier 
systems. On the contrary, it allows to add cognitive limitations and human mistakes 
to a learning agent. For an appropriate representation of human learning, BRA can, 
thus, deliberately be suboptimal (if required). Problem solving methods, however, are 
typically designed to be efficient. A major difference and advantage to existing learning 
approaches is furthermore the use of symbolic state representations. This makes a 
model more tractable than, e.g., a binary string representation or neural network. It 
becomes possible to look into the agent’s 'mind’ and understand its mental model. By 
the same means, BRA can also cover more abstract concepts in an intuitive way.
The motivation of the example simulations was to assess the performance of the 
algorithm from a perspective of verification. Being a simple simulation, it was straight­
forward to verify that the algorithm performed as specified in simple settings. Agents 
learnt to distinguish simple features in the environment.
BRA is a very general way of representing learning. It attempts to represent learning 
and bounded rationality in a more realistic way - neither too ‘simple’ (pure stimulus- 
response), nor too ‘rational’ (full information and deliberation). The solution in BRA is 
to combine a rule-based with an RL-based approach. Being a framework, BRA allows
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the specification of different learning models. More precisely, the following typical 
learning cases in ACE scenarios can be represented:
1. Dynamic CBR: The agent learns to behave habitually depending on the situation, 
without having full knowledge of all possible situations. This is the most general 
case described by the previous sections, and was demonstrated in the example.
n
More formally, this case can be described with k > 1, Q = $, \Ak\ > 1, and
k=l
succ(£k) ±  0. For example Cq.o =  (0 < a < 1000), A1 =  {x ,y},  Cq>0 = (0 < b < 
1000), A2 =  { x , y , z } .
2. Static CBR: The agent does not learn rules, but simply learns to behave habitually 
for a set of given situations. This case can be described with k > 1, \Ak\ > 1,
n
n  4 * =  0 for fc >  1 and succ(Ck) =  0. It describes a simple CBR agent who
f c = i
learns optimal actions for a number of fixed situations. The difference to the 
previous case is that the successor operation returns an empty set of symbols (i.e. 
‘nothing’).
3. Pure RL: This case is given by further simplification of CBR (2): k = 1, \Ak\ > 1, 
£q =  0. There is only one situation, which is described by an empty condition. 
The agent becomes a simple reinforcement learner like those described in the game 
theory literature review.
4. Combining CBR and LCS: It is possible to combine the case-based approach of 
BRA with the classifier idea used in LCS. This can be described with A; > 1,
n
\Ak\ = 1 and f) Ck ^  0. succ may be empty or non-empty. For example CqQ =
f c = i
(0 < a < 1000), A1 =  {%}, Cqq =  (0 < a < 1000), A2 =  {y}. Here, several 
mappings ‘compete’ to become the current node from which the single action is 
selected. Initially, the competing mappings are likely to become activated with 
similar probability (by cycles of generating, testing and deletion of paths). Once 
true values of the state-descriptors are approached, the agent should eventually 
apply some rules with higher probability even if the conditions are overlapping. 
This type of learning is basically a different form of representing case (1) - instead
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of deciding between action x and y using RL, the state value is used as the decision 
criterion.
5. Fully deterministic: A BRA agent can become fully deterministic by allowing only
n
one condition and one rule per k. In this case, k > 1, \Ak\ = 1, Ç\ Cq = $ and
k=l
s uc c{ C q) =  0.
Being a configurable computer simulation framework, the features of the algorithm 
always depend on the concrete problem modelled. The remaining chapters 3, 4 and 5 are 
applications of this framework. More specifically, cases (1), (2) and (3) are represented. 
Case (4) is, in principle, a different form of case (2) and not further treated. Also, case 
(5) is not treated since it is not interesting for most models of human behaviour, but 
belongs to a very subconscious mode of learning where nothing about the environment 
is known or perceived. In detail, the chapter represent the cases in the following way:
-  The statistical discrimination model in chapter 3 is a representative of case (1). 
The model variants treated have a two-dimensional state space (test results and 
colours of workers). BRA works on these dimensions, expanding further state 
descriptions and learns the respective action policies.
-  In chapter 4, a simple RL model of network formation is presented, implementing 
case (2). The cases are given by the player names in the simulations. Learning 
takes place only in the form of RL; there is no expansion. However, a simple 
reference model representing case (1) is compared with the simple RL version.
-  In chapter 5, learning is further simplified, representing case (3): Patients choose 
between doctors; no additional cases are needed. From an implementation point 
of view, RL is realised as case (2) with a single condition - if a consumer is ill 
he becomes a patient; as a patient he chooses a doctor. To represent this binary 
choice, a condition is checked in the rule system of the agent before executing the 
behaviour.
Chapter 3
Statistical Discrimination
3.1 In troduction
Discrimination is the disadvantageous treatment of individuals based solely on their 
membership of a certain group such as race, age or gender. Economic discrimination 
occurs in different domains, e.g., in the housing, insurance or labour market. For 
example, insurance premiums frequently differ among age groups or gender. Women 
or migrants more often work in jobs below their actual qualification as comparably 
qualified white males. In labour economics, one speaks of discrimination if members 
of a certain group who have the same abilities and skills as other groups ‘are accorded 
inferior treatment with respect to hiring, occupational access, promotion, wage rate, 
or working conditions’ (McConnel et al 2006; p.428). Typical forms of discrimination 
in labour markets are: wage discrimination, where the disadvantaged group receives a 
lower wage; employment discrimination, where the disadvantaged group is more likely 
to unemployed; job discrimination where certain groups are restricted from entering 
certain occupations irrespective of ability; and human capital discrimination, meaning 
that the disadvantaged group has less access to productivity-increasing opportunities 
such as schooling or vocational training (McConnel et al 2006; p.428).
In Economics, Becker (1957) first brought forward a theory of discrimination, which
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was based solely on preference. He defined employer discrimination as a situation in 
which employers are prejudiced against a certain group and prefer to employ members 
of group A  but not members of the prejudiced group B  (the distinction of A  for the 
advantaged and B  for the disadvantaged group will be kept for the remainder of this 
section). This taste is assigned a monetary value. The strength of this value is called 
discrimination coefficient d. Employers maximise a utility function that is the sum 
of profits plus the value of employing members of the particular groups. Prejudiced 
employers want to hire B  workers at a wage rate of wB- B  workers are hired only if 
their wage is lower to compensate for the discrimination coefficient, thus wa = WB+d. If 
the aggregate coefficient d' in the market is sufficiently large, this will create a wage gap 
between A and B  workers as long as labour supply exceeds demand. The model implies 
that biased employers earn less due to their preferences, as unbiased firms can hire more 
B  workers with equal skills at the lower wage. In the long run, this would eliminate 
the wage gap, because the number of more profitable, non-discriminatory employers will 
increase to the point where B  workers do not have to work for discriminating employers. 
In reality, however, differences in wages between groups have mostly persisted.
In the theory of statistical discrimination, on the other hand, inequality between 
groups arises endogenously. The reason for discriminatory treatment is based on be­
lieved or actual average differences between groups. The average characteristic is then 
ascribed to individual members of each group. When members of the disadvantaged 
group realise these beliefs and expect to be treated negatively, they may actually adopt 
this behaviour, which reinforces existing stereotypes.
There are two broad directions of statistical discrimination models. Phelps (1972) 
and related approaches build models based on exogenously imposed differences. The 
basis of such models are two groups of workers and employers who observe skills only as 
a noisy signal, e.g. by using an employment test. Skill and signal are jointly normally 
distributed. The noisier the signal, the closer a worker’s productivity is on average to 
the group average. If the signal is precise, it predicts productivity well. Discriminatory 
outcomes can be generated in basically two ways: Either each group’s signal is equally
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informative, but productivity is different. In this case, one group will receive lower wages 
as employers expect productivity to be lower. In the other case skills are distributed 
evenly, but signals are differently informative. Workers belonging to the group with the 
more informative signal receive higher wages than workers with the same skill belonging 
to the group with worse signals.
At the same time, Arrow (1973) proposed a model in which initially identical groups 
can evolve into groups with different productivity due to co-evolving stereotypes on 
the employer side. In the model, workers invest in human capital conditional on the 
expected wage. Employers pay a wage depending on the skills of the worker, which they 
observe perfectly after their hiring. Discrimination can exist if employers expect the skill 
level of group B  to be lower than that of group A. This reinforces wage expectations 
of the workers of the respective groups. If investing in human capital is not worth the 
effort for group B, the beliefs of the employers are reinforced, leading to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. The result is an equilibrium in which one group does not invest and will 
consequently be assigned the less well-paid jobs. Coate and Loury (1993) extend this 
model by adding higher uncertainty with respect to the observability of workers’ actual 
skill.
Coate and Loury (1993) is the basis for many models, including dynamic approaches 
and laboratory experiments. Also the model developed in this chapter is based on it 
and will therefore be described in detail in section 3.2.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a dynamic model of statistical discrimina­
tion in labour markets using BRA as the learning method. There already some dynamic 
models (e.g. Blume 2006); however they use belief learning methods. Furthermore, the 
chapter also aims to reproduce the experimental results of Fryer Jr. et al (2005). Using 
an agent-based model has the advantage that not only the aggregate results, but also 
individual behaviour can be compared. The research question thus becomes whether 
and under which conditions statistical discrimination can emerge in an RL model, and 
whether these mechanisms reflect actual human behaviour.
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The outline is as follows: In section 3.2 the theoretical literature is discussed in 
some detail and in section 3.3 the experimental literature. Emphasis is put on the 
central approaches: The model of Coate and Loury (1993) (CL); and the laboratory 
experiment of Fryer Jr. et al (2005), which is based on CL. The RL model is described 
in section 3.4, which takes the experiment as the starting point for its specification. 
The model is calibrated for the learning and choice parameters of BRA in section 3.5.1. 
Then, simulations are run and the dynamics of statistical discrimination analysed in 
more detail in sections 3.5.2 and .
3.2 M odels o f S ta tistica l D iscrim ination
In this section the central approaches of statistical discrimination are discussed. For a 
more complete, recent review, see Fang and Moro (2011).
In the seminal model of Arrow (1973) groups are ex ante identical; actual differences 
between groups are derived endogenously. In the model, firms offer two types of jobs, 
skilled and unskilled. Firms have a production function f ( L u, Ls), where Ls stands for 
skilled and Lu for unskilled labour. Unskilled workers receive a wage of wu = f i ( L s, Lu) 
and skilled workers a wage of ws = /^(L*, Lu), where / i  and / 2 denote the first derivative 
of the first and second arguments of / .  Skills are acquired through investment at cost 
c, which is distributed according to a distribution function G(-), which is independent 
of worker colour.
The proportion of skilled A  workers tta and skilled B  workers tt# is determined by 
the following process: If a worker is assigned to an unskilled job, he receives wUJ if he is 
assigned to the skilled group he gets ws, independent of the colour. The firm conducts 
a test which determines the skill with certainty. If the worker belongs to the skilled 
group j ,  j  e  {A, B}, the employer pays a wage > 0 and 0 otherwise. For this test, 
the firm must pay a cost r. Arrow claims that competition among firms results in zero
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profits, so that r can be written as
r =  nA[fi(L8,Lu) -  wA],
r =  7rB [ / i ( L s , L u ) -  wB\.
This implies that
wa =  — wb +  1 — ( — f i ( L s, . 
ka \ ^ a J
Thus, if 7rs  < tta then wB < w a , and the resulting segregation between low- and 
high-skilled jobs can be explained by beliefs instead of preferences.
In equilibrium, the fractions tta and ttb might differ. Workers invest in skills only 
if the expected gain exceeds the costs. The gains are given by Wj — wu for group j  
workers. The proportion of skilled workers is G(wj — wu), that is the fraction of workers 
whose investment cost is lower than the wage gain.
Equilibrium is given by
TTj =  G(Wj(7TA, 7tb ) -  wu) , j  G A, B.
While in the symmetric equilibrium tta =  7tb , in the asymmetric tta ^  7tb . In a 
situation where most workers of a group invest little, the firms will perceive the group 
on average as lower-skilled and assign the unskilled job to members of that group. This 
in turn provides little incentive for the workers to invest in the future, decreasing the 
average skill of the group. By this mechanism, self-fulfilling prophecies become possible: 
Because B  workers are believed to be not qualified, they invest less so that in the end 
B  workers are indeed less qualified.
The most important difference in Coate and Loury (1993)’s model is that wages are 
fixed, and that worker skills are not perfectly observable. In the model, firms assign 
workers of type A  and B  either to a simple task for which no qualification is required, 
or a complex task which requires a skill. The wage for the complex task is w, while the 
wage for the simple task is 0. The firm’s return x  depends on which task was assigned 
and the actual qualification: If the worker is qualified and the task complex, the return
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is x q > 0; if the worker is not qualified and the task complex, the return is —x u. If
a skill or not. The skill investment cost c is distributed heterogeneous across workers 
according to a cumulative distribution function G(-). This function is independent of 
the worker group. G(c) is the fraction of workers with investment costs not greater than 
c. Firms observe a noisy signal 0 of a worker’s qualification. The signal is drawn from 
a uniform interval according to a probability distribution function f q(0) if the worker 
is qualified, and f u(0) is the worker is not qualified. f q and f u are assumed to satisfy 
the monotone likelihood ratio property that 1(0) = fq(0)/fu(0) is strictly increasing 
and continuous in 0. This implies that workers who invested in skills are more likely to 
receive a positive signal, and that the ex-post probability that a worker was qualified 
is also increasing in 6.
The game has three stages. In stage 1, nature draws workers’ types and investment 
cost c. In stage 2, workers make their investment decision given c. As signal 0 E [0,1], 
the firms observe a test result which is drawn from the probability distribution functions 
fu or f q, respectively. In stage 3, firms decide whether to assign workers to the complex 
or simple task.
A firm will hire a worker only if it believes the worker is qualified. Since the signal is 
noisy and the probability of being qualified is increasing in 6, a suitable hiring strategy 
is to set a threshold standard. Workers achieving the standard are assigned to the 
qualified task, workers who fail to achieve this threshold value are assigned to the 
unqualified task. More specifically, the posterior probability ^(tt, 0) that a worker is 
qualified is given by:
The expected payoff is £ ( 7 t ,  0)xq — (1 — ^ ( t t ,  6) ) x u . The best policy is to assign the 
worker to the complex task only if x q/ x u > (1 — ^(tt, #)) /  (^(tt, 6)), which is equivalent
the task is simple, the return is always 0. Workers decide ex-ante whether to invest in
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to x q/ x u > (1 — tt/tt) (fu(Q)/fq(6))- The threshold s*(7r) is given by
s'(n) =  min{y G [0 ,1 ] | J  >  ( ^ )
Employers set the standard Sj = G A, B, before observing the actual signal.
More optimistic beliefs will lead to lower standards, more pessimistic beliefs to higher. 
Thus, if a group is believed to be less qualified, investing workers from that group are 
less likely to get a signal exceeding s*.
Rational workers invest only if the cost does not exceed the expected benefit. The 
expected benefit depends on the probability that the worker gets the qualified job, which 
in turn depends on the standard s*, and the gross return from the wage of this job. The 
probability of getting assigned to the qualified job is l —Fq(s) if the worker invested, and 
1 — Fu(s) if not. The expected benefit can then be defined as /3(s) =  cj (Fu(s) — Fq(s)), 
where u  is the gross return from being assigned to the complex task. Thus, the worker 
invests only if c < /3(s). The fraction of workers that become qualified is G((3(s)). /3(s) 
is a single-peaked function of s*, increasing whenever f u{s)/ fq(s) > 1, and decreasing 
if f u( s ) / fq(s) < 1, which reflects the monotone-likelihood property. There is little 
incentive to invest if standards are very high or very low. Either the chance to get the 
qualified job is always high independent of investment behaviour, or too small to make 
investment beneficial.
In equilibrium, employers choose standards that induce workers to become qualified 
at the rate postulated by the beliefs. Formally:
xJ = G(P(s'(*j ) ) ) , j e { A , B }  (3.1)
A discriminatory equilibrium can exist whenever equation 3.1 has multiple solu­
tions. Employers may have the belief that a group is less qualified than the other and 
consequently, will set higher standards for this group. As this lowers the incentive to 
invest, the outcome is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Figure 3.1 shows the equilibrium graphically. Coate and Loury (1993) note that not 
all solutions of equation 3.1 are locally stable under the implicit adjustment process
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium in Coate and Loury’s statistical discrimination model. The x-axis 
represents the assignment standards s that need to be fulfilled to be assigned to the qualified 
task, on the y-axis, tt measures the belief how many workers invest in skills. WW depicts pairs 
of standards and proportions of a group investing consistent with optimal worker behaviour 
(the graph {(s, 7r)|7r =  G(/?(s))}). EE depicts the standard-belief pairs consistent with optimal 
employer behaviour (the graph {(s,7r)|s =  s * ( tt) } ) .  A point s and tt that lies on both curves 
solves equation 3.1.
tt*4 "1 =  G(P(s*(tt)). An initial belief close to tt* converges only to tt* if the slope of the 
EE curve exceeds that of WW at tt* .  An unstable self-confirming belief is not robust 
to small errors in employers’ perceptions, as the resulting standards will not induce 
workers to engage into the ’required’ investment behaviour.
Coate and Loury (1993) analyse the implications of this model with respect to the 
question whether discriminatory equilibria can be changed by imposing hiring quotas. 
They show that there are conditions under which negative stereotypes can be eliminated. 
The idea is that in a non-discriminatory equilibrium, an employer assigns the complex 
task to a randomly selected worker with equal probability. This equality is achieved via
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an adjustment process of the assignment thresholds Sj, j  E A, B  that changes the skill 
investment incentives of both groups. For qualified workers it becomes more difficult to 
get assigned to the complex task, while unqualified workers are motivated to increase 
their skills. Note that in the resulting equilibrium sa must not necessarily be s#; the 
concrete value depends on the initial discriminatory equilibrium. CL illustrate how this 
process works by the following example: Consider a situation where the employment test 
can take three outcomes: A pass result, a fail result, and an unclear result. The unclear 
result corresponds to a signal which can originate both from investing and not-investing 
workers. Without affirmative action, firms assign with probability 1 workers with bad 
test results to the unqualified task, and workers with a good result with probability 
1 to the qualified task. If the result is unclear, firms can either follow a liberal or 
conservative strategy. Under the liberal strategy, workers are assigned to the complex 
task, under the conservative strategy to the simple task. Without intervention, the 
expected return from the liberal strategy must be large enough to assign the qualified 
task. If B  workers coordinate on the conservative equilibrium because employers have 
low expectations about B  productivity, and A  analogously on the liberal equilibrium 
because of higher expectations, the outcome is discriminatory. If a quota is introduced 
in such a state, the employer must decide whether to assign more B  workers, possibly 
with a bad test result, to the complex task, or more A workers with ambiguous results to 
the simple task. If the expected loss of assigning qualified workers to unqualified jobs is 
greater than the expected gain from assigning unqualified workers to the complex task, 
the firms will assign all B  workers with unclear results, and a fraction of B  workers with 
failed tests to the complex task, until the employment quota requirement is achieved. 
The employers thus patronise B  workers because the assign them the skilled jobs even 
though they failed the test. As a consequence, the investment incentives for B  workers 
might be lower as for A workers. Employers continue to view members of group B  as 
less qualified.
Most models of statistical discrimination are static models and state only that dis­
criminatory equilibria might exist. However, how discrimination comes about is not
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considered and usually attributed to historical circumstances. Only some dynamic 
models exist, of which the Blume (2006)’s is described in some detail in what follows.
Blume (2006) considers a stochastic model using ideas from evolutionary game the­
ory based on the CL model. There are three types of workers: The common type c can 
acquire skills at cost c > 0; workers of type 0 have no cost of investment; and an ’un- 
teachable’ type oo with infinite investment costs. The total number of workers is fixed 
at M, but the size of each subgroup may vary. A worker is of type 0 with probability 
po, type oo with probability and of type c with probability 1 — po — Poo- Po and poo 
are small. The skill level of the common type is endogenous, while the level of groups 0 
and oo is fixed at the beginning (always/never skilled). Workers believe to get a skilled 
job with probability i/. On the employer side, there are two types of firms. Both types 
value unskilled workers with 0. Type r  firms value a skilled worker at r  > 0, type o 
firms with cr > 0. The probability that a firm is of type a  is e. The cost of hiring an 
unskilled worker is p > 0.
Workers have no opportunity to signal their skill; group membership is the only 
marker. Employers have a common expectation tt that a worker is skilled. In each 
discrete time step, one employer is matched with a worker. The probability that this 
happens is given by g =  min{N/M,  1}. The wage rate for skilled workers is fixed at w; 
costs are c < w < r. If a skilled worker is matched with a firm, he earns w; a worker 
who is not offered a job goes to the unskilled labour market and earns 0.
In equilibrium, workers maximise their expected return with respect to skill acqui­
sition. Firms maximise their profits depending on the expectations about the skill level 
of the labour force. Type r  firms hire a worker only if expected profits are not negative:
7TT — (tTW +  (1 — 7r)p) >  0
The reservation belief t t *  that a worker is skilled is given by: tt* = T+^ _w ; this 
value makes the firm indifferent about hiring or not. It is assumed for r-firms that 
((1 — p0)rj +  Pqw)/pq > 0, which implies t t *  > 0. Similarly, for type-cr firms 
((1 — pq)ï] +  Pqw)/pq < cr. From this follows that type <r firms will always hire a worker
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from the disadvantaged group. Whether type r  firms do so, depends upon their beliefs.
Type c workers believe with probability u that they will be offered a job, so that 
the return to skill investment is vw — c. The reservation belief at which c workers are 
indifferent whether to acquire skills or not is given by:
vw — c — 0
The equilibrium is determined by two probabilities: py, the probability that a type r  
firm offers a worker a job, and pw, the probability that a type c workers acquires skills. 
Thus, equilibrium is a pair py, pw such that
1. p y  maximises p y ( 7 r r  —  t t w  — (1 — t t ) ? / )
2. pw maximises pw(vw — c)
3. tt =  po +  (1 — p o o ) Pw
4. z/ =  (1 -  e)qpf  =  eq
Hence, analogously to CL, the beliefs t t  and u determine the equilibrium. Two 
possible pure equilibria exist: First, full-employment exists when all workers who can 
acquire jobs are offered skilled jobs ( p y  =  l , p w =  1, t t  =  1 , 1/  = q ) .  An underemployment 
equilibrium is given if type c workers choose not to acquire skills, and only type a firms 
offer jobs ( p f  =  0 , p w = 0 , t v  = p 0, i /  = qe).  In the full-employment state, all workers 
find a job, even the unteachable ones; in the under-employment state, only the workers 
with zero investment costs get a job. Statistical discrimination exists if both full- 
and underemployment pure equilibria exist. This happens if qe < i/* assuming that 
t  >  w >  c, vu* <  q, po <  t t * <  1 — poo. Similarly, if z/* < qe then the only pure 
equilibrium is the full-employment state. The typical case is po < t t *  < 1 — p^ , as the 
fractions p0 and p ^  are assumed to be small. This is the basis for the dynamic analysis 
which is described next.
In the dynamic perspective, I  workers enter the labour market at each discrete 
timestep t. A worker’s lifetime has two periods. In the first period at t, they acquire
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skills. In the second period at t +  1 they are matched with an employer. Employers 
hire workers according to their beliefs. Of the M  workers at time t, K t will receive 
jobs, and Jt of the workers with jobs have in fact skills. Normalising these numbers 
as fractions defines kt = K t / M  and j t = Jt/M.  From the fractions j t and kt firms 
and all workers update their beliefs to TTt+i and i/t+1. All knowledge is public. The 
newly arrived workers at t =  1 make then their skill investment decision based on vt+i- 
Since all information is public, workers can predict firms’ expectations accurately, so 
that vt+i = q  iî 7Tt+ i  > t t * ,  or vt+i = q e  otherwise. If nt <  t t *  then only type-cr firms 
offer jobs, resulting in the underemployment equilibrium (beliefs in the ‘low regime’). 
If beliefs are 7rt > t t * ,  the full-employment equilibrium results (beliefs are in the ‘high 
regime’).
The market outcome j t , kt is the result of the belief formation in the preceding 
time steps. The stochastic process (jt, &t) ^ 0 thus describes the evolution of the market 
outcomes. The learning procedure based on public information described above makes 
the process Markovian with two transition regimes. The probability that 7rt+i is in low 
regime depends on the joint distribution of j t and kt. Blume shows that there are only 
two such distributions, leading either the to the high or the low regime. Analysing the 
long run behaviour reveals that for most parameter values the process remains in one of 
the two regimes most of the time. More specifically, the parameters t t  and e determine 
equilibrium selection. As e —>• 1 and tt —)• 1 the probability of the high regime goes to 
1, and vice versa. As the size of the market grows, the process is more likely to remain 
in one of the two states permanently.
Blume (2006) discusses a number of policy implications. For example, imposing a 
hiring quota has the effect of raising e, the probability of being hired in the low regime. If 
this change is large enough, the underemployment equilibrium will disappear. However, 
also the opposite might happen, and the probability of the high regime fall to 0: With 
higher e more workers’ true skills are observed, which makes it more difficult to transit 
from the low-regime if the skill level is low. This is the same conclusion as in Coate and 
Loury (1993), but there the reason was too low incentives to become qualified; here the
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reason lies in employers’ learning abilities.
Levin (2009) presents a similar stochastic model. The main difference is that time 
is continuous with workers arriving at a constant flow rate. In the model, employers 
observe the noisy test signal ’Good’ or ’Bad’. As in the preceding models, workers 
invest only if expected returns exceed a certain threshold. The process depends on the 
probability 9 of receiving a positive signal. As this probability increases, the process 
moves to a high regime. Steady states with discriminatory equilibria may evolve. Levin 
(2009) shows that even if 6 increases for the disadvantaged group, this may still not 
result in higher investment so that negative expectations and discrimination will persist. 
He also shows that not any increase in 9 by, e.g., better access to resources shifts the 
equilibrium to high state, but only changes that are large enough.
The purpose of this short review was to discuss the major models of statistical dis­
crimination, looking at the dynamics where possible. These concepts provide the basis 
of the RL model presented in section 3.4. The main features of these models are:
-  Discriminatory equilibria can exist if the beliefs of both employers and workers 
are mutually reinforced.
-  Whether a group invests or not depends on employers’ beliefs and the probability 
# of a positive test result.
-  Once discrimination exists, it might take strong interventions to shift the equilib­
rium from an under-employment state to a full-employment state.
Further extensions of CL or alternative models are not further treated here. For reviews 
see, e.g., Fang and Moro (2011) or Altonji and Blank (1999). Before presenting the RL 
model, the next sections looks at statistical discrimination experiments.
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3.3 E xperim ents w ith  S ta tistica l D iscrim ination
Statistical discrimination has been tested in a series of experiments. Before discussing 
the experiment of Fryer Jr. et al (2005) in detail, some earlier experiments are sum­
marised based on the review of Anderson et al (2005).
Davis (1987) studied an experimental labour market in which worker groups were of 
different size. If more observations can be drawn from one group, then it is more likely 
to produce a higher maximum observation. If employers focus on this higher draw, this 
may result in a bias towards the larger group. In the experiment, the employer group was 
in the first period confronted with 80 % of draws from the majority population, in the 
second they chose themselves how intensively the respective groups should be sampled. 
Still, 60 % of the employers sampled the majority group, pointing to a mechanism with 
which a bias towards one group might arise simply induced by population properties 
(Anderson et al 2005; p.105).
In the experiment of Anderson and Haupert (1999), workers were divided into green 
and yellow groups. The productivity of each worker in each group was assigned exoge­
nously. Before making a decision, employers could interview the workers at a certain 
cost. Anderson and Haupert (1999) observed that in markets with lower average pro­
ductivity of one colour, employers tended to hire fewer workers of that group. They 
claim that in the absence of an interview, employers focus on the population average. 
This is supported by the fact that employment levels rose after the cost of interviewing 
was reduced (Anderson et al 2005; p.106)
Whereas in the previous experiments differences were exogenous, Fryer Jr. et al 
(2005) conducted a classroom experiment where productivity and hiring decision could 
evolve simultaneously as in the model of Coate and Loury (1993).
The experiment is set up as follows: Half of the players are employers, the other 
workers. Half of the workers are green, the other purple. Workers are told that their 
investment cost is drawn from an interval between $0 and $1, and that costs are inde-
Chapter 3. Statistical Discrimination 65
pendent and vary randomly. Workers make their investment decision after observing 
their cost. After the decision, a test result is generated. If a worker invests and gets 
hired, he gets a wage of $3.00. If he is not hired, he gets a low-skill job at a wage 
of $1.50. The net gain for an investing worker is the wage minus his investment cost. 
Two draws of the test are made to determine the final test result. Test results are 
represented as marbles in an urn. A blue marble (B) represents a positive test result, a 
red one (R) a negative result. The probability that a result is good is 0.5 if the worker 
invested, or 0.2 if not. A test result of BB thus means that the chance that a worker 
invested is high, a result of RR means he probably did not invest, whereas in the event 
of BR (or RB), the result is unclear. An employer only knows the worker’s colour and 
test result. An employer earns $4.00 if a worker who invested is hired; $0.00 if a worker 
who did not invest was hired, and $2.00 if the worker was not hired. To both workers 
and employers, the hiring rates of each colour are presented, i.e. information about the 
market outcome is public.
Two treatments are presented: In the first treatment, investment costs are drawn 
for both worker groups over 20 periods from the interval [$0.00, $1.00]. The second 
treatment was conducted to ‘investigate the effects of historical discrimination’ Fryer Jr. 
et al (2005; p .166). In this treatment, for the first five periods investment costs for purple 
workers were drawn from the interval [$0.5, $1.00], whereas for green workers from 
[$0.00, $0.5], so that green workers had higher incentives to invest. For the remainder 
15 rounds, the cost distributions were equal.
In general, Fryer Jr. et al (2005) observe that discrimination emerges only in some 
experiments. Of these they present two instances.
In the first experiment discrimination against purple workers emerged quickly. Around 
80-90% of green workers were hired most of the time, whereas purple workers were hired 
at around 40-50%. Hiring rates remained almost constant for green, and slightly im­
proved for purple workers. Investment rates for both groups increased for some periods, 
after which they fell again. Investment costs in the first two rounds was (by chance)
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higher for purple workers. This ‘may have been a factor that kept investment rates 
much higher for green workers in most periods’ (Fryer Jr. et al (2005; p. 165)). Em­
ployers hired always when the test result was BB. Employers were more liberal with 
green workers: If the test result was unclear, they were hired invariably, but only 78% 
of purple workers. If the result was RR, employers still hired 64% of green, but only 
15% of purple workers. In the following discussion it emerged that beliefs that purple 
workers would not invest formed quickly, similarly the corresponding belief that this 
group is unlikely to get hired. This lead most workers of that colour to decrease their 
efforts. Moreover, the consistent liberal treatment of green workers encouraged most of 
them in their investment behaviour, while some players stopped investing because they 
expected to get hired anyway. Thus, investment rates for both groups declined in the 
second half of the game, but for different reasons.
In the second experiment, it emerged that investment rates of green and purple 
workers were similar, although the costs for purple workers were much higher. They 
were hired at an only slightly lower rate than green workers. After step 5, the cost 
distributions became equal again. Purple workers continued to invest at similar rates, 
while investment rates for greens dropped quickly, resulting in higher employment for 
purples (raising from about 60% to 90%), and lower employment for greens (decreasing 
from about 65% to 50%).
Summarising, these results highlight some driving factors in experimental environ­
ments:
-  Negative stereotypes can form quickly and are persistent. It might only take 
some random perturbations (here, initial cost asymmetries) to generate these 
stereotypes.
-  Decisions are not independent. The belief that one group is more productive 
leads to the belief that this still holds if bad or mixed outcomes occur, while the 
opposite is true for the disadvantaged group.
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-  The height of the cost does not necessarily have a large impact on the investment 
decisions, as long as the return to investment is positive.
3.4 A  R einforcem ent Learning M od el o f  S ta tistica l 
D iscrim ination
There are n  worker agents and m  employer agents. Workers are assigned the colours 
green and purple with equal probability. Each round, workers and employers are paired 
randomly. Employers must decide to hire or not to hire a worker depending on the 
result of an employment test and the colour of the worker. If no investment is made, 
the worker incurs no cost. The test outcome might be either good (+) or bad (-). Two 
draws are made. The probability of a positive test signal is drawn from one of two 
distributions; f q(0) if the worker invested, and f u(@) if not. Table 3.1 shows the payoffs. 
In the following simulations, investment cost c is fixed at 0.1 throughout, so that there 
is never a negative payoff.
hire not hire
invest 0.3-c (0.4) 0.15-c (0.2)
not invest 0.3 (0) 0.15 (0.2)
Table 3.1: Payoffs for the RL statistical discrimination model (employer payoffs in brackets)
This model setup is with minor variations identical to Fryer Jr. et al (2005). The 
main difference is that all information is private. Employers and workers have no 
information about the employment levels of the respective groups as in the original 
game. Another difference is the magnitude of rewards, which was divided by 10 for this 
experiment (simply to standardise values between 0 and 1). Furthermore, in the Fryer 
experiment, there were as many employers as workers and workers were split exactly half 
in green, and half in purple. In the simulation, worker groups are partitioned randomly, 
so that one worker group is often larger than the other. Moreover, there are only half as 
many employers as workers. The reason is to support learning: The smaller the worker
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group, the more likely there will be similar behaviour simply by chance, and thus it 
is ‘easier’ to discriminate. Similarly, with fewer employers, variation may decrease by 
chance, and feed back into worker decisions. As a consequence, only half of the worker 
population is matched each round, while all employers act.
Using the BRA approach developed in chapter 2, the agents are implemented as fol­
lows: Workers have a simple state-action mapping with an empty state description and 
invest/ not-invest as action set. Employers, on the other hand, may use the different test 
outcomes and colours of the agents to construct rules according to BRA. The action set 
consists of hire/not-hire. As described below, different ways are possible to generate the 
rules that constitute the beliefs about the relationship between colour and productivity. 
If the majority of generated rules are based on colour alone, statistical discrimination 
is clearly observable; if rules are only based on test only, there is meritocracy.
Three different setups are considered. Using the convention of definition 4, they can 
be described as follows:
Variant I In this variant, there is only limited learning. Only if test results are am­
biguous (+- or -+; since both events are equivalent, +- is used as the representative 
for both from here on) agents may learn; otherwise employers always hire if the result 
is good (++), or never hire if the result is bad (- -). This corresponds to the example 
constructed by Coate and Loury (1993) described above. Employers can learn a con­
servative or liberal strategy, depending on their beliefs about the productivity of each 
group - if in doubt they can either believe that the test comes from a productive worker 
or the opposite. The deterministic rules can be described by : Cq^ —>hire with 
Cgi :(test-result =  + + ) and : Cq^ —mot-hire with Cq,! :(test-result =  - -). The 
corresponding initial state-action mapping for the learning problem is : Cq j —» A  
with Cq,! : (test-result =  +-) and (colour =  purple or colour =  green). Using definition
3
4, the decision model can hence be described by & =  3, \Ak\ =  2, p| =  0 and
k=l
the symbols in table 3.2. The table describes all possible rules the search process can 
expand.
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Cq =  {test-result =  - -}
C20 =  {test-result =  + + }
Cq =  {(test-result =  + -  A (colour =  purple V colour =  green))}
C\ =  C\ =  succ{C\) =  succ{Cfy =  0
>C? i =  succ{Cq) =  {test-result =  + -  A colour =  purple}
C\ 2 — succ{Cq) =  {test-result =  + -  A colour =  green}
succ{C^) =  0
Table 3.2: Description of all possible rules in Model Variant I. The events +- and -+ are 
summarised as +-.
Variant II In this variant, three different sets of state-action mappings are specified. 
The first set contains only one initial rule : Cq^ —> A  with Cq x : (test-result =  + + ) 
and (colour =  purple or colour =  green), the second set contains : Cq,! —^ A with 
C®’1 : (test-result =  - -) and (colour =  purple or colour =  green), and the third set is 
given by : Cq^ —> A with Cq^ : (test-result =  +-) and (colour =  purple or colour 
=  green).
3
Based on definition 4, the model can be decribed by A; =  3, \Ak\ =  2, f) Cf =  $
k=l
and the symbols described in table 3.3, which again describes all possible mappings.
This specification pre-wires some knowledge about the relationship between test- 
result and productivity by restricting the possible combinations of the condition ele­
ments. Per mapping, only two rules can be generated, limiting the maximum number 
of rules to six. Subjects observe test result and colour, and based on the test result 
they start deliberating how to treat the worker from the respective groups.
Variant III This variant finally poses the most challenging learning task. The initial 
rule can be described correspondingly with : Cq  ^ —> A with C h  : (test-result =  
+ +  or test-result =  - - or test-result =  + -) and (colour =  purple or colour =  green). 
Agents start with no prior knowledge or categories at all.
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Cq =  {(test-result =  + +  A (colour =  purple V colour =  green))}
Cq = {(test-result =  - A (colour =  purple V colour =  green))}
Cq = {(test-result =  +- A (colour =  purple V colour =  green))}
£} i =  srtcc(£o) — {test-result =  + +  A colour =  purple}
£})2 =  s u c c ( C q )  = {test-result =  + +  A colour =  green}
=  s u c c ( C q )  = {test-result =  - - A colour =  purple}
Cl 2 =  s u c c ( C q )  = {test-result =  - - A colour =  green}
^ 1,1 =  s u c c ( C q )  = {test-result =  +- A colour =  purple}
C l  2 =  s u c c ( C q )  =  {test-result =  + -  A colour =  green}
s u c c ( C \ )  =  0 ; 
s u c c ( C l )  =  0 
s u c c ( C l )  =  0
Table 3.3: Description of all possible rules in Model Variant II. The events +- and -+ are 
summarised as +-.
Based on definition 4, this variation of the model can be described with A; =  1, 
\Ak\ = 2 and the symbols in table 3.4.
Cq = {(test-result =  + +  V test-result =  - - v  test-result =  +-)
A (colour =  purple V colour =  green)}
C\ x = s u c c { C q )  = {(test-result =  + + ) A (colour=green V colour =  purple)}
C\ 2 =  s u c c ( C q )  = {(test-result =  +-) A (colour=green V colour =  purple)}
C \  z = s u c c { C q )  = {(test-result =  - -) A (colour=green V colour =  purple)}
C \  A — s u c c ( C q )  = {(test-result =  - - v  test-result =  +-)
A (colour=green V colour =  purple)}
C \  b =  s u c c ( C q )  = {(test-result =  + +  V test-result =  - -)
A (colour=green V colour =  purple)}
C \  Q = s u c c { C q )  = {(test-result =  +- V test-result =  + + )
A (colour=green V colour =  purple)}
C \  7 = s u c c ( C q )  = {(test-result =  + +  V test-result =  - - V test-result =  +-)
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A (colour =  purple)}
C\$ = s u c c (C q )  =  {(test-result =  + +  V test-result =  - - v  test-result =  +-) 
A (colour =  green)}
£2,1 =  succ(£}1) =  {test-result =  + +  A colour =  green}
£2,2 — succ(£}1) =  {test-result =  + +  A colour =  purple}
£2 3 =  5u c c (£})2) =  {test-result =  -f- A colour =  green}
£2 4 =  s u c c (£})2) =  {test-result =  + - A colour =  purple}
£2 5 =  succ(C\ z) =  {test-result =  - - A colour =  green}
£2 6 =  succ(£})3) =  {test-result =  - - A colour =  purple}
C \ j  =  succ(£}j4) =  succ{C\) =
{(test-result =  - - V test-result =  +-)A colour =  green }
£2 § — succ(£14) == succ(C8) =z
{(test-result =  - - V test-result =  +-) A colour =  purple}
£ 2,9 =  succ(£}5) =  succ(Cl) =
{(test-result =  + +  V test-result =  - -) A (colour =  purple)}
£ 2,10 =  succ(£}5) =  succ(C^) =
{(test-result =  + +  V test-result =  - -) A (colour =  green)}
£2 21 succÇC-^  g) ^  succ(£g) —
{(test-result =  + - V test-result =  + + )  A (colour =  purple)}
£ 2,12 — s u c c ( £ i 6) =  succ(Cj) =
{(test-result =  +- V test-result =  + + )  A (colour =  green)}
£213 =  succ(C\ 7) =  {test-result =  + - A colour =  green}
£214 =  succ(£} 8) =  {test-result =  + - A colour =  purple} 
s u c c ( £ 2 ;1) =  s u c c ( £ 2 )2) =  s u c c ( £ 2 ]3) =  s u c c ( £ 2 i4) =  s u c c ( £ 2 )5) =  
s u c c (£ 2 )6) =  su c c (£ 2 )3) =  su c c (£ 2 )13) =  s u c c (£ 2 j3) =  s u c c (£ 2 )14) =  0 
£ 3 1  =  succ{Cl7) =  C \ z
£ \ , 2  = SUCC(£'\,l) — ^ 2,5 
^3,3 =  S,ucc(£2)8) =  £ 2,4 
^3,4 =  succ(£2)8) =  £ 2,6 
^ 3,5 ~  Sltcc(£2 g) =  £2,2
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Aï,6 =  SUCC(^~'2,9) =  ^2,6 
^ 3 ,7  =  S7tCc(Z^2,lo) =  ^ 2 ,1  
^ 3,8 — s u c c ( ^ 2 , l o )  =  ^ 2,5 
^ 3 ,9  =: <5'î/Cc(/^2Jl l )  =  ^ 2 ,2  
A i,10 =  SUCC(£'2,ll)  — A , 4
A,1 1 = succ{ 2^,i2) — A,1 
A,12 = 5WCC(A,12) — A,3
succ(Cl) = 0
Table 3.4: Description of all possible rules in Model Variant III. The events +- and -+ are 
summarised as +-.
3.5 S im ulations
Simulations are run in three steps:
1. First, the model is explored to find the RL parameter settings for a  and 7 that are 
capable of generating discrimination. The other parameters are fixed. The results 
of the optimisation procedure are looked at in some illustrative simulations.
2. Using the results of these exploratory simulations, the RL parameters are fixed 
and more simulations with a larger number of agents and more repetitions are 
run. The key statistical discrimination parameter 6 is varied. The aim is to 
obtain representative samples of the model behaviour.
3. Some more specific scenarios modelling existing negative stereotypes, taste-based 
discrimination and variation in investment costs are run to analyse further which 
features are responsible for generating statistical discrimination.
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3.5.1 Exploration
The aim of this section is to find out which model setups under which parameter 
settings are able to generate statistical discrimination. For this, many simulations 
with few agents and many a  and 7 parameter settings are run and optimised using a 
Genetic Algorithm (GA) as a stochastic optimisation method. The following paragraphs 
describe the procedure used and the outcome of these simulations.
3.5.1.1 Finding Optimal Learning Param eters
GA’s (Holland 1975) are often used in stochastic optimisation problems. An optimi­
sation problem is, for instance, the approximation of a function that estimates some 
empirical observable value. GA’s are, in principle, a directed search process. At the 
start of the process, a pool of candidate solutions called chromosomes is initialised. A 
chromosome contains a number of genes. The genes represent, for example, parameter 
values of a function to be approximated. A chromosome is initialised with a number 
of typically randomly initialised genes. A gene is represented as a binary string. The 
bits of the string can encode different things such as the digits of a number. The task 
of the algorithm is to evolve and select the best solutions from the chromosome pool 
by applying genetic operators such as mutation or crossover. These operators change 
and recombine the bits of the fittest genes. Mutation switches a bit of the string with 
a certain probability; crossover selects a fraction of the chromosomes and recombines 
genes of the same type from the resulting sample at a randomly selected point in the 
string. The new pool of chromosomes constitutes the next generation. Fitness is deter­
mined by a fitness function, which computes the distance from the candidate solution 
to the problem solution. While a subset of the fittest genes is reproduced in the next 
generation using the operators, unfit genes are removed from the population. The pro­
cess stops after a certain criterion, e.g., after a maximum number of generations has 
been computed, or some fitness threshold has been reached (for an introduction, see, 
for example, Goldberg (1989)).
Here, the GA is initialised with chromosomes containing four genes. The genes
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represent the pnr 3-meters cxempioyen 'Remployer i -^worker and 'yworker • The population size 
of a generation is limited to 20 chromosomes; the maximum number of evolutions is 
bound to 25. The probability that mutation occurs is set at 0.35. The crossover rate is 
12%. The framework used for implementation is JGAP (2011). The fitness function is 
given by the resulting employment discrimination after a simulation run of 5000 time 
steps. For this, the average difference between employment levels between green and 
purple workers over all time steps is computed. The larger the difference, the ‘fitter’ 
the candidate parameter set. The time scale has no relation to the classroom game. 
The reason is that this model is of an exploratory nature and unknown whether the 
necessary agent learning can be achieved in ‘real time’. Moreover, large time scales can 
inform about the stability of the model in the long run.
Applying this algorithm to each model variant produces for each variant a set of 
different optimal parameter values. Before looking at some example runs in the next 
sections, the parameters and the outcome of the optimisation procedure are shown in 
table 3.5. % is set to an arbitrary high value (100 in this case), because the goal is to 
find out whether it is possible to generate discrimination at all. Therefore, a limitation 
of state descriptions provides no benefit at this stage. (  is set to a small value to allow 
frequent re-evaluation of mappings and consequently, adjustment in the beliefs. That is, 
it is easier to revise negative stereotypes. If discriminatory outcomes emerge, they are 
likely to be based on co-evolution and not ignorance on the employer side. Similarly, the 
parameters zv and ft are set at intervals that allow reasonable large samples of rewards 
for single rules (about 100 time steps), but can be changed frequently enough over the 
5000 time steps to allow reasonable variation in the expanded state-action mappings. 
Finally, p was fixed at a value > 0 to prevent traps in the search process, but not too 
large to prevent excessive switching.
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Parameter value meaning
Discrimination parameters
f qo 0.5 Probability of good test result if invested
f u0 0.2 Probability of good test result if not invested
c 0-0.1 Investment cost interval
BRA parameters
c 0.05 Weight for revisiting expanded nodes
p 0.3 Weight for switching paths in the tree
75 Interval for deleting inferior expansions
V 100 Interval for creating new expansions
X 100 Maximum numbers of nodes
Variant I
^em ployer, 0.01-0.15
choice parameter for r 1 - action set bound to 
descriptor Cq (test-result is ambiguous and 
(colour is green or colour is purple))
If em ployer^1 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for r 1
(^worker 0.01 - 0.2 choice parameter for worker rule
'yworker 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for worker rule
Variant II
^ em ployer,r1 0.01 - 0.1
choice parameter for r 1 - action set bound 
to descriptor Cq ((test-result—-b-) and 
(colour=green or colour=purple))
1  em ployer,^ 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for r1
Q  em ployer,^ 0.01 - 0.1
choice parameter for r 2 - action set bound 
to descriptor Cjq ( (test-result =  + + ) and 
(colour=green or colour=purple))
'fem ploy er,r2 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for r 2
^■employer,r3 0.01 - 0.1
choice parameter for r 3 - action set bound 
to descriptor £q ( (test-result=- -) and 
(colour=green or colour=purple))
^em ployer,r3 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for r 3
^■worker 0.01 - 0.2 choice parameter for worker rule
^w orker 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for worker rule
Variant III
choice parameter for r 1 - action set
^em ployer,r1 0.01-0.15
bound to descriptor C\ ( (test-result—-b-b
or test-result—-b- or test-result—- - ) and 
(colour=reen or colour=purple))
Iem p lo yer^ 1 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for r 1
(^worker 0.01 - 0.2 choice parameter for worker rule
worker 0.01 - 0.5 discount parameter for worker rule
Table 3.5: Simulation parameters for finding optimal RL parameters.
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Figure 3.2: Model fit for various parameter settings in model variant I.
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Figure 3.3: Model fit for various parameter settings in model variant II
Figures 3.2 to 3.4 summarise the different parameter settings that have been visited 
by the GA. The figures display all samples which were run and are sorted by the largest 
difference in the employment levels of the two groups. The x-axis represents simulation 
runs while the y-axis displays the various parameters of the model and the fitness 
criterion, which all vary between 0 and 1. On the right end of the graph are those 
simulations that produce the strongest discrimination.
In general, settings with small aworker (early lock-in into investment/ non-investment 
behaviour) have the best chances to produce the discrimination. Thus, if worker be­
haviour is relatively stable and differs, for some reason, between groups (here due to 
the variation of choice and learning behaviour), then employers discriminate between 
them accordingly.
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Figure 3.4: Model fit for various parameter settings in model variant III.
3.5.1.2 Variant I
In this scenario, learning happens only when test results are ambiguous. In the case of 
- - employers never hire, in the case of + +  they always hire.
Figure 3.2 shows that discriminatory outcomes emerge mostly in case where workers’ 
ex. is small. The reason for this is that the workers act as an 6environment’ for the 
employers. The more stable workers’ behaviour, the easier it becomes for the employers 
to learn. When the initial configuration is such that sufficient members of each group 
play almost exclusively one of the two possible strategies, discrimination can emerge 
very quickly and remain stable. As soon as workers’ cx increases, the employers are 
increasingly unable to use colour as a decision hint, and the hiring rates for both groups 
become similar.
The sample simulation shown in figures 3.5 and 3.6 illustrates this dynamic. Discrim­
ination persists, but investment behaviour of the workers is non-deterministic. There 
were also simulations with even greater discrimination; however in these simulation 
workers never changed their strategies, i.e. no experimentation occurred any more, and 
the result was determined fully by the matching of the first time step.
The sample simulation generates discrimination, but stays short of the simulation 
reported by Fryer et al.: In both cases, there is persistent discrimination, and this
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Figure 3.5: Hiring rates of an example run for model variant I (5 purple workers, 5 green 
Workers). Parameters, (^employer =  0.13, ^em ployer ~  0.17, CX.wori~er —  0.01, 'yworker ~  0.17
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Figure 3.6: Investment rates of an example run for model variant I (5 purple workers, 5 green 
workers). Parameters. C^emp/oyeT’ — 0.13, Remployer — 0.17, Q^ or/cer =  0.01, 'yworker =  0.17
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behaviour emerges very early. However, in the classroom experiment, discrimination 
was, with employment rates of 0.8 and 0.4, much larger. In the simulation, rates are 
on average about 0.48 and 0.36, in the most extreme case the rates reached 0.55 and 
0.24. A simple calculation reveals that the hiring rates in the simulations reflect a 
liberal strategy independent of worker colour: For investing workers, the test outcome 
probabilities are + +  =  0.5 *0.5 =  0.25, —  =  0.5 *0.5 =  0.25, and -j— =  2(0.5 *0.5) =  
0.5 (since event H— and —h are equivalent, they are denoted only with H— ); for non­
investing workers these probabilities are + +  =  0.02*0.02 =  0.04, —  =  0.8*0.8 =  0.64, 
and H— =  2(0.016 * 0.016) =  0.032. In the simulation, purple workers invest with a 
relative frequency of 0.6 and green workers with a relative frequency 0.4. In case 
of a liberal strategy independent of colour (represented by the rule ‘if test result is 
ambiguous, always hire’), the expected employment level is 0.6 * 0.75 =  0.45 for purple 
workers, and 0.4 * 0.75 =  0.3 for green workers. This is, by and large, reflected by the 
simulation results. Employers hire fewer green workers because their test results are 
usually worse. If employers were biased against green workers because they invest less, 
the employment rate of greens should be lower (for a pure conservative strategy, the 
rate would be 0.1 only).
This means that difference in employment levels can be generated and persist in this 
model. However, it seems likely that it is not the type of discrimination observed in the 
classroom game, where decisions were biased towards ‘hire’ in case the worker belonged 
to the group with higher expected investments and towards ‘not-hire’ in the opposite 
case. In the RL model, discrimination reflects actual differences in worker productivity.
3.5.1.3 Variant II
The example run of model variant I indicates that employer decisions reflect actual 
investment behaviour. This resulted into a colour-independent liberal strategy. Possi­
bilities for discrimination were limited, as employers could use colour as decision cri­
terion only if the test result was ambiguous. In the second setup, employers have the 
capability to favour workers even if their result was bad, and to discriminate even if the
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Figure 3.7: Hiring rates for an example run of model variant II (6 purple workers, 4 green 
workers). Parameters: Oiernpioyer =  0.08, e^mployer =  0.21 (for all initial mappings), a WOrker  =  
0.01, 'yworker =  0.3
test result was good.
Looking at the fitness of simulations with different parameter settings, figure 3.3 
shows analogous behaviour as Variant I.
However, the employment level is higher and as figure 3.7 shows, the difference in 
employment levels is much stronger. Moreover, it seems that this equilibrium state can 
collapse quickly for no or only very little changes in investment behaviour (figure 3.8).
This result comes closer to the empirical results of Fryer Jr. et al (2005), who 
observed that if in doubt, workers expected to invest are hired at a higher rate than 
if expected not to invest. In the simulation, discrimination is persistent; however, the 
level of employment and the extent of discrimination may change quickly. As it can be 
seen from figure 3.8, this is due to a preceding change in investment behaviour.
Calculating the hiring rates for a liberal strategy in the same way as in variant 
I results in expected employment levels of 0.44 for purple and 0.4 for green workers. 
The actual average hiring rates are 0.79 for purple and 0.45 for green workers. This
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Figure 3.8: Investment rates for an example run of model variant II (6 purple worker, 4 
green workers) . Parameters: CKempioyer = 0.08, e^mployer = 0.21 (for all initial mappings), 
( ^ w o r k e r  = 0.01, ' Y w o r k e r  = 0.3
means that employers hire purple workers most of the time even if the test result is bad, 
whereas the test outcome plays a more important role for green workers (even though 
they are hired more frequently than even the liberal strategy would suggest). Which 
beliefs exactly form during simulations with such outcomes is shown in more detail in 
section 3.5.2.
3.5.1.4 Variant III
Figure 3.4 illustrates that there is no parameter setting supporting discrimination in 
this variant. At most, if at all, it seems that large choice parameters (a «  0.1) on the 
employer side, together with small choice parameters (a % 0.05) on the worker side 
generate differences in hiring levels.
The simulation with the largest average difference in hiring rates emphasises this 
result (Figures 3.9 and 3.10). Hiring rates in general are much lower as in the previous 
examples (on average 0.31 for purple and 0.23 for green agents). It is difficult for 
employer agents to distinguish between the benefits of a good and a bad test result, so
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Figure 3.9: Hiring rates for an example run of model variant III (4 purple workers, 6 green 
workers). Parameters. C o e m p lo y e r  — 0.05, R e m p l o y e r  ~  0.07, CX,worfcer  = 0.12, ' Y w o r k e r  = 0.15
that they tend to rather not hire anybody. Although there are differences in hiring rates 
across both groups, this variation does not follow a stable pattern; the green workers 
simply experience more erratic phases of hiring and investment. This may lead to short 
cycles of discrimination (e.g. between steps 2000 and 3000), but the pattern does not 
persist.
3.5.2 Average R esults
After finding out appropriate learning parameters, this section presents simulations with 
more agents, samples of different 0 values and more runs, keeping the RL parameters 
constant.
The distribution of 9 determines the outcome of the test result, depending on 
whether an agent has invested or not. If f u(9) and f q(6) is similar, investing does 
not make a big difference - the outcome is mostly random. If the difference ôf^e) = 
f g W  — fu(9) is large {fq(0) > f u(9)] see also section 3.2), investing increases the chance 
of a good test result strongly. If there is a positive relationship between $ and investment 
level and, consequently, in the hiring rate in the RL model, then the overall employ-
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Figure 3.10: Investment rates for an example run of model variant III (4 purple workers, 6 
green workers). Parameters, — 0.05, ' Y e m p l o y e r  — 0.07, ( ^ w o r k e r  — 0.12, ' Y w o r k e r  — 0.15
ment level can be expected to increase with S/p). The medium range of reflects a 
similar setup as in the previous section: The chance of a positive test result is slightly 
higher for investing workers. This setting can also be expected support discrimination 
the most - it depends crucially on employers’ response whether investment pays. If the 
standards are very high (e.g., never hire a worker with a bad test result if coming from 
a certain group), investing becomes a costly choice for workers. Conversely, it becomes 
expensive to turn around such beliefs once they exist for the same reason. In the RL 
model, this could turn into reinforcing the non-investment choice.
To fix a  and 7 , the averages of simulations producing an average discrimination rate 
of 10% were selected, ensuring the possibility of discrimination in subsequent runs. This 
boundary is set arbitrary to pick not only one, possibly unrepresentative, parameter 
value of, say, the most discriminatory outcome. Furthermore, only model variants I and 
II are followed up, since variant III was not capable of producing discrimination. The 
following section will analyse both models further.
Simulations are run for 50 samples of 0, drawn from uniform distributions f q(0) and
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Parameter value meaning
Discrimination parameters
f qo 0.5 - 1.0 Probability of good test result if invested
f j 0.0 - 0.5 Probability of good test result if not invested
c 0 - 0 . 1 Investment cost interval
Variant I
^ e m p l o y e r , r 1 0.13
learning parameter for r 1 - action set bound 
to descriptor Cq (test-result is ambiguous 
and (colour is green or colour is purple))
1  e m p l o y e r ^ 0.15 discount parameter for r 1
^ w o r k e r 0.0107 learning parameter for worker rule
‘‘Y w o r k e r 0.16 discount parameter for worker rule
Variant II
^ e m p l o y e r , r 1 0.05
learning parameter for r 1 - action set 
bound to descriptor Cq ((test-result—-b-) and 
(colour=green or colour=purple))
R e m p l o y e r , r 1 0.43 discount parameter for r1
^ ■ e m p lo y e r , r 2 0.05
learning parameter for r2 - action set 
bound to descriptor £§ ( (test-result—b—b) 
and (colour=green or colour =purple))
7 e m p l o y e r , r 2 0.43 discount parameter for r2
^ ■ e m p lo y e r , r 3 0.05
learning parameter for r 3 - action set bound 
to descriptor Cq ((test-result is bad) and 
(colour is green or colour is purple))
I f  e m p l o y e r , r 3 0.43 discount parameter for r 3
^ - w o r k e r 0.0107 learning parameter for worker rule
' Y w o r k e r 0.27 discount parameter for worker rule
Table 3.6: Simulation parameters for obtaining average results.
f u(9). Each simulation is repeated 5 times. Table 3.6 summarises the parameters.
3.5.2.1 Variant I
Figure 3.11 shows simulation results averaged over different parameter settings 9. On 
the x-axis the difference = f q(6) — f u(9) is displayed. To compare the employment 
levels over all the runs, the members of the green and purple groups are relabelled into
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Figure 3.11: Average hiring rates for model variant I across different values of 6. The x-axis 
is given by S f ^  = f q(0) — f u{0)- Discrimination is the difference between the high and low 
employment group.
advantaged and disadvantaged depending on which group had the higher or lower em­
ployment in a particular simulation. Figure 3.12 displays the results for all simulations.
Figure 3.11 shows that the difference between the groups is small; the largest average 
difference between employment rates is 0.16. The chance to generate a positive test- 
result has thus, on average, no influence on discrimination. Moreover, employment does 
not rise with Sf^)- If discrimination evolves, it is again an isolated event without any 
relationship to the parameter 9 (estimating the linear regression function in the form 
of discrimination = a + (3Sf(o) did not result in significant coefficients). This is also 
underlined by a look at the distribution of single runs in figure 3.12 - runs with the 
same can result in very different employment levels. Summary measures of the 
simulation samples given in appendix B illustrate that higher average discrimination 
is due to single runs with discrimination, whereas most samples show little difference 
between the groups.
Figures 3.13a to 3.13d show the simulations with the highest difference between em­
ployment levels (0.1603 and 0.1604). The pattern is similar to the simulation presented
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Figure 3.12: Hiring rates for model variant I across different values of 6. The x-axis is given
by 5/(0) = f q{0) -  M e)
in the previous section 3.5.1.2. Discrimination and investment behaviour evolves at the 
same time early in the simulation and persists.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show the rules that emerged. Since only the rule for ambiguous 
test results was not fixed, there are just three possible outcomes. Using the exponential 
selection rule (equation 2.4), the table displays the choice propensity p(hire) for action 
‘hire’ and the number of rule activations. The propensity for action ‘not hire’ is 1 — 
p(hire). The table shows that the original rule (test result is ambiguous and (colour 
=  green colour =  purple)) is activated only a few times, while the successor rules are 
activated more often. Thus, most of the time the discriminatory behaviour persists. 
However, the differences between the two groups is small. In the first simulation, for 
example, purple workers are hired with a probability of 0.86, whereas green workers with 
probability 0.61. This reflects the observation made in section 3.5.1.2 - discrimination 
comes about due to different investment behaviours alone.
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(b) Investment rates variant I (23 purple, 27 
green workers), f u(d) — 0.26, 
f q(d) =  0.59
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(d) Investment rates variant II (30 purple, 
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f q(d) =  0.55
Figure 3.13: Statistical discrimination - 2 sample simulation runs of model variant I,
^employer = 25, nworker = 50. Each graph shows moving averages over 10 time steps.
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state description p(hire) rel.act.
abs.
act.
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =  
purple or colour =  green)
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
green
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
purple
0.61
0.61
0.78
0.03
0.47
0.49
3
45
47
Table 3.7: Rules generated in a sample simulation of model variant I (23 purple workers, 27 
green workers), f u(9) = 0.26, f q(9) = 0.59 and their relative (rel. act.) and absolute (abs. 
act.) activation frequency in the employer population. Measurements were taken every 100 
time steps.
state description p(hire) rel.act.
abs.
act.
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =  
purple or colour =  green)
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
green
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
purple
0.67
0.68
0.86
0.06
0.49
0.45
19
152
141
Table 3.8: Rules generated in a sample simulation of model variant I (30 purple workers, 20 
green workers), f u{6) = 0.48, f q{0) — 0.55 and their relative (rel. act.) and absolute (abs. 
act.) activation frequency in the employer population. Measurements were taken every 100 
time steps.
3.5.2.2 Variant II
Figure 3.14 shows again simulation results averaged over different parameter settings 
9. Figure 3.15 displays the results for all simulations.
Discrimination is on average higher as compared to setup I. The difference between 
high and low employment groups moves up to about 0.3. Estimating a linear regres­
sion of the form discrimination =  a  +  pSf(e) results in a small, however significant 
relationship with discrimination = 0.03467 +  0.03617^/(0). However, large differences 
in average employment levels are again mainly due to extreme values in the samples, 
as shown in appendix B. A large average discrimination comes usually with a high
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Figure 3.14: Average hiring rates for model variant II across different values of 6. The x- 
axis is given by S f ^  = f q(0) — f u(6). Discrimination is the difference between high and low 
employment group.
standard deviation. Figure 3.15 illustrates this graphically. Thus, also here one cannot 
assume a relationship between 6 and discrimination.
Figures 3.16a to 3.16d show the two single simulation runs with the highest discrim­
ination (0.31 and 0.28). In both examples, investment levels are relatively stable from 
the beginning, while employment levels adjust only after some 1000 time steps. This 
points to a pattern where first some actual difference between worker group behaviour 
exists, which is then followed by an adjustment of the beliefs on the employer side.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show the rules that emerged for the two sample simulations. 
In the first simulation, employers developed no rule for the ambiguous test case. They 
trust most of the time that green workers’ good test results lead to high productivity, 
while they believe the opposite of purple workers. If the test result is bad or ambiguous 
employers tend not to hire. In the second simulation - reflecting the Fryer results - 
employers tend to favour the green workers even in the event of a bad test result; they 
behave similarly if the result is unclear. Purple workers are always believed to be less 
productive: If their test result is negative, they get almost never hired; if the result is
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Figure 3.15: Average hiring rates for model variant II across different values of 9. The x-axis 
is given by Sf{e) = f q(0) -  f u(9)
positive, they are hired only with a chance of 0.2. Likewise, their chances to get hired 
in case of an ambiguous test result are worse.
The difference between the two samples is the impact of £/(0)- While in the first 
simulation, employers can be certain that an investing worker has a positive test result 
= 0.99) and a non-investing worker most likely has a negative result ( fq{0 = 
0.06)), this is not so clear in the second simulation. In the latter, the chance of a 
good test result if not investing is closer to the chance of a good result if investing. 
Consequently, the variety of the rules that emerges is greater. In the first simulation, 
the parent state-descriptions ‘test-result is good and (colour=green or colour=purple)’ 
and ‘test-result is bad and (colour=green or colour=purple) ’ are activated almost as 
many times as their children, indicating that the coarser grained descriptions are (on 
average) nearly as good as the more detailed successors. The expected value of the 
parent approaches the payoffs in table 3.1. Since the test-result is a certain indicator 
of productivity, there is no need to consider colour as a hint. In the second simulation, 
the difference between the expected values of the parent state-descriptions cannot be 
so large as in table 3.1, because non-investing workers of the same colour will more
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Figure 3.16: Statistical discrimination - 2 sample simulations runs of model variant II, 
^employer — 25, nworker =  50. Each graph shows moving averages over 10 time steps.
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state description p(hire) rel.act.
abs.
act.
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =  
purple or colour =  green) 0.05 0.02 90
Test-result is bad and (colour =  purple 
or colour =  green) 0.16 0.18 1040
Test-result is good and (colour =  pur­
ple or colour =  green) 0.33 0.12 698
Test-result is bad and colour =  green 0.1 0.2 1152
Test-result is bad and colour =  purple 0.05 0.24 1387
Test-result is good and colour =  green 0.9 0.12 691
Test-result is good and colour =  purple 0.11 0.11 607
Table 3.9: Rules generated in a sample simulation run of model variant II (28 purple workers, 
22 green workers), f u(6) = 0.06, f q(9) = 0.99 and their relative (rel. act) and absolute (abs. 
act.) activation frequency in the employer population. Measurements were taken every 100 
time steps.
often get a positive test result. So it becomes more likely that the algorithm evolves 
(or switches between) more branches, using colour as an additional hint. When the 
new rules match worker behaviour, they remain stable. As a result, the employers in 
model variant II follow clearly a discriminatory pattern that makes it difficult for purple 
workers to escape their situation - even if they achieve good test results, employers are 
unlikely to believe them.
3.5.3 How Persistent is Discrim ination?
So far, the simulations showed that discrimination in the RL model can emerge. How­
ever, there is no general rule when this might happen. Furthermore, looking at the de­
tails of variant I, clearly this candidate does not match the empirical results of Fryer Jr. 
et al (2005). Variant II has more parallels in aggregate results as well as in the behaviour 
patterns that emerge. In what follows, model variant I is, therefore, not considered any 
further.
The purpose of this section is to find out whether there are conditions that support
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state description p(hire) rel.act.
abs.
act.
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =  
purple or colour =  green) 0.31 0.07 447
Test-result is bad and (colour =  purple 
or colour =  green) 0.1 0.06 794
Test-result is good and (colour =  pur­
ple or colour =  green) 0.35 0.13 365
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
green 0.63 0.08 482
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
purple 0.33 0.07 447
Test-result is bad and colour =  green 0.18 0.19 1170
Test-result is bad and colour =  purple 0.06 0.2 1256
Test-result is good and colour =  green 0.86 0.11 662
Test-result is good and colour =  purple 0.2 0.09 591
Table 3.10: Rules generated in a sample simulation run of model variant II (26 purple 
workers, 24 green workers), f u(0) = 0.35, f g(0) = 0.98 and their relative (rel.act.) and 
absolute activation (abs. act.) frequency in the employer population. Measurements were 
taken every 100 time steps.
statistical discrimination on the average, that is, whether it is possible to make some 
general statements about why and when discrimination emerges in the RL model. For 
example, the existence of negative stereotypes towards one worker group could discour­
age this group from investing from the beginning and persist over time. Such scenarios 
can be modelled by starting with situations in which discrimination exists, for example 
by setting negative stereotypes or uneven cost distributions. Then, it can be observed 
in which direction the simulation develops once the barriers are removed.
Three scenarios are considered to investigate this question. First, taste-based dis­
crimination is introduced. In this scenario, the share of firms never hiring green workers 
is increased. In the second scenario, heterogeneous conditions for green workers are in­
troduced by increasing their investment cost for an initial, but limited period. In the 
third scenario, employers are confronted with always investing purple and never invest­
ing green workers for an initial, limited period. After this period, the deterministic
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workers are replaced with the original, homogenous agents. The third scenario can also 
be thought of as an extreme case of the second where investment cost at the beginning 
is prohibitive for green workers, and 0 for purple workers.
T aste-based  d iscrim ination  In this scenario, inequality is generated by fixing firm 
behaviour, similar as the preference model of Becker (1957)). Simulations are run with 
a proportion of firms never hiring green workers; for purple workers, the original rules 
of model variant II apply. Figures 3.17 and 3.18 shows the hiring rates of green and 
purple workers as the number of these firms (labelled p-firms) increases. In this sce­
nario, the employment chances of green workers worsen deterministically. The question 
is how they react to these conditions and how this influences the remaining firms hir­
ing green workers. If statistical discrimination is encouraged, one would expect an 
over-proportional decrease in hiring levels of green workers: Green workers invest less 
due to worsening conditions on the labour market, which induces the remaining liberal 
employers not to hire them because of expected lower investments. If the liberal em­
ployers continue to hire greens at the same rate, then worker behaviour reflects just the 
increasing number of p-firms.
Figure 3.17 shows a slight sigmoid shape of the hiring level graph of green workers, 
that is, hiring levels decrease slightly over-proportionally while the number of p-firms 
increases linearly. An estimate of the logit function with employment as dependent and 
share of p-firms as independent variable (interpreting the employment levels as cate­
gories) shows graphically a closer approximation than the linear model (coefficient esti­
mates are significant). That is, in the medium region workers are discouraged strongly 
from investing, resulting in over-proportionally lower hiring levels. However, the effect 
is small.
Furthermore, as figure 3.18 shows, the discrimination of the green group has also 
an effect on the hiring level of purple workers. The effect is linear. In the beginning, 
purple workers manage to free-ride on the expectations of the employer population and 
invest at lower rates as they get hired. Firms expect higher average investment rates
Chapter 3. Statistical Discrimination 95
“ “ hiring ra te
**  linear p red ic tio n  hiring r a te  
; ' *  logit p red ic tio n  hiring r a te  ; •
f
l:
Î
0.1 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9
Figure 3.17: Hiring rates of green workers if increasing numbers of firms deterministically 
discriminate against them. The x-axis depicts the number of firms that never hire green 
workers. The dotted line indicates the linear model estimated from the data, the hatched line 
the estimated logit function.
(independent of which colour invests more), which makes riskier firm decisions, such 
as hiring workers with a bad test result, more profitable. With increasing p-firms, the 
chance of generating high payoffs on average decreases as green workers invest less and 
less, so the average payoff of hiring (any) workers with a bad or ambiguous test result 
will also decrease.
U nequal investm ent costs In this scenario, there is initially an unequal distribution 
of costs similar as in the experiment of Fryer Jr. et al (2005) described above. For a 
starting period, the cost distribution of green workers is drawn from the higher interval 
0.1 - 0.3, so that investing is always more expensive than for the purple group (interval 
0 - 0.1). This could represent a situation where entry barriers into certain vacations 
are high for the discriminated group. The question is whether this leads to different 
investment behaviour and if yes, whether this persists after the barrier is removed. 
The scenario implemented by setting back the cost distribution to normal after step 
1000. Simulations are run again for f u(0) =  0.35, f q(0) =  0.98 and f u(0) = 0.06,
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Figure 3.18: Hiring rates of purple workers if increasing numbers of firms deterministically 
discriminate against green workers. The x-axis depicts the number of firms that never hire 
green workers. The dotted line indicates the linear model estimated from the data, the hatched 
line the estimated logit function.
f q(9) = 0.99, i.e. with the same settings as for the two sample simulations with the 
highest discrimination from the preceding section 3.5.2. Figures 3.19a to 3.19d show 
the results.
In both scenarios, green workers invest less up to time step 1000, and employers hire 
them at a corresponding lower rate. The hiring rate differs according to the distributions 
of 6. In the simulation with less noise {fu(9) = 0.06, f q(6) = 0.99), the employment level 
of both groups is higher. The pattern in both simulations is similar. In both simulations, 
green workers are hired at a similar rate as purple workers after the barrier is removed. 
That is, cost heterogeneity leads to discrimination, but the effect on employer beliefs is 
not permanent. Whether this is because the difference between costs is too small can 
be checked in the next paragraph.
N egative stereo types In the last scenario, inequality is generated by creating neg­
ative stereotypes on the employer side. To achieve this situation, the two sample sim­
ulations of variant II are set up with the same parameters as before. The simulation
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Figure 3.19: Effect of cost heterogeneity in model variant II, n empioyer =  25, n worker = 50, 25 
repetitions. Each graph shows moving averages over 10 time steps.
is split in two parts: For the first 1000 steps, employers are confronted with purple 
workers who always, and green workers who never invest. After that, all deterministic 
worker agents are removed and replaced by learning worker agents as in the original 
setup. The simulation is then run for another 4000 time steps. Figures 3.20a to 3.20d 
shows average results for 25 repetitions.
As the figures illustrate, employers discriminate on average when worker behaviour 
is deterministic. They hire purple workers at a rate of almost 0.35 and green workers 
at a rate of about 0.1. However, after exchanging the worker agents, both hiring rates
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Figure 3.20: Effect of prior negative stereotypes in model variant II, nempioyer = 25, nworker =  
50, 25 repetitions. Each graph shows moving averages over 10 steps.
converge to the same rate in between the extremes. The only difference between the two 
samples is the employment level: For the setting f u{0) = 0.35, f q(6) = 0.98, the level 
is higher for purple and lower for green workers as compared to the first simulation. 
Furthermore, there is a slightly lower investment. So it seems that the smaller chance 
of getting a positive test result discourages green workers from investing. This effect is 
small and only temporary. In the longer run, both hiring and investment rates converge.
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show the rules responsible for this result. In the first simulation 
( /tt(0) =  0.06, f q(0) = 0.99), the relative frequency of activations of the general rule
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‘if test-result is bad and (colour=green or colour=purple) ’ increased from 0.13 to 0.24, 
whereas the share of its children decreased. Thus, after switching worker behaviour, 
employers generalised some rules. For simulation f u(9) = 0.35, f q(6) = 0.98, the share 
of the general rule ‘if test-result is good and (colour=green or colour=purple)’ increased 
only slightly from 0.1 to 0.15. Thus, employers generalise existing discriminating rules 
to some extent. However, the adaptation process works mainly over adjusting the 
selection probabilities.
Some more simulations were run to verify the observation that initial beliefs do not 
influence the result in the longer run. Figure 3.21 shows the discrimination between 
green and purple workers for different Sf^). On average, discrimination is low; maximum 
values are at most around 0.1. Averaged over all steps, there was no simulation with 
discrimination larger than 0.06. The extent of discrimination varies; this variation, 
however, does not occur between simulations, but over time. In most simulations, 
green workers even get hired more often at some stage. For example, for f (9q) = 0.71 
and f (0u) = 0.21 discrimination is close to -0.15 at £ =  1500, but close to 0.05 at £ =  
2000 and £ =  4500.
3.5.4 Summary of the Sim ulation R esults
Besides presenting more detailed figures about the behaviour of the RL model, the 
purpose of the preceding two sections was to test under which conditions it is possible 
to generate discrimination. Varying the exogenous parameter 9 produced similar results 
as already obtained in the exploration section. Discrimination can occur, but cannot 
be explained by 9 alone. In the simulations that resulted in discrimination, a certain 
independence of worker and employer behaviour was observed. Thus, an important 
reason for discrimination in the RL model can be seen in different investment levels on 
the worker side, if they are discovered only later during the simulation by the employers.
In the next step, three scenarios where simulated. These scenarios introduced sys­
tematic biases in the simulation setup in the form of deterministically discriminating 
firms, different investment cost distributions, and the introduction of negative beliefs
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state description p(hire) rel.act.
abs.
act.
for t < 1000
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =  
purple or colour =  green) 0.41 0.02 20
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
green 0.5 0.01 11
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
purple 0.5 0.01 11
Test-result is bad and (colour =  purple 
or colour =  green) 0.33 0.13 119
Test-result is bad and colour =  green 0.13 0.21 185
Test-result is bad and colour =  purple 0.84 0.2 184
Test-result is good and (colour =  pur­
ple or colour =  green) 0.34 0.15 131
Test-result is good and colour =  green 0.19 0.13 118
Test-result is good and colour =  purple 0.78 0.13 119
for t = 1000 to t — 5000
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =  
purple or colour =  green) 0.15 0.02 136
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
green 0.45 0.02 121
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
purple 0.54 0.02 124
Test-result is bad and (colour =  purple 
or colour =  green) 0.39 0.24 1791
Test-result is bad and colour =  green 0.13 0.18 1353
Test-result is bad and colour =  purple 0.14 0.18 1375
Test-result is good and (colour =  pur­
ple or colour =  green) 0.37 0.11 815
Test-result is good and colour =  green 0.16 0.12 866
Test-result is good and colour =  purple 0.16 0.12 877
Table 3.11: Rules generated for model variant II with negative stereotypes, 25 repetitions, 
f u(9) = 0.06, f q(0) = 0.99, and their relative (rel. act.) and absolute (abs. act.) activation 
frequency in the employer population before and after time=1000. Measurements were taken 
every 100 time steps.
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state description p(hire) rel.act.
abs.
act.
for t  < 1000
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =  
purple or colour =  green) 0.35 0.08 74
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
green 0.34 0.07 61
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
purple 0.63 0.07 63
Test-result is bad and (colour =  purple 
or colour =  green) 0.37 0.13 121
Test-result is bad and colour =  green 0.25 0.1 93
Test-result is bad and colour =  purple 0.7 0.1 94
Test-result is good and (colour =  pur­
ple or colour =  green) 0.36 0.1 93
Test-result is good and colour =  green 0.16 0.17 160
Test-result is good and colour =  purple 0.8 0.17 160
for t = 1000 to t = 5000
Test-result is ambiguous and (colour =  
purple or colour =  green) 0.31 0.07 613
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
green 0.32 0.06 553
Test-result is ambiguous and colour =  
purple 0.32 0.06 560
Test-result is bad and (colour =  purple 
or colour =  green) 0.4 0.12 1075
Test-result is bad and colour =  green 0.28 0.1 864
Test-result is bad and colour =  purple 0.3 0.1 855
Test-result is good and (colour =  pur­
ple or colour =  green) 0.44 0.15 1271
Test-result is good and colour =  green 0.17 0.17 1430
Test-result is good and colour =  purple 0.19 0.16 1419
Table 3.12: Rules generated for model variant II with negative stereotypes, 25 repetitions, 
fu(6) = 0.35, f q{Q) = 0.98, and their relative (rel. act.) and absolute (abs. act.) activation 
frequency in the employer population before and after time=1000. Measurements were taken 
every 100 time steps.
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Figure 3.21: Discrimination rates of green workers if firms are biased negatively against green 
workers. Discrimination is the difference between green and purple employment levels. Each 
line represents averages of 10 simulation runs for a particular combination of f q(0) /  f u(9) 
(The legend displays the concrete realisations).
about green workers on the employer side. The simulation results show a slight tendency 
of mutually stabilising expectations. So, for example, there is a non-linear relationship 
between the number of deterministically discriminating firms and investment behaviour. 
The more firms discriminate one group, the stronger this group is discouraged from in­
vesting, and the more unbiased firms tend not to hire members of that group. The next 
scenario showed that the effect of increasing the investment costs of green workers was 
not significant enough to establish a persistent negative employer bias. A similar pic­
ture exists if firms have negative stereotypes about green workers. Thus, even an initial 
prohibitive entry cost did not lead to persistent discrimination of the disadvantaged 
group. In the longer run, discrimination disappears.
Thus, the RL model shows a weak interdependency between employer expectations 
and worker behaviour. However, the main driving force in the RL model is the stickiness 
of investment behaviour. This dynamic is closer to the approach of Phelps (1972), where 
employers adjust to existing differences in worker productivity. In the RL model, this
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can only occur if the simulation takes a certain path. A favourable condition can 
be seen in free-riding behaviour of worker agents. If firms treat workers equally in 
the beginning, but investment behaviour is different, members of the free-riding group 
have no incentives to increase investments. Nevertheless, as their behaviour is flexible 
enough, employers will adjust their hiring levels. On the other hand, workers in the 
model are less flexible, and so they remain with their initial choices. So to speak, 
initial ‘liberal’ behaviour in favour of less productive workers can turn into persistent 
discrimination, but negative beliefs usually do not discourage otherwise homogenous 
workers from investing.
3.6 C onclusion
This chapter presented a RL model of statistical discrimination using the BRA algo­
rithm developed in chapter 2. It aimed to reproduce experimental results and asked 
whether these results could be generalised with an RL-based model. Thus, the question 
was, whether, starting from empirical observation, there is a general mechanism that 
could explain the emergence of statistical discrimination.
The RL model was compared with both theoretical and empirical results from sta­
tistical discrimination games. Several model variants were simulated to find out which 
setup and parameter setting can reproduce the patterns of Fryer Jr. et al (2005)’s 
classroom experiment best. One model (variant II) reproduced with a relative large 
discrimination the aggregate as well as behavioural patterns. Using this setup, some 
more scenarios were simulated to analyse the properties of the model further.
Similar to game-theoretic and experimental results, the RL model shows that sta­
tistical discrimination can exist. Whether it occurs is, however, path-dependent. The 
scenarios simulated in this chapter were not capable of creating a setting in which 
statistical discrimination emerges on the average.
Some differences to the theoretical as well as experimental literature can be high­
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lighted:
-  The relationship between 0 and employment level could not be observed. In­
creasing the likelihood of a positive test result does not increase the number of 
investing workers and thus their hiring rates.
-  Initial beliefs do not necessarily influence the outcome in the long run. That is, 
employer behaviour can adjust very quickly if worker behaviour changes, e.g. due 
to an intervention such as increasing access to human capital.
-  In the RL model, discrimination emerged although no knowledge about market 
outcomes was available, whereas in the experiment knowledge about market out­
comes was public. Thus, for a belief to emerge it may require even less publicly 
shared information. By looking closer at the rules that emerged during the sim­
ulations, it could be shown that the behavioural patterns of the RL model are 
nevertheless similar as in the classroom experiment: If in doubt, hire a worker if 
he or she comes from the group that is believed to be more productive; do not hire 
if he or she comes from the group that is assumed to be less productive. In some 
simulation runs, this results in a state in which workers of the preferred group get 
hired even if they signal low productivity.
-  In the RL model, worker behaviour is the driving factor for generating discrimi­
nation. Discrimination can only emerge if the groups stick to different investment 
behaviour after employer change their policies.
In summary, the RL model was shown to be a good approximation of actual human 
behaviour in the experiments. While results of experiments and simulations are similar, 
the RL model cannot confirm all the relationships postulated by theory. Furthermore, 
a general rule capable of creating discrimination could not be found.
Chapter 4
Network Formation
4.1 In troduction
Networks are an important paradigm for modelling social and economic relationships. 
How members of a society are connected to each other determines behaviour and welfare. 
Through connections to other persons, important resources can be accessed and used 
for one’s own purpose.
A useful distinction is between social and personal networks. Personal networks are 
comprised of the relations an individual has, e.g. relatives, friendships, acquaintances. 
Social networks are an aggregation of individual networks.
The structural properties of networks have long been the topic of network analysis 
in Sociology. The following stylized facts about empirical personal networks can be 
drawn from this literature:
-  Personal networks are small; the closer the contact, the smaller the network. In 
personal relationships, these contacts are usually family and a few very close 
friends. Building on existing research, Hamill and Gilbert (2009) also note that 
maintaining close relationships is costly, requiring resources as time and effort. 
This naturally limits the extent of close relationships a person can maintain.
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-  The distribution of the degree (the number of links a node in the network has) 
of personal networks is unequal. Some individuals are more sociable, and so have 
more relationships than most other people in the network. Empirically, distribu­
tions of personal networks are typically right-skewed, or ’fat-tailed’. This has been 
observed, for example, for co-authorship data: There are some economists who 
appear in many co-authored papers, while the majority has only few co-author 
relationships (Jackson 2008; p.60).
-  Members of personal networks tend to share the same characteristics (homophily). 
Contacts between similar people are more likely than among dissimilar people. 
This can be described by the cluster coefficient. This coefficient determines, in 
principle, the likelihood that two nodes share the same links. Thus, personal 
networks have characteristically large cluster coefficients, as compared to, say, 
a social network. This phenomenon has already been observed by Granovetter 
(1973).
Social networks, on the other hand, are much less connected than individual net­
works, i.e. they have a low overall network density (the ratio of all links relative to all 
possible links). In larger groups, it is simply impossible to know most other people. 
Nevertheless, most individuals in a society can be reached within a few steps. This 
property of small average path lengths (the number of nodes between any pair of nodes 
in the network) and small diameters (the largest distance between any two nodes in the 
network) has been captured in the notion of small worlds. This phenomenon became 
widely known by Milgram’s experiments (e.g. Watts 2004; Milgram and Travers 1969). 
In these experiments, persons had to route letters to persons in other states whom 
they did not directly know, passing the letter to the target themselves or to someone 
they thought is likely to know that person. About a quarter of the letter reached their 
targets. Drawing on such insights, Milgram suggested that there are in general six 
degrees of separation, i.e. anyone in a society is linked to anyone else with just six 
intermediaries.
Chapter 4. Network Formation 107
While a large literature about the structural properties of networks exists, much less 
has been written about the dynamic aspects. Many concepts of how and why people 
relate to each other are based on chance (homophily, social or regional closeness, etc.), 
but they do not conceptualise the creation and maintenance of relationships as choice. 
For example, Barabasi’s preferential attachment model (Barabasi and Albert 1999) 
simply assumes a higher probability of linking to already well-connected persons in the 
society. However, if links, as stated above, are assumed to be costly, persons have to 
make implicit or explicit decisions about who they want to be friends with.
The concept of strategic network formation models the decisions on the micro­
perspective explicitly. Strategy should here be understood not literally, but in the sense 
that individuals tend to form mutually beneficially relationships and drop relationships 
that are not (Jackson 2008; p. 153).
Viewing the formation of connections in such a way allows to model networks as the 
outcome of a game. Goyal (2007) summarises the main features of strategic network 
formation as follows:
-  Strategic network formation can be modelled as a game in which players decide to 
link or not to link to each other, depending on some value function of the network 
and an allocation rule that distributes the value among the players.
-  It is based on assumptions of complete information (players know each other and 
the payoff structure).
-  Networks have some form of externality; that is, for individual players the struc­
ture of the network itself influences their utility.
Communication networks represent a commonly used network model in Economics. 
Communication networks model relationships among individuals tha t exhibit some ben­
efit to the members of the network, typically in the form of information flows. The ben­
efit depends on the number of other persons a member is linked to; the more persons
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in the network, the higher its value to the individual. In its simple form, utility is a 
linear function of the number of other players in the personal network. A more realistic 
form assumes decay in value the more distant the source of information is. Establishing 
and maintaining direct links is costly because it typically involves some effort. Indi­
vidual utility depends, then, on the relationship between costs and benefits. On the 
aggregate, then, this relationship determines the shape of the networks that can form. 
Such a general model can cover many interesting social and economic settings where 
the structure of the networks influences the well-being of the members, for example, 
friendships, work relationships, but also research partnerships between firms.
Although strategic network formation focuses on the micro perspective, it is also 
possible to generate large-scale networks. Jackson and Rogers (2005), for instance, 
present a spatial variation of a communication network game. In this model, players 
are distributed on islands. Costs for connecting to near-by players are low and high 
for connecting to distant players. Jackson and Rogers (2005) show that with certain 
cost settings, the resulting network exhibits small world properties. The intuition is 
that players form links with most of their close neighbours, but economise on distant 
links. It is, nevertheless, still beneficial to maintain the distant links which provide the 
only chance to access the benefits of more players. Similarly, the residential segregation 
model of Schelling (1971) could be seen as a prototype of a network model combining 
chance and choice: Green and red members of a society move randomly and meet other 
members. Depending on their preference for living in a same-colour neighbourhood, 
they decide to relocate or stay. The result is a society that is clustered into same colour 
neighbourhoods.
In recent years, several experiments with strategic network formation have been 
conducted in order to compare the theoretic predictions with empirical data. Few of 
them are based on the partially cooperative network model of Jackson and Wolinsky 
(1996; JW). In this model, links are formed only if both involved players agree. More 
research is related Bala and Goyal (2000)’s non-cooperative version, where links can 
also be established unilaterally.
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As this overview illustrates, strategic network formation can be seen as a differ­
ent and complementary way for generating personal and social networks dynamically. 
There have also been experiments to evaluate the predictive power of network formation 
models. So far, however, no experience-based model of network formation exists. In 
general, RL models have been found to predict experimental data better (see chapter 
2). The purpose of this chapter is to provide such a model for network games in order 
to bridge the gap between theory and experimental evidence. It focuses on the level of 
personal networks alone.
Section 4.2 first introduces notation and definitions. Section 4.3 shortly discusses 
the relevant theoretical, section 4.4 the experimental literature. The RL model is then 
described in section 4.5. The simulations are analysed in section 4.6. In section 4.8, a 
modified version of the RL model is used to compare the results to the laboratory exper­
iments conducted by Conte et al (2009). The main question is whether the RL model 
can predict the outcome of network formation processes better than the equilibrium 
prediction.
Relating the RL network model to the general learning approach as discussed in 
chapter 2, it represents the case-based variant of BRA. Using definition 4 developed in
n
section 2.4.4, it can be described with: & > 1, \Ak\ > 1, Q =  0 and s uc c( C q) = 0 for
k—l
a number k of cases. It is assumed that all players know each other, so that k players 
represent the k cases. There is no dynamic extraction of rules. A variant of BRA where 
the case distinctions are allowed to evolve dynamically is shortly presented in section 
4.7.
4.2 D efin itions and N ota tion
4.2.1 Graphs
D efinition  5. Graphs. A graph g, g Ç G, consists of a nonempty set of elements, 
called vertices and denoted v ^v  Ç V, and a list of pairs of vertices, called edges. Edges
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connecting two vertices Vi and Vj directly are denoted ij. A weighted graph is a graph 
in which weights are attached to the edges. The cardinality of a graph is the number of 
edges it contains, and is denoted with cg.
Af denotes the set of all possible graphs that can be generated from V.
g+ij denotes the graph that can be obtained by adding the edge ij to graph g. 
Conversely, g-ij denotes the graph obtained by deleting this link.
Graphs that are obtained by adding or deleting links are called ‘adjacent’.
For simplifying the description of networks, an undirected, unweighted graph can 
be defined as follows:
D efinition  6 . Network density. Network density measures how strongly the vertices 
of a graph are interconnected by dividing the number of existing edges by the number
n  n
of possible edges. In the directed graph it is defined as D = 5 3  f or
2=0 j=0
n  n
undirected graph it simplifies to D = y 5 3  U- The fully connected graph
i= 0  j>i
has a density of 1, the empty graph a density of 0.
D efinition 7. Shortest path. Let Pxy be a nonempty path in a weighted graph g from  
vertex x to vertex y, consisting of k edges xv\, v\V2 ...Vk-iy. The weight of Pxy, denoted 
as W{Pxy), is the sum of the weights,
W (xvi),W (viV 2 ), ...W(vi~-iy). I f  x=y, the empty path is considered to be a path from  
x to y. The weight of the empty path is zero. I f  no path between x and y has weight 
less than W (Pxy), then Pxy is called a shortest path between x and y, and is denoted as 
SPxy.
D efinition  8 . Average path length. The average path length is the average of all shortest
n
paths in the graph g and denoted as L: L = ^ SPij
While the above definitions are taken from standard graph theory (e.g. Bondy 2008),
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the following notation is simply a short way of describing network structures in small 
networks:
D efinition  9. Network patterns. Let the vector a be the ordered in- or out-degree of all 
vertices. The in-degree is the number of edges arriving at vertex i,the out-degree is the 
number leaving from it, the sum of both is called in-out degree. In an undirected graph 
the in-degree equals the out-degree, since for all edges arriving at i, there must be one 
leading back. I f  the labels of the nodes are interchangeable, a describes the structure of 
the network completely.
For example, the structure 1,1,1,1,4 represents a star with 5 vertices, four vertices 
having one link, denoted by T ,  and one vertex having four links to all other vertices, 
denoted by ‘4’.
4.2.2 Games on Graphs
In a network game, the vertices Vi represent players, and the edges the relationships 
they can engage in.
Network games further include value and allocation functions on the set of possible 
graphs G. Value functions specify how the total utility is generated by the network, and 
the allocation rule defines how this value is distributed among the individual players.
D efin ition 10. Value functions (see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)).
(i) A value function vf is a mapping v f  : {g\g C g ^}  — R
(ii) The value function c v f is defined as the sum of individual utilities of the players:
D efinition 11. Allocation function (see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)).
An allocation function Y  : {g \ g C  distributes the value generated by v f .  The 
‘equal split rule’ (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) distributes the value evenly among the 
players and is defined as: Ye(g,v) = cvf(g )/n .
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4.2.3 Stability definitions
D efinition 12. Pairwise Stability (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). A network is pairwise 
stable if
(i) for all edges ij 6 g, Yi(g, v) > Y i ( g -  ij, v) and Yj(g, v) > Y i ( g -  ij, v)
(ii) for all edges ij £  g, Yi(g, v) <Yi(g + ij, v) then Yj(g, v) >Yi{g + ij, v)
In words: If a link between two players is stable, then there cannot be an adjacent 
network with higher value obtainable by deleting this link. Conversely, for any player 
not being part of the network, the value that can be added by this player must be 
smaller than the current value, otherwise the link would be formed.
The concept of pairwise stability requires that at most two players act at the same 
time, and that the players look only one step ahead. The concept of strong stability 
extends pairwise stability to coalition of players:
D efinition  13. Strong Stability (Jackson and van den Nouweland 2005). A network g 
is strongly stable with respect to Y  and vf if  for H  Ç V  and g ’ obtainable from g via 
deviations by H, and Vi £ H  such that YVi(g ',v f) > YVi(g ,v f) , there exists j  € S  such
zw < %(#,%/).
That is, a network can only be stable if a subset H  of players has no incentive to 
alter it.
For dynamic models of network formation, Jackson and Watts (2002) adapted the 
concept of stochastic stability (Young 1993). In the dynamic version of the game, at 
each time step two randomly selected players decide to form or sever a link. The players 
act myopically and base their decision on whether they are better off with the alteration 
in t+1. That is, they do not consider the possible consequences that may follow by 
changing the utility of other players. After the decision is taken, with some probability 
e > 0 the alteration is applied, or with 1 — e not. This is a Markov chain with the 
states being the respective networks that are formed during the process. W ith e —> 0
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the stationary distribution converges to a unique limiting stationary distribution. From 
this follows the next definition:
D efinition  14. Stochastic stability (Jackson and Watts 2002). A network in the support 
of the limiting stationary distribution of the dynamic process is stochastically stable.
Jackson and Watts present methods that allow the identification of stochastically 
stable networks. The main idea is to identify paths between adjacent networks leading 
with the smallest possible resistance to a pairwise stable network. Resistance describes 
whether there exists an improving path from a given network (i.e. with every step all 
players have to be better off), and if not, how often some deviation from the individual 
rational choice (described by e) has to be made. More details follow in the next section.
4.3 M odels o f N etw ork Form ation
The JW model is essentially a proof of the existence of stable and efficient networks. 
Subsequent work based on this model (Watts 2001; Jackson and Watts 2002; Hummon 
2000; Doreian 2006) as well as related work (Bala and Goyal 2000; Beal and Querou 
2007) provide a dynamic perspective.
In the JW model, players are fully informed, perfectly rational and myopic. Two 
players can choose at a time to link to each other. The link is only formed if both 
players agree. The links are undirected since both ends are involved in establishing it. 
Links can be severed unilaterally; the game is hence partially cooperative. After their 
decision, the network value is computed, and the value distributed among the agents 
according to the equal-split allocation rule. Direct links are costly, and both agents 
bear the costs of the link. Then, the next two players are selected, who take their 
decisions based on the current value of the network and the value that would result by 
their respective actions. As they are myopic they only consider the next state of the 
network. This process goes on until pairwise equilibrium is reached. Depending on the
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cost of links, three different equilibria can be sustained: the fully connected network, a 
sparsely connected network, and the empty network.
The utility function is given by:
players have a certain value w#, plus a constant ’intrinsic’ value wu that each player 
perceives (so that, say, remaining unconnected can have its own utility). 0 < 5 < 1 is 
a decay factor by which the value of connections may decrease, captures the fact 
that the longer the path between the two nodes, the smaller its benefit becomes. If i is 
not connected to j, 6 is set to 0. Direct links are the most valuable, but they come at 
a cost: Cij denotes the costs of maintaining direct relationships (e.g. time and effort); 
for all indirect connections, it is set to 0.
For simplicity, Jackson and Wolinsky set wu to zero and to 1, so that the network 
depends only on the rate of decay and the cost of direct links. Furthermore, cost and 
value are dependent on links, not players. Therefore, the indices are left out, and only 
c and ô is written. They prove the following properties of the network game:
-  c < ô — ô2: The complete graph is the only unique stable solution. Players will 
choose to connect with each other directly provided that the cost of a link is lower 
than the value gained from it: The value of the highest valued indirect link 62 is 
smaller than the net-value S — c gained from a direct link.
-  ô — ô2 < c < Ô: Many solutions are possible, namely all those benefiting from 
indirect links. In this case a direct link has positive utility, but as J — c < J2 it is 
more beneficial to be indirectly linked. One of the stable solutions is star, as this 
structure minimises the number of links and the distance between the nodes.
(4.1)
Uj is the number of links in the shortest path between individuals i and j. Links between
-  5 < c: The only feasible solution is the empty network. No player would be willing 
to create a connection, even if there exists a network that yields positive payoffs.
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They also show that for all n, a unique efficient network exists:
-  If c < S — S2 then the complete network is efficient, as the utility of any direct 
link exceeds the benefit of an indirect link.
-  for S — 62 < c < Ô + (n — 2)/2 * S2 the star is efficient. It minimises the number 
of direct links while connecting all players with a minimal distance.
-  for ô + (n — 2)/2 * ô2 < c only the empty network is efficient; that is. For any 
situation where costs exceed the value that can be generated by the star.
Watts (2001) analyses the actual process of forming the network in the connection 
model. The static model only identified the equilibria and confirms that stable network 
states exist, but does not reveal whether and how these can actually be reached. In the 
dynamic version, two players are selected randomly and given the opportunity to form 
a link. Players are myopic, and thus anticipate in their decision only the utility of the 
network that forms in the next step. The process stops if a stable network results.
She finds that two main attractors are possible: The formation of a stable network, 
or a cycle of adjacent networks (an adjacent network is a network that is obtainable by 
adding or deleting one link) without any sustainable equilibrium. A network can only 
be pairwise stable if it can be reached over a path of adjacent networks. Where there is 
no such path, after some time all feasible networks have been visited, and the process 
must cycle along those networks. In more detail, the main results are:
-  S — c > 62 > 0: The fully connected network forms. In each period utility strictly 
increases for any two players not yet directly connected. Since breaking any link 
an agent reduces his payoff, no links will ever be broken, as in the static model.
-  0 < J — c < J2: Stable non-empty networks can form. The star is efficient and 
is also a pairwise stable network, although not the unique one. The probability 
that a star develops decreases as n goes to infinity, because its formation depends 
on the order in which players meet: Some agent must be the centre agent. If the
Chapter 4. Network Formation 116
centre agent C  meets another agent A  not yet linked to it, then C will agree to 
establish the connection only if A  is not linked to anyone else already connected 
to C. Otherwise, C would lose the benefit of the indirect link. Thus, the star can 
only form if all agents meet the centre agent first. The link will be established 
because with 0 < J — c, any direct link between isolated players will be formed. 
The larger n, the more likely that unconnected players meet each other before 
meeting the same (centre) agent. As a consequence, the likelihood of cycles or 
the convergence to sub-optimal solutions increases. Especially in the higher cost 
regions, agents prefer to connect to players who already have a link. As the chance 
to meet the centre agent first decreases with n, the process is likely to converge 
to a network with only one path connecting every pair of players (i.e. a ‘line 
network’).
-  5 — c < 0: No link is formed. Myopic agents cannot form any links, since there is 
no benefit in establishing the first link, even if connected networks with a utility 
> 0 do exist.
Jackson and Watts (2002) generalise this approach by modelling it as a stochastic 
process, Again, two players are selected randomly, but their decision to form or not 
form a link is only carried out with a certain probability 1 — e, whereas with probability 
e nothing is done. The parameter e may be thought of as errors individuals make in 
their calculations, or deliberate deviations in order to explore different paths. The 
smaller e, the more likely the results converge to that of Watts (Watts 2001). However, 
with larger random perturbations, the myopic nature of the players can be overcome by 
visiting networks that would not result by rational, myopic decisions. Thereby, a new 
path of adjacent networks can be reached, possible leading to a pairwise stable network. 
As already indicated (see definition 14), the dynamics can be formalised as a Markov 
process on the random variable e. As e -4- 0, stable networks that cannot be reached 
are excluded, and the process selects those solutions that can actually be reached by 
myopic players. An application to the co-author model (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) 
demonstrates that the complete network is selected as the unique stochastically stable
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network out of several possible solutions. This means other stable solutions might exist, 
but are not reachable. However, they also demonstrate that there are examples where 
all pairwise stable networks are equally stochastically stable.
Hummon (2000) uses the same model specification as Watts (2001), but he simulates 
the model computationally to obtain his results for n=3, 5 and 10 (see also Doreian 
(2006) for a detailed, but purely descriptive follow up for n=5 and n = 6). The most 
important observation in this context is that on average in all cost ranges either a star 
or a ring emerges as the most frequent solution. Which formation occurs depends solely 
on n and the order in which actors meet. As Watts (2001) derived theoretically, the 
simulations show that with increasing n the frequency of the star decreases. Only in 
the lower cost ranges the star still forms.
Bala and Goyal (2000; BG) analyse the formation of communication networks as a 
non-cooperative game. In the BG model, links can be formed and severed unilaterally. 
Agents who initiate links have to bear all the costs. They consider two variants of the 
model, on in which benefits accrue only to the linking agent (1-way-flow model), and 
one where benefits are shared between players (2-way-flow model).
Using a payoff function without decay, the payoff of a player is given by the benefit 
received of direct and indirect links minus the cost of direct links in network g:
TTiW =  ^ (p )  -  c/jf(g) (4.2)
The marginal benefit of being connected to another agent is normalised to 1. c is the 
cost, fi is the number of all players player i is connect to, and /if is the number of direct 
links the agent maintains.
In any setting where the benefits exceed the costs, it is a best response to link 
to at least one other player. Bala and Goyal show that in the 1-way-flow model the 
Nash equilibrium network is either empty or minimal connected. A minimal connected 
network is a network in which all nodes are connected and splits apart into more than 
one component as soon as one link is severed. In the 2-way-flow model, the equilibrium
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network is either empty or minimally bi-connected, meaning that agents are connected 
in the form a directed graph, and no redundant links exist.
This equilibrium definition includes a large number of networks as the number of 
player grows. For example, for three players there are already five Nash networks in 
the 1-way-flow model. As a refinement, Bala and Goyal define strict Nash equilibrium 
networks. A strict Nash equilibrium exists if there is no other strategy available for all 
players i that is a best response given a strategy profile of the other players J . For 
the 1-way-flow model, Bala and Goyal show that the Strict Nash equilibrium is either 
the empty network or a wheel (a directed graph in form of a ring). More specifically, 
if c < 1 the ring is the unique equilibrium; i f l < c < n  — 1 both empty and wheel 
network are stable; if c > n — 1, the empty network is the unique stable network. In the 
2-way-flow model, the equilibrium network is either the empty or the centre-sponsored 
star network (a star where the centre player pays all the links). If c < 1, the centre- 
sponsored star is the unique equilibrium; if c > 1, then the empty network is the unique 
strict Nash equilibrium.
To investigate the question whether these static games actually converge to strict 
Nash networks in a dynamic setting, the game is specified as a repeated one. The start 
is a random network, and each player plays his strategy sequentially. All players observe 
the resulting network as well as the strategies played. Players remain with their last 
strategy with a probability p, or decide to play new action with probability 1 — p. In 
the latter case they decide on a best-response given the actions played by the other 
players in the previous round of the game. Bala and Goyal then identify limiting cases 
of strict Nash equilibria by looking at the changes that are induced when exactly one 
player adapts his strategy. Simulations are used to test whether the game converges to 
these limits for different p and to determine the speed of convergence. They find that 
in the 1-way-flow model, the rate of convergence is rapid, reaching one of the predicted 
networks in less than 20 rounds. In the 2-way-flow model, convergence takes longer. 
The smaller p, that is, the closer behaviour to pure best-response, the quicker strict 
Nash equilibrium is reached. The intuition behind this is that with p =  0, the network
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will oscillate between full and empty networks (assuming an initially empty network) 
as all agents move. In the first step, linking to any player is the best response. When 
the network is fully connected, severing all but one link is optimal. With p close to 1, at 
some stage only one agent will not move, leaving it at the centre of a centre-sponsored 
star with some positive probability (see also Bernasconi and Galizzi (2005)).
Beal and Querou (2007) model a network game with a notion of bounded rationality. 
They begin with a one-shot game. In the model, forming a link requires the consent of 
both players. Players incur costs for offering the link; consequently, players only offer 
links if they know that their opponents do the same. This results in the empty network 
as unique Nash equilibrium if players are fully rational. In their dynamic version of 
the game, players have limited memory, but are otherwise perfectly informed about 
other players’ past actions. The game is repeated over a finite number of time steps 
larger than players’ memory. Players maximise their average payoff. Beal and Querou 
show that with this form of bounded rationality, non-empty networks can exist. Any 
deviation must be weighted by the players against the potential harm that results from 
deleting links, as the other players will never link once it has been revealed that the 
other player does not link until they forget the deviation until they forget the deviation. 
As a result, the costs of establishing new links cannot be too high, or the potential value 
gained from a link must be large enough before any link can emerge.
More recent BG-type models look at the role heterogeneity plays for equilibrium 
selection. Although heterogeneity is out of scope of this chapter’s model, these models 
are noteworthy because of some experimental results related to them (discussed in 
section 4.4). McBride (2006) focuses on value heterogeneity and partial information. 
Value heterogeneity is given if the value of connections is different among players; partial 
information means that a player observes only the actions of his direct neighbours. In 
such cases, inefficient outcomes might emerge, whereas under perfect information, the 
efficient minimal connected networks are also equilibrium networks. Other authors 
analyse the role of heterogeneous cost for establishing links (e.g. Galeotti et al 2006). 
They find that in equilibrium state, cost-heterogeneous players form either empty or
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centre-sponsored star networks; if value varies as well, a strict equilibrium is either the 
empty network or a minimal connected network with components being connected in 
the form of centre-sponsored stars.
Models with farsighted players (Watts 2002; Deroian 2003) or coalition formation 
(Dutta and Mutuswami 1997; Jackson and van den Nouweland 2005; Slikker and van den 
Nouweland 2000) are related to the network formation game, but use different assump­
tions about agent behaviour and cooperation among agents. When players are allowed 
to form coalitions, conditions for equilibrium are stronger and thus reduce the number 
of possible equilibria since deviations require the consent of all concerned players in 
the coalition. Using definition 13, Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) show that 
strongly stable networks are efficient. When players are farsighted, situations where the 
costs of links formed exceeds the benefits, but the resulting (non-empty) network has a 
positive payoff for the connected players, can be overcome. However, although efficient 
networks could be formed in such cost ranges, this does not happen because each player 
wants to prevent to become the centre of a star-like structure. Rather, circle networks 
distributing costs and benefits equally are likely to form.
There have been no applications of RL to strategic network formation games in 
particular. Using the stag hunt game, only Pemantle and Skyrms (Pemantle and Skyrms 
2000; 2004) provide an RL approach of link formation. In the stag hunt game, there 
are two types of hunters, stag hunters and hare hunters. Both receive a higher utility 
from hunting with the same types, a lower utility of being in a group with hunters of 
the other type, and a zero payoff if they stay alone. At each time step, hunters can 
propose to form a group with two other hunters. Hunters who receive a proposal always 
accept the offer, so that the group will form if a proposal is made. Starting with equal 
propensities to form cliques with any type of hunters, the process converges to cliques 
of the same types if recent experience is weighted higher. On the other hand, if agents 
remember all their experiences, the process is much more unstable or converges very 
slowly.
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4 .4  E xperim ents w ith  N etw ork  Form ation
Several network game experiments have been conducted. Most experiments are based 
on the BG model; only few follow a similar specification as the JW  model, which is the 
focus of the RL model analysed later. However, also for the (partial) cooperative JW  
model some conclusions can be drawn from the experimental literature.
Vanin (2002) conducts an exploratory experiment of the JW model with four players. 
The cost setting is J < c < that is, in the medium range where the star is
efficient, but not stable. The value of linking to other players j ,  w^, is set to 1000; 
the cost of a link is 1000; ô was set to 0.8. Pairwise stable is any minimal connected 
network. Three different groups played the game cooperatively by discussing possible 
solutions and agreeing on the links they form. A first treatment allows for side-payments 
to compensate those players bearing larger costs; the second is without side payments. 
With side-payments two groups coordinate on efficient outcomes, while the third group 
forms a ring. In the second treatment, there are no side-payments. The first two groups 
coordinated on the line network. The other group, however, did not consider to agree 
on an unequal outcome and coordinated on a ring, splitting the cost equally. This 
result is remarkable insofar as the line is the pareto-optimal outcome: While the ring 
provides an equal payoff of 240 to all players, the line provides a payoff of 240 to the 
players with 2 links, but the two extreme players get 952. This agreement was reached 
tossing a coin. Such an outcome requires that players accept inequality that the players 
distinguish between the opportunity to gain more before the game starts, and the actual 
outcome.
Falk and Kosfeld (2003) consider the BG game with 1-way and 2-way flows of 
benefit and no decay. There are four players in the game. The cost settings cover 
empty, minimal and star networks as the equilibrium prediction. The game is played 
for five rounds. Links are formed simultaneously. After a step, players are informed 
about the network, costs and the connected players. They find that
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-  In 1-way flow models many outcomes are Nash strict Nash equilibria (between 40 
and 60 %). However, for the 2-way flow model, there is no strict Nash equilibrium, 
and fewer Nash equilibria (between 10 and 30 %).
-  If there is more than one unique stable network, subjects solve the coordination 
problem by opting for the efficient network.
-  Higher costs support the selection of both Nash and strict Nash solutions in the 
1-way flow model, but have a negative impact on the selection in the 2-way flow 
model.
Falk and Kosfeld (2003) provide two possible explanations for the unequal results in the 
1-way and 2-way flow models. The first possibility is the asymmetry in payoffs: In the 
1-way flow model, the ring is the stable network, as each player has to create a link to 
participate in the value of the network. Costs and benefits are distributed equally. In 
the 2-way flow model, the stable solution is the centre-sponsored star, but no rational 
player wants to be in this position. Their data support this hypothesis, as they find 
that when such solutions are reached, they are unstable, i.e. the disadvantaged players 
sever their links. The other possible explanation offered are social preferences. This 
hypothesis is supported by their finding that the frequency of Nash outcomes decreases 
the more unequal the payoffs are - this becomes especially apparent in the low frequency 
of the centre-sponsored star. Using a regression model, they find that individuals are 
more likely to revise their strategy if outcomes were unequal.
Using a similar setup as Falk and Kosfeld (2003), Bernasconi and Galizzi (2005) 
find very different results. They consider four treatments with low and high costs and 
one- and bi-directional flow of benefits. The main difference to the former experiment 
is a more neutral labelling. Bernasconi and Galizzi (2005) claim that the use of ordered 
labels A,B,C,D in Falk and Kosfeld’s experiment serves as a coordinating device, as they 
find in their own experiments that the ring from A to D can be observed significantly 
more often than when random labels are used. They therefore choose instead, more 
neutral labels like or ’%’. They find that in the one-directional treatments almost
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no Nash networks emerge (between 1% and 3%). In the bi-directional experiments 
sometimes Nash networks form, but also with comparatively low frequency (between 
13% and 17%).
Callander and Plott (2005) consider a BG model with 1-way flow of benefits with 
no decay. They consider different treatments with homogenous and heterogeneous cost 
settings. Cost settings are such that the wheel is strict Nash. For the homogenous case, 
they find that
-  The empty network never occurs.
-  If networks converge, it is usually a Nash equilibrium, however, not strict.
-  Not all Nash equilibria are stable, often an equilibrium state collapsed again.
Looking at how players take decisions and the dynamics of behaviour, they find that
-  Players typically do not play myopic best-responses as in the BG model. They 
often use simple strategies considering the future outcomes of the game. Agents 
make more sophisticated decisions anticipating future outcomes.
-  Agents using such simple strategic behaviour follow their strategy more consis­
tently.
-  Convergence depends on the behaviour of all agents. The more agents switch to 
simple strategic behaviour, the more likely the network converges.
-  The more agents remain committed to their behaviour, the more likely other 
agents will adopt this behaviour as well.
Conte et al (2009) investigate a link formation game where links are formed only 
if both players agree. In each round of the game players bid for links simultaneously. 
The main interest is not whether networks converge, but which individual strategies are 
responsible for the result. There are six players, no decay, and cost settings are such
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that the equilibrium prediction is a minimal connected network. Subjects have full 
information about the network. In total, there were 54 participants. Nine experimental 
sessions were run with six players per session. A session lasts at least 15 rounds, after 
which a random generator determined to stop the session. In the experiments, mini­
mally connected networks emerge; however, stability is low. Conte et al (2009) attribute 
this to the fact that many equilibria are possible, so that it is difficult to coordinate on 
a certain outcome. They also observe that when a minimal connected network is estab­
lished, some players are tempted to experiment with alternative strategies. As a result, 
a network might come out of equilibrium again. From the individual perspective, they 
find that 40 % of strategies are best-response strategies. The remaining 60% strategies 
are not very far from best-response behaviour. Distance is determined by calculating 
an index based the difference between profits of actual and best response behaviour. 
Common alternative strategies are reciprocator and opportunistic behaviour. The first 
behaviour maximises direct connections by always offering links to those players who 
offered links in the previous round. The second behaviour tries to maximise indirect 
links by removing direct links whenever possible. Best response behaviour is strongly 
group driven, i.e. the more players adopt this strategy the more likely that the remain­
ing agents follow. There is an overlap between best response and the other strategies. 
Conte et al (2009) estimate econometrically that 42% of players belong to the oppor­
tunistic, 31% to the best response type and 27% to the reciprocator type. The high 
portion of the opportunistic type thus points, similar as the previous studies, to more 
complex than myopic best response behaviour.
Goeree et al (2009) test whether heterogeneous players manage better to agree on 
efficient networks. They consider three treatments: A baseline treatment with homoge­
nous agents, a treatment with a low-cost agent (experiencing lower costs for maintaining 
a link), and a treatment with a high-value agent (experiencing and providing higher 
utility per direct or indirect link). They find that with homogeneous agents, formation 
of equilibrium networks fails. Introducing cost heterogeneity supports the emergence 
of equilibrium networks in the form of minimal connected or star-networks. When
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agents receive different value from linking the chance to observe equilibrium networks 
is highest.
Summarising the main results of the experimental literature, the following conclu­
sions can be drawn:
-  The frequency of equilibrium networks differs strongly between the experiments. 
Some authors find no Nash networks at all. Maximum rates observed go up to 
40%.
-  Even where Nash networks are found as good predictors, it becomes apparent that 
the actual individual decisions deviate from the myopic best response (Callander 
and Plott 2005). Basic strategies like opportunistic linking, reciprocating be­
haviour or simple strategic-decision making are more common.
-  The more agents commit to a certain behaviour, the more likely convergence.
-  Some authors further mention an equality norm, i.e. a preference of the players 
for equal distributions of cost (e.g. Vanin 2002).
4.5 A  R einforcem ent Learning M od el o f N etw ork  
Form ation
One conclusion of the literature review is that actual human behaviour in the experi­
ments differs often from the equilibrium condition. It has been observed that humans 
often use non-best response strategies. This section describes the RL based model of 
network formation (as one alternative to best response behaviour) and asks how the 
outcome differs from the theoretic predictions.
A dynamic version of the connections model is considered, similar to Watts (2001) 
and Jackson and Watts (2002), but adapted to a setting with RL agents. As a bench­
mark, the original analysis of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for the static, and Watts
(2001) for the dynamic model can be used.
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The game proceeds as follows:
-  Two agents are picked randomly.
-  Both agents decide whether to offer a link or not.
-  If both agents offer a link, the connection is added, otherwise not.
-  The new network is computed.
-  The two agents who acted receive their rewards, calculated with equation 4.1.
If a link was formed, it exists as long as the two agents do not meet again. When they 
meet another time, the link is maintained if both agents offer a link again, otherwise it 
is severed.
L earn ing  In the reviewed network games literature bounded rationality was described 
as an injection of ‘irrationality’, for example, as error term e as in Jackson and Watts 
(2002) or Bala and Goyal (2000), or a limited memory as in Beal and Querou (2007).
In the model presented here, RL can be seen as a form of limited rationality. Agents 
start with no information at all and learn by trial and error about the game and the 
application of the appropriate actions. Players know only the name of the other players 
and may choose from the action set A ={cto an} given by {offer link, not-offer
link}.
Using the concepts of BRA introduced in chapter 2, the internal choice model for 
agent i is given by r^v : C ffî*  {offer, not-offer}. There are & -  1 mappings and 
the initial conditions contain only one attribute with one value (player-name=A;), so no 
further expansion is possible. BRA thus reduces to disjoint sets of simple RL rules. For 
each rk agent i updates the action strengths, that is
9(<U(Z, &)) =  9(%(Z -  1, &)) +  i M g ,  t) -  q(aj(t -  1, /c))),Vrfc.
Using the exponential selection rule in equation 2.10, agent i chooses at the next en­
counter with agent j  his action.
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P a ra m e te r se ttin g s  The model has four parameters of interest, a  and 7 , cost c 
and value 5. As in the original JW model, is set to 1, and Wu to 0. Agents are 
homogenous; cost and value are the same for all players.
In the simulations, the parameters c and a  are varied, c can be seen as the structural 
parameter influencing the opportunities for the players; a  determines the rate of explo­
ration. The greater a, the more likely exploration in the action selection process as the 
selection propensities for both actions become more similar; the smaller a , the faster 
the agents stick to a reasonably good solution. The central question for the adaptive 
network model is whether it is possible to generate stable and efficient solutions, and 
how the properties of the learning rule have to be for this. The influence of randomness 
on the outcome has led to the choice of stochastic stability as the benchmark stability 
definition for the RL model.
The discount parameter 7 is only of minor importance for the analysis. 7 sets the 
rate at which the reward is updated. The smaller this weight, the faster the experienced 
reward approximates the true reward. Experiments with various 7 values were used to 
select the best model for a more detailed analysis of a. A  short overview of different 7 
settings is given in section 4.6.4.
The value of J, 0 < J < 1 is fixed at a value larger > 0. Since there are no 
requirements or other substantial reasons for a particular value except that decay exists, 
it has been set to 0.5. For each cost range, the values for c are drawn randomly in order 
to obtain some samples within each cost range, a  is incremented by 0.01 from 0.01 to 
1.
Table 4.1 shows the parameters in summary.
cost range a ô 7
c < 0.25 (low cost range) 0.01 . . .  1 0.5 0.1, 0.25, 0.75, 1
0.25 < c < 0.5 (medium cost range) 0.01 . . .  1 0.5 0.1, 0.25, 0.75, 1
c > 0.5 (high cost range) 0.01 . . .  1 0.5 0.1, 0.25, 0.75, 1
Table 4.1: RL network model parameter settings
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M easurem ents for th e  sim ulations Networks and network formation can be de­
scribed in a variety of ways. In section 4.2.1 the measures D (density) and L  (average 
path length) were already introduced. Three additional measures are defined here:
A stability measure is computed to assess how robust the solutions are. It might 
occur that a simulation result comes very close to the theoretic equilibrium in settings 
where agents explore enough and discover better solutions. Since exploration comes 
at the cost of more random decisions in the process, the whole system can become 
unstable.
D efinition 15. Stability. St — 1 —
Stability is simply the difference in the number of links between two time steps, 
divided by the number of maximum possible links to standardise the measure. For a 
single simulation step, the value can be either 0 or 1. Over a sample of simulations, St 
can be interpreted as the probability that a link changes at t. It thus varies between 0 
and 1 and the closer it is to 0 the more stable the network is.
To compare the results with the game-theoretic prediction, a fitness measure is 
defined as follows:
D efinition  16. Fitness /  Efficiency. Let the vector g stable be the stochastic stable net­
work (efficient network), and gactuai & simulated network. Let stepsmax be the maxi­
mum number of modifications starting from any network to gstabie, and stepsactUai the
number of modifications to reach gstabie from gactuai • Define the fitness at time t as:
■P-J. ___ 1_ Z s l'ePs a c tu a l,t  I s te P s a c tu a l,t  Q  \
J  t  2  V S te p S m a x  S te p S m a x
The resulting measure varies between 0 and 1 and tends towards 1 the closer the 
network structure to the stochastic stable network, and the more stable the simulation 
result (multiplying the distance with St and adding it in the enumerator has the effect 
that stable states are weighted higher as ^  — O if a linked changed, 1 otherwise).
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To determine the stochastic stable network, the procedure in Jackson and Watts
(2002) has been implemented as a computer program. The program computes the set 
of all possible networks, and finds out the pairwise stable network with the minimal 
resistance from all other networks in the set.
4.6 S im ulations
4.6.1 Overview
Simulations were run for at least 10.000 time steps per a  and 7 combination for each 
cost range in samples of up to 4000 steps with several repetitions per simulation, giving 
a reasonably large sample. Figure 4.1 shows how fitness values vary depending on a 
and 7 .
Figure 4.1: Fit of simulations for simulated a and 7 values.
Across all 7 , the fit of the simulation develops analogously - starting with a high fit
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of up to 0.6 for small a, then decreasing to values of about 0.35. Furthermore, results 
fit better for 7 =  0.25 and 7 =  0.75; that is, for values close to very long memory and 
no memory at all. The reason for this behaviour lies in the different role of adjustment 
speeds to other agents’ behaviour depending on the cost range. This is discussed in 
section 4.6.4.
Analysis revealed that the 7 and ol combinations maximising fitness in each cost 
range are a = 0.1 and 7 =  0.75 for the low, a  =  0.01 and 7 =  0.25 for the medium, 
and a  =  0.07 and 7 =  1.0 for the high cost range (in the high cost range several 
combinations achieve a fit of 1. Out of the top 20 results, the simulation belonging to 
the most frequent 7 value and the highest a  was chosen). Some more samples for these 
specific values were simulated to look closer at the behaviour for various cost values. 
Using network density as an indicator, figure 4.2 illustrates connectivity as a function 
of cost.
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Figure 4.2: Network density over all cost samples.
In the high cost range (c > 0.5) the empty network emerges as solution. In the low 
cost range (c < 0.25), connectivity is high (almost fully connected structures). In the
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medium cost range (0.25 < c < 0.5) networks become sparser (density between 0.4 and 
0.5). For the ‘border’ regions between low and medium, as well as medium and high 
cost range connectivity changes gradually; for example, for cost—O.54, density was 0.28. 
In the RL process, no threshold function between cost ranges emerges as stated in the 
benchmark model.
The following sections analyse the behaviour of the simulation in more detail. It is 
analysed how the shape of networks changes when a  changes. The question is how the 
exploration and exploitation affect the connectivity and stability of small networks. 7 
is held constant at the value maximising the fitness in each cost range.
4.6.2 Network Properties for Different a
Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 show how density, stability and fit develop in the low, medium 
and high cost ranges.
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Figure 4.3: Network density, stability and fit for the low cost range.
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Low cost range (c < 6 — 62) The optimal solution is the fully connected network 
(D = 1). Figure 4.3 shows that for small 0.07) the network is strongly connected 
(D % 0.7) without reaching the complete network, and stability tends towards 1. As 
could be expected, for small a, agents tend to stick to first-best solutions, which are 
those providing the largest increase in marginal utility. With a  increasing towards 
% 0.11, the network is developing towards the fully connected network (D œ 0.8). 
However, this comes at the cost of stability, i.e. some agents keep switching. Finally, 
for a > 0.6, connectivity and variability approach a limit in an asymptotic manner with 
density about 0.35. The random limit is given by the probability that offered links are 
accepted. Assuming total randomness, the chance of offering a link is 0.5, the chance 
that the other player offers a link at the same time is equally 0.5. Thus, the probability 
that a link can actually be formed by pure chance is 0.25. This indicates that RL 
performs better than randomness, even if the distance between the action propensities 
becomes smaller.
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Figure 4.4: Network density, stability and fit for the medium cost range.
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M edium  cost range (62 < c < J) According to the static as well as the dynamic 
model, minimal connected networks should form (i.e. D  œ 0.5). Computations showed 
that the star is the efficient as well as stochastic stable pairwise network. In the sim­
ulations, agents end up very close to a minimal connected network (D «  0.5) for 
ol < 0.06. These networks are very stable. For 0.07 < a  <  0.15 there is a decrease 
in density to œ 0.4, with a sharp drop in stability and corresponding decreases in fit. 
For 0.15 < a  < 0.3 density decreases further. For a  §  0.3 the connectivity of the 
network settles asymptotically near to the random limit; similar to the low cost range 
the RL process performs also here (slightly) better than random. The density of «  0.4 
in the range 0.07 < a < 0.15 indicates that networks are not over-connected, but may 
be rather efficient. The sharp decrease in stability points, however, to coordination 
failure (random switching) rather than reinforcements. In principle, optimal network 
structures can develop simply because they are closer to a random outcome.
d en sity
stability
0 .7 -
! 0 .5 -
0.3-
0.2 -
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 .2:0 .25  0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
a
Figure 4.5: Network density, stability and fit for the high cost range.
H igh cost range (c > 5) Here, the empty network is expected. Although for some 
agents positive utility could be generated by indirect links, there is always at least one
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agent for whom the costs exceeds the value it receives and thus motivates the deletion 
of direct links. Figure 4.5 shows that the simulation converges to the equilibrium 
prediction if agents explore little (a <% 0.15). For a  > 0.25, at least two agents are 
linked (D = 0.1). The random limit is approached for a  values > 0.3. the model 
approaches quite fast a situation where at least two agents are linked. At a  % 0.6 the 
simulation converges to the random limit (D % 0.2). Here again RL clearly performs 
better than a random process.
4.6.3 Network Structure and Dynam ics
Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show the results for the three cost ranges for the measures density 
(D), stability (S'), and match (fit) . A cluster analysis for a  has been performed on 
the variables D and S  to group the results. These variables have been chosen because 
they describe the dimensions structure as well as time. For the resulting clusters, the 
emerging networks are characterised by network structure, and the summary measures 
density D, average path length L, fitness f i t ,  S  and efficiency E. The choice of three 
cluster centres reflects roughly the main dynamics observed in figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5: A 
good fitness in the lower a  regions, then decrease in fitness (which may mean a decrease 
or increase in density), finally approximation of the random limit. The tables illustrate 
the most network architectures which result during this process. For readability, only 
the upper quartile is represented. The share of each network is based on the frequency 
in the quartile (not the overall occurrences).
Low cost range (c<  ô — Ô2) Table 4.2 shows the following: In cluster 1 (the cluster 
with the best fit), the most common visited networks are 2,3,3,4,4; 2,2,2,3,3 and 2,2,3,3,4 
with a relatively high connectivity (D =  0 . 6 - 4  missing links to the complete network; 
and 0.8-2 missing links to the complete network). The path lengths of 1.5-1.75 indicate 
that most networks are connected in a way that each player can be reached directly or 
with one intermediary at maximum. In the second a  range, the most frequent networks 
2,2,2,3,3; 2,2,3,3,4 and 1,2,2,2,3 are still connected more densely than sparse networks, 
but are also quite unstable (S  % 0.7 as compared to % 0.9 in the first cluster). Finally,
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Cluster Network D L S Fit Share
a 0.01 - 0.24 1,2,3,3,3 0.6 1.88 0.92 0.58 0.07
avg(D) 0.68 1,2,2,2,3 0.5 2.05 0.92 0.48 0.09
avg(L) 1.67 2,3,3,3,3 0.7 1.63 0.93 0.67 0.1
avg(S) 0.93 3,3,4,4,4 0.9 1.38 0.93 0.87 0.11
avg(Fit) 0.66 1,2,2,3,4 0.6 1.75 0.93 0.58 0.12
avg(E) 0.66 2,3,3,4,4 0.8 1.5 0.92 0.77 0.15
2,2,2,3,3 0.6 1.75 0.94 0.58 0.17
2,2,3,3,4 0.7 1.63 0.93 0.68 0.18
a 0 .2 5 - 0.46 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.22 0.66 0.33 0.08
avg(D) 0.59 2,3,3,4,4 0.8 1.5 0.75 0.7 0.1
avg(L) 1.84 1,1,2,3,3 0.5 2 0.7 0.42 0.1
avg(S) 0.71 1,2,3,3,3 0.6 1.88 0.71 0.51 0.11
avg(Fit) 0.51 1,2,2,3,4 0.6 1.75 0.72 0.52 0.14
avg(E) 0.51 2,2,2,3,3 0.6 1.75 0.73 0.52 0.15
2,2,3,3,4 0.7 1.63 0.74 0.61 0.15
1,2,2,2,3 0.5 2.06 0.69 0.42 0.18
a 0 .4 7 - 1.0 1,2,2,2,3 0.5 2.06 0.62 0.4 0.07
avg(D) 0.26 1,1,1,2,3 0.4 2.25 0.62 0.32 0.08
avg(L) 0.51 1,1,1,1,2 0.3 0 0.61 0.24 0.08
avg(S) 0.63 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.18 0.62 0.32 0.09
avg(Fit) 0.21 0,1,1,1,1 0.2 0 0.63 0.16 0.1
avg(E) 0.21 0,1,1,2,2 0 0 0.62 0.24 0.17
0,0,0,1,1 0.1 0 0.65 0.08 0.19
0,0,1,1,2 0.2 0 0.64 0.16 0.21
Table 4.2: Low cost range network structures
cluster 3 illustrates that with a: —>• 1, network density approaches its random limit 0.25, 
with frequent unconnected networks (i.e, L = 0).
M edium  cost range (52 < c < J) In the medium cost range, relatively stable 
networks close to minimal connected networks form. The network 1,2,2,2,3 is the most 
common one, with an average path length of 2.04, meaning that now often at least one 
intermediary connects two different players. This is close to a ring (only one player has 
more links), which is the structure minimising the costs, at the same time distributing 
them evenly so that no incentives for deviation exist. This is similar to the results 
of Watts (2001), and - for the non-cooperative game - of Bala and Goyal (2000). For
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Cluster Network D L S Fit Share
a 0.0 1 - 0.2 1,2,2,3,4 0.6 1.75 0.85 0.62 0.07
avg(D) 0.46 1,1,2,3,3 0.5 2 0.78 0.44 0.07
avg(L) 1.78 2,2,2,2,2 0.5 1.88 0.94 0.16 0.09
avg(S) 0.83 2,2,2,3,3 0.6 1.75 0.85 0.31 0.14
avg(Fit) 0.44 0,1,1,2,2 0.3 0 0.72 0.43 0.14
avg(E) 0.44 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.37 0.81 0.3 0.15
1,1,1,2,3 0.4 2.25 0.88 0.63 0.17
1,2,2,2,3 0.5 2.04 0.85 0.46 0.22
a 0.21 - 0.4 1,2,2,2,3 0.5 2.06 0.54 0.39 0.09
avg(D) 0.24 1,1,1,2,3 0.4 2.25 0.57 0.52 0.09
avg(L) 0.43 1,1,1,1,2 0.3 0 0.59 0.4 0.09
avg(S) 0.5 0,1,1,1,1 0.2 0 0.62 0.27 0.1
avg(Fit) 0.38 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.16 0.56 0.26 0.11
avg(E) 0.38 0,0,0,1,1 0.1 0 0.66 0.41 0.14
0,1,1,2,2 0.3 0 0.6 0.4 0.19
0,0,1,1,2 0.2 0 0.63 0.54 0.19
a 0 .4 1 - 1.0 0,1,2,2,3 0.4 0 0.56 0.52 0.07
avg(D) 0.25 1,1,1,2,3 0.4 2.25 0.56 0.52 0.07
avg(L) 0.32 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.15 0.55 0.26 0.08
avg(S) 0.62 1,1,1,1,2 0.3 0 0.59 0.34 0.08
avg(Fit) 0.35 0,1,1,1,1 0.2 0 0.63 0.27 0.11
avg(E) 0.35 0,1,1,2,2 0.3 0 0.6 0.4 0.17
0,0,0,1,1 0.1 0 0.68 0.42 0.19
0,0,1,1,2 0.2 0 0.64 0.55 0.22
Table 4.3: Medium cost range network structures
example, in cluster 1, the ring has a share of 0.09. More efficient structures (1,1,2,2,2; 
1,1,1,2,3) are more common. Unconnected networks occur already in cluster 1, and 
become more frequent in clusters 2 and 3; thus indicating that any equilibrium-like 
state in this cost range is more unstable and difficult to sustain. Whereas D  indicates 
a relatively close match with pairwise stable networks (these are: 1,1,1,1,4; 1,2,2,3,4; 
1,3,3,3,4; 2,3,3,3,3; 2,2,2,3,3; 1,1,2,2,4; 2,2,2,2,2 for cost closer to the low cost limit, plus 
the more sparse structures 1,2,3,3,3; 1,1,2,3,3; 1,2,2,2,3; 1,1,1,2,3 for costs closer to the 
high cost range), the distance to the unique stochastic stable network 1,1,1,1,4 is larger 
as compared to the low cost range. That is, while rational myopic players according to 
the stochastic process of Jackson and Watts (2002) are most likely to end up with a
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star network, the RL process diverges strongly from this result.
Cluster Network D L S Fit Share
a 0.01 - 0.27 1,1,1,2,3 0.4 2.25 0.41 0.42 0.01
avg(D) 0.05 0,1,1,1,1 0.2 0 0.76 0.7 0.02
avg(L) 0.09 0,1,1,2,2 0.3 0 0.7 0.59 0.03
avg(S) 0.91 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.39 0.65 0.5 0.04
avg(Fit) 0.9 0,0,1,1,2 0.2 0 0.77 0.71 0.04
avg(E) 0.9 0,0,0,1,1 0.1 0 0.88 0.85 0.14
0,0,0,0,0 0 0 0.99 0.99 0.72
a 0 .2 8 - 0.51 0,1,1,1,3 0.3 0 0.65 0.58 0.02
avg(D) 0.08 1,1,1,1,2 0.3 0 0.64 0.57 0.02
avg(L) 0 0,1,1,2,2 0.3 0 0.64 0.57 0.04
avg(S) 0.75 0,1,1,1,1 0.2 0 0.72 0.69 0.07
avg(Fit) 0.76 0,0,1,1,2 0.2 0 0.72 0.69 0.16
avg(E) 0.76 0,0,0,0,0 0 0 0.89 0.95 0.31
0,0,0,1,1 0.1 0 0.81 0.81 0.38
a 0 .5 1 - 1.0 1,1,2,2,2 0.4 2.13 0.55 0.47 0.03
avg(D) 0.16 0,1,1,1,3 0.3 0 0.62 0.57 0.04
avg(L) 0.05 1,1,1,1,2 0.3 0 0.61 0.56 0.05
avg(S) 0.71 0,1,1,2,2 0.3 0 0.62 0.67 0.1
avg(Fit) 0.72 0,1,1,1,1 0.2 0 0.68 0.91 0.11
avg(E) 0.72 0,0,0,0,0 0 0 0.82 0.57 0.15
0,0,1,1,2 0.2 0 0.68 0.67 0.22
0,0,0,1,1 0.1 0 0.75 0.79 0.32
Table 4.4: High cost range network structures
H igh cost range (c > J) In the first, cluster the most frequent network is the empty 
network with a share of 0.73. In the most frequent non-empty network only two players 
are connected. In the other clusters, non-empty networks are more frequent. In the 
second cluster, two players link most of the time; in the third cluster it might happen 
that even more than two players connect.
4.6.4 M em ory Effects
To round up the analysis, summary measures are reported for simulation runs with 
different 7 values while holding a  constant. For each cost range, the optimal a  values
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Cost range 7 D L S fit
0.1 0.68 1.66 0.95 0.66
0.25 0.61 1.78 0.96 0.6
(c<  5 — 62) 0.5 0.64 1.67 0.83 0.59
0.75 0.79 1.5 0.92 0.75
1 0.72 1.6 0.89 0.63
0.1 0.51 2.05 1 0.44
0.25 0.47 2.08 1 0.61
(S2 < c < = S ) 0.5 0.51 1.8 1 0.48
0.75 0.51 1.88 0.99 0.46
1 0.46 1.93 0.99 0.51
0.1 0 0 0 0.99
0.25 0 0 1 0.99
( c > a ) 0.5 0 0 1 1
0.75 0 0 0.99 0.99
1 0 0 1 1
Table 4.5: Simulation results for various 7
were chosen: 0.1 in the low, 0.01 in the medium, and 0.02 in the high cost range.
Table 4.5 shows that in the low cost range fitness and connectivity are best for the 
higher 7 values. Moreover, a 7  value of 1 increases connectivity as compared to smaller 
values. It also affects the stability of the network, as the probability of deviations is 
the highest. 7  =  0.75 seems to compromise well between exploration, on the one hand, 
and stability on the other.
In the medium cost range, 7  — 0.25 is optimal. Higher 7  values, but also 7  =  
0.1, are also here responsible for higher density - which is inefficient in this scenario. 
Furthermore, 7  — 0.Î and 7 =  0.25 both maximise the path length, which means they  
are support networks that connect the players in the sparsest way. As noted above, 
in the medium cost range utility might strongly decrease after a certain threshold is 
reached. If agents react very quickly, this could lead to a collapse of the network. More 
tolerance on the other side might support experimentation on the fringes.
In the high cost range there seems to be no influence of 7  (at least not for the chosen
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a? values) - all solutions are typically empty and very stable networks.
4.6.5 Summary of the Sim ulation R esults
Low cost range (c < S—Ô2) The likely reason that the network does not approach full 
connectivity is the decreasing rate of utility the more connected the network becomes. 
At the beginning of the process, the first links provide the highest marginal utility and 
reinforce the highest action strengths. After agents are connected directly or indirectly 
to all other agents (i.e. via flower networks contracting the distance with very few 
additional links), the marginal utility of exchanging an indirect for a direct link is 
small. Consequently, the selection probabilities for forming and not forming the link 
become for certain players more equal the later they interact in the formation process. 
As a result, the decisions would switch between offering and not offering a link for some 
of the players, irrespective of a. The situation can, nevertheless, stabilise early in the 
simulation if a player first experiences either linking or not linking as negative (or 0), 
but benefits from an indirect link added by another pairing of players. If the distance 
becomes small enough, the particular action played at that time becomes reinforced, 
and with a  sufficiently small, will be repeated. If a  is large, this could result in a cycle 
where most of all players are at some stage the ‘marginal’ agent that is not worth linking 
to. This can be inferred from the trends in density and stability: For the smallest a 
values stability is highest, but not density. As a  increases, stability decreases stronger 
than density increases. Moreover, the distribution of visited network structures does not 
change very much, which means that similar network structures exist during the whole 
run, but with more frequently changing links. The optimal 7 value of 0.75 indicates, 
furthermore, that agents have a short memory and so react quickly to changes in the 
network structure.
M edium  cost range (52 < c < 6) Up to the level where the utility of not being 
linked is smaller than being linked, the learning process follows the same marginal 
utility dynamics as in the low cost range. Once utility becomes negative, the average 
rewards decrease strongly and prevents further linking. Thus, the cost settings act as a
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natural cut-off to the reward perceived by the agents. In the low cost range, there is no 
such bound, but the additional utility becomes very small, leading to random switching. 
The closer cost to ô — ô2, the more similar behaviour in the medium cost range becomes 
to behaviour in the lower cost range - density increases. Note furthermore, that the 
optimal 7 is with 0.25 very low as compared to the other cost ranges, which means that 
agents are more tolerant of deviations. A plausible reason for this is that agents must 
not be ‘too’ myopic, since for stable networks in this range agents have usually to link 
to two other agents. The utility of just one link is small and thus the motivation to 
alter that link is large. Allowing some tolerance for such behaviour ensures that the 
network does not collapse quickly as a consequence of a single agent severing a link.
Moreover, fit in the medium ranges is worst as the star is the stochastic stable 
network, but the emerging structures are ring-like. This coincides with Watts (2001)’s 
prediction that the formation of stars becomes unlikely the larger n, but conflicts with 
the stochastically stable star that was computed using the approach in Jackson and 
Watts (2002).
H igh cost range (c > J) There is nothing surprising in the high cost range; it 
largely reflects the equilibrium prediction. Here, the learning task for the agents is 
extremely simple because there are very few non-empty networks in which an agent can 
experience a positive reward. Thus, the only deviation in this case from the prediction 
is induced solely by the increased randomness in the action probabilities with increasing 
a. Furthermore, the optimal 7 value of 1 shows that the best performing agents react 
very quickly with no memory at all to alterations in the network structure. This is 
plausible, since independent of the history, any addition of a link has always a negative 
impact for at least one agent - which was also stated in the dynamic benchmark model.
Thus, the networks evolving from the learning model differ with the exception of the 
high cost range quite considerably from the equilibrium prediction. A closer look at the 
data showed that for the optimal a  and 7 values (0.1/0.75, 0.01/0.25 and 0.07/1), the 
pairwise and stochastic stable outcome was met with a rate of 0.01 in the low range
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(4,4,4,4,4 the only pairwise/ strongly and stochastic stable network) as compared to a 
rate of 0.13 of the most frequent network 2,2,3,3,4; in the medium cost range 51% of 
all visited networks were pairwise stable, but only 19% stochastic stable; only in the 
high cost range 71% of all networks were the predicted empty network. Looking at the 
structure of the networks that evolved, it is more accurate to speak of two characteristic 
cost ranges, one with c < ô and one with c>  6. In the ranges where positive utility is 
achievable, agents form sparsely connected networks, adding some shortcuts contracting 
the distance between them (flower networks). The smaller cost, the closer the resulting 
networks are to the complete network. The higher the cost the more sparse the resulting 
network will be - independent of whether the cost is in the low or medium range. The 
shorter the distance between agents in the network, the more undecided agents become 
whether to connect to some other player directly or not. l î  62 — 5 < c < 6, the RL 
process matches pairwise stable networks more often because utility is increasing with 
the first additional links, but later decreasing (i.e. marginal utility is in the very low cost 
range convex, whereas in the second case, it is decreasing after reaching its maximum). 
Another factor is simply chance - sparse networks are simply closer to the random limit 
of 0.25.
4.7  A pplying  B R A
In the base model, knowledge is pre-wired - agents maintain a state-action mapping 
per player and form expectations about the behaviour of each player. The implicit 
assumption was that learning is simplified by saving the necessary specialisation and 
generalisation procedure. It thus helped to reduce complexity, and concentrate on the 
effects of pure RL in a network game context. Applying BRA as described in chapter 
2 and allowing to evolve this internal model dynamically can be seen as a further 
test of robustness - is it possible to perceive player-specific behaviour (similar to the 
discrimination game), and if not, does this impact the result at all?
In the BRA network model, agents develop the state-action mappings themselves.
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The initial rule has the form ro,i : Co,i —> A  where the condition can be described with: 
(player-name=2 or player-name=3 or player-name—4 or player-name=5) for the first 
player, for the second player ^player-name—2 or player-name=3 or player-name=4 or 
player-name=5) and so on. During the process of the simulation, agents expand this 
initial rule into finer grained mappings, for example Ci,i —>• A  with C iti ^player-name—2 
or player-name=3) and Ci^  —> A with Ci# ^player-name—4 or player-name—3 .^ The 
idea is that with this mechanism the base model can be learnt if the distinction per 
player label is useful.
Three simulations, one for each cost range, were run for 5000 time steps each. Pa­
rameters where set as follows: % =  100, z/ =  50, // =  40, £ =  0.3, p =  0.2. The parameter 
setting follows a similar logic as the simulations in chapter 3. % is unreachable, because 
limited cognitive capacities impose restriction in this exploratory simulation. The other 
parameters are set in a way that allows the computation of action and state values from 
reasonably large samples (z/, / i ) ,  and the revisiting of generalised nodes (C), since the 
environment is very dynamic.
Using the measures D, S  and f i t ,  figure 4.6 shows the networks obtained with this 
method. In the low cost range, density is 0.62, similar to the average base network 
model result. The same holds for the other cost ranges - density is 0.35 in the medium, 
and 0.04 in the high cost range. Thus, BRA generates the same outcome as the base 
model. In general, stability is lower than in the base model due to the increased amount 
of experimentation.
Figures 4.7 to 4.9 show the rules that were created during the process and how often 
they were activated. As useless rules are deleted by BRA, these appear with a lower 
frequency, rules that survived longer have a high frequency.
As all three figures show, there was no value in developing finer grained rules during 
the process. This is no surprise for the low or high cost range - in these scenarios utility 
is always increasing or mostly negative independent of the current state of the network. 
In the medium cost range, more rule experimentation is happening. For example, 36
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Figure 4.6: Network density, stability and fit for the BRA version of the model.
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Figure 4.7: Rule extractions in the BRA network model for the low cost range. The labels 
denote the mappings, e.g. 1 2 3 4 represents the condition (player-name=l or player-name=2 
or player-name=3 or player-name=4).
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Figure 4.8: Rule extractions in the BRA network model for the medium cost range. The 
labels denote the mappings, e.g. 1 2 3 4 represents the condition (player-name=l or player- 
name—2 or player-name=3 or player-name—4).
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Figure 4.9: Rule extractions in the BRA network model for the high cost range. The labels 
denote the mappings, e.g. 1 2 3 4 represents the condition (player-name=l or player-name=2 
or player-name—3 or player-name=4).
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mappings were generated as compared to 27 in the low cost range. The low frequencies, 
however, show that this does not lead to any sustainable mappings.
From this result, it can be concluded that the outcome in the medium cost range 
is similarly generated by a simple decrease in the selection probability, irrespective of 
the players who meet. It explains why the stability and fitness values are worse in the 
medium cost range; and it also shows that no specific model is necessary to generate 
the result. Simply decreasing the chance of offering a link is enough - at the price of 
higher instability.
4.8 C om parison w ith  Em pirical R esu lts
After describing the structure of the networks resulting from the RL model, this section 
asks whether the presented RL model can explain empirical networks better than the 
equilibrium prediction.
However, with existing empirical results, comparison is not straightforward. As 
described in section 4.4, results in experimental game theory vary considerably. In the 
BG models, Nash networks emerge with a frequency of 0% to up to 40%. An evaluation 
of how well the RL model performs based on this data is difficult. In particular, except 
Vanin (2002) there is no experiment of the JW model. This model was, however, a 
first exploration where the co-operative nature of the game was investigated, but little 
quantitative data produced.
To gain some intuition how well the RL model does in predicting actual outcomes, 
here the experiment of Conte et al (2009) is simulated: The model is closest to a JW- 
type model as it requires mutual consent to establish and maintain a link. The following 
modifications were made to the RL model: ô is set to 1, i.e., there is no decay. All agents 
act simultaneously, so that all possible parings happen at the same time step, so each 
agent has to make n-1 choices each round. This leads to much higher variability in 
the game, as from a single agent’s perspective, the environment changes much more
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erratically as if only two agents moved at a time.
The remaining parameters are set as in Conte et al (2009)’s experiment described 
above. Table 4.6 summarises the parameter settings.
cost benefit a 6 7
90 100 0.01 . . .  0.25 1.0 0.1, 0.25, 0.75, 1
Table 4.6: Adaptive network model parameter settings for the simultaneous linking game.
Simulations were run for a  values up to 0.25 and some 7 values. Each simulation 
is run for 100 steps and repeated 10 times. This is longer than the original 20 rounds, 
but was chosen deliberately to gain more representative results (whereas the variation 
in the experimental results is high due to the small numbers). To compare the result 
to the original model, the average payoff (over all simulations and time steps) is used. 
In Conte et al (2009), this value is given as 175.056 (standard error 7.901). The most 
similar values fall into simulations with 7 =  0.75 (see figure 4.10).
220
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Figure 4.10: Average payoff for various a and 7 values in Conte et al (2009)’s simultaneous 
linking game.
From these runs, the simulation with the smallest difference from the experimental
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result in average profits and standard variation is selected *. This turns out to be 
the setting 7 =  0.75 and a = 0.19. Table 4.7 compares the average payoff from the 
experiments with the payoff resulting from the theoretically derived Nash equilibrium 
and the simulated results. While also the simulations do not match perfectly, they 
are with an expected value of about 172 much closer to the actual result than the 
equilibrium prediction (a line network) with 296.67.
F a y  o f t  e x p e r i m e n t a l  (s.d.) F ayo&simuiate(i (s.d.) Payoffnas/l
175.056 (86.55) 171.62 (125.45) 296.97
Table 4.7: Comparison of payoffs of equilibrium prediction, experimental and simulated 
results in the simultaneous linking gamely—O.75, a = 0.19, 10 repetitions
Figure 4.11 illustrates the dynamic of the simulation using a measure of stability, 
fitness and density for illustration. Stability is defined as above in definition 15, that 
is, as the likelihood that an agent changes a link. The share of Nash networks indicates 
how often the agents formed Nash networks (i.e. minimal connected networks) in the 
simulations. Although the simulations achieve quickly their final state with a Nash 
frequency of up to about 20% (average: 14%), it is also obvious that stability is not 
very high. A value of only slightly about 0.6 means that almost every second agent 
chooses a different strategy each time step. The share of Nash networks increases 
slightly the longer the simulation runs.
Table 4.8 shows the Nash networks that emerged. The most frequent network is 
1,1,1,2,2,3 with a share of 0.078. The efficient star occurs only three times during 
the simulations. Moreover, the most frequent network was the unconnected network 
0,1,1,2,2,2, which appeared only slightly more often (share: 0.08) than 1,1,1,2,2,3. Thus, 
similar as Falk and Kosfeld (2003) observe, if a network is connected, there is a high 
chance that it is a Nash network.
Although no exact comparison between the RL network model and the empirical
*This was the only aggregated figure available at the time of writing. It was not possible to obtain 
the results from the authors as their paper was under review at that time.
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Figure 4.11: Density, stability and frequency of Nash networks over time in the simultaneous 
linking game (a = 0.19, 7 = 0.75, 10 repetitions). Values are computed as moving averages 
over 10 time steps.
pattern stability share count
1,1,1,1,1,5 0.71 0.0004 3
1,1,1,1,3,3 0.56 0.0086 58
1,1,1,1,2,4 0.65 0.0108 73
1,1,2,2,2,2 0.55 0.0422 286
1,1,1,2,2,3 0.54 0.0771 522
Table 4.8: Nash networks visited in the simultaneous linking game, share represents the 
share of the network of all networks visited during the simulations. The number of total 
observations is 6773.
studies are possible, the following parallels and differences between the RL model and 
actual human behaviour emerge:
-  Nash networks are a good predictor for outcomes of the network game. It is not
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necessarily myopic, rational behaviour that causes this result. The frequency in 
the RL model is, however, low (about 15%). Many experiments of BG models 
report similar figures, but variation is high (from 0% to 40%).
-  The RL model matches the empirical outcome (measured by the average payoff) 
much closer than the static equilibrium prediction.
-  The RL model is very unstable. This holds, to some extent, also for the empirical 
results; some authors report a tendency to experiment after a stable solution 
emerged for some time steps. Many experiments never converged to a stable 
state. However, variation is lower, as for example observed in Conte et al (2009). 
There, in one instance convergence was observed. Following most authors, this 
is due to the tendency of real players to behave strategically. So, Callander and 
Plott (2005) find that some subjects take into account future outcomes, which is 
of course impossible to capture with a simple RL model.
4.9 C onclusion
In this chapter, a reinforcement-learning version of Jackson/Wolinsky’s connections 
model was presented and studied with simulations. The simulation results have been 
compared with the equilibrium predictions using the concept of stochastic stability as 
developed in Jackson and Watts (2002). The patterns (high connectivity in the low, 
medium connectivity in the medium, and low connectivity in the low cost ranges) are 
similar, but there is some considerable distance between the equilibrium and RL model 
predictions.
The outcome of the RL process is driven by marginal utility, which has very different 
forms depending on the cost range. In the low cost range utility is convex but always 
positive; in the medium cost range, it slopes downwards after a certain density of the 
network is reached; in the high cost range, it is strictly negative. For a probabilistic 
choice model, this results in random switching in the low cost range the more connected 
the network becomes; low rates of experimentation in the medium range once utility
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starts to decrease; and punishment of any links in the high cost range. Moreover, the 
emerging structures in the medium ranges are most likely to be ring-like, as was stated 
by authors like Watts (2001) or Bala and Goyal (2000); but this does not correspond to 
the outcome that was computed based on the stochastic stability approach in Jackson 
and Watts (2002), which resulted in a star.
Simulations with the BRA approach (chapter 2) showed that the same results can 
be generated with a simpler rule. The outcome of the algorithm was that agents did not 
differentiate between players, but apply the same linking probability to any player they 
meet. This suggests that the more elaborated mental model of section 4.5 (remembering 
each player separately) does not add anything to an agent’s utility. This is similar to 
results stated for two-player games in the experimental game theory literature (e.g Erev 
and Roth 1998).
In behavioural game theory, experiments with network formation are mostly based 
on non-cooperative network formation. Equilibrium outcomes with homogeneous agents 
are difficult to obtain with human subjects. At most about 40% of experiments converge 
to equilibrium. To find out whether the RL model predicts actual human behaviour 
better than the equilibrium prediction, another set of simulations with a modified setup 
based on the experiment of Conte et al (2009) was conducted. In the simulations, about 
15% of the emerging networks were Nash. Using payoffs as a criterion for comparison, 
the RL model predicts much better. However, the stability of the simulated networks 
is lower than in the experiments. Moreover, in the RL model as well as in some of 
the reviewed literature, most connected networks were Nash. That is, this equilibrium 
concept describes empirical results well if the network becomes connected. However, it 
does not reveal anything about its frequency. This is estimated more accurately by the 
RL model.
Concluding, simple RL can be seen as a better predictor for actual human behaviour 
in network formation situations than the equilibrium prediction. It reproduces both 
theoretical patterns (although not to the same degree) as well as empirical phenomena.
Chapter 4. Network Formation 151
Thus, the RL network formation model contributes by adding an experience-based 
learning approach, which is situated between both strands of the literature. It provides 
a possibility to find out how likely a theoretic prediction is; while Nash equilibrium is 
a useful concept for the type of result to be expected, the RL approach is a useful way 
to estimate the chance that this occurs in reality.
Chapter 5
The Market for Prim ary Care
5.1 In troduction
Health Economics typically treats health systems as linear systems that can be tested 
with statistical tools. Often, however, reality is more complex. Heavy interventions 
may cause only small changes, or compromise policy goals in different dimensions. In 
Kernick (2006)’s view, one could also characterise health care as a complex system, and 
argue that the construction of linear models leads to the omitting of system elements 
that are in the end the driving factors for the response of the system to policy interven­
tions based on these linearised models. In complex systems, heavy interventions may 
have negligible influence, or small interventions may have a large effect. Interactions on 
different levels might produce unanticipated consequences, because on the macro-level 
these interactions cannot be accurately modelled. For example, a reform that allows 
patients a choice of health providers might remain without consequences if the doctors 
are reluctant to support their patients’ decisions because they, say, see their influence 
and prestige in danger. The system can remain in an unchanged state. Other interven­
tions might change the system only in the short run because other factors restore the 
original state. For instance, higher patient mobility might first reduce waiting lists as 
patients search and so distribute more evenly across providers. However, in the long 
run waiting times might increase again, because, for example, some providers become
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highly sought after due to their reputation, while others are underemployed.
On the more specific level of general practice patterns, Scott (2000) points out 
that on the micro-level not much is known about doctors’ decision making. There 
are, however, other, non-economic factors important for decision making. For example, 
doctors refer their patients to specialists out of uncertainty, or follow the pressure of 
their patients for certain treatments or prescriptions. However, economic models so far 
have not considered the possibility of such interactions on the individual level and their 
consequences on the aggregate level.
To find out whether complex systems theory provides an answer to the limitations 
of current research methodologies is, according to Kernick, a matter of years. In his 
view, a research program is needed that encourages the development of new statistical 
tools, experimental work to support theoretical constructs and demonstrate their useful­
ness, tools that promote systematical thinking about healthcare and a more widespread 
application of models that encourage dialogue between the stakeholders in the health 
economy.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an agent-based model of primary care 
and to add a computational approach to such a research agenda. A distinctive feature 
is the modelling of different assumptions about consumer behaviour on the individual 
level. Consumer behaviour in general has often been described as routine or habitual 
behaviour. This fits a special case in the BRA learning framework presented in chapter 
2. RL will here be applied to model patient choice of the general practitioner (GP). 
If a consumer knows n doctors, each doctor can be represented as a choice or action 
alternative. Using definition 4 this case is represented in BRA by: k = 1, \Ak\ = n, and 
s u c c ( C q ) = 0, with A = {choose(GPi) . . .  choose(GPn)}. k represents here the situation 
that a consumer is feeling ill, i.e. becomes a patient. Thus, patients are faced with a 
single condition (being ill), under which they choose among different GP alternatives.
The plan of this chapter is as follows: In the next section 5.2, the health economic 
background is briefly outlined, before describing GP and patient behaviour in some more
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detail in sections 5.3 and 5.4 based on the available literature. Section 5.6 specifies the 
RL model. Section 5.7 presents simulations. First, the model is simulated with a large 
range of parameters to gain more understanding of its. overall behaviour. Then, section
5.7.2 provides more detailed, dynamic results.
5.2 Background
The efficient provision of health care and its quality are central objectives of government 
policy. Especially in gate-keeping systems, ‘general (or family) practice and its role is 
increasingly regarded as the key to achieving efficiency and equity in many health care 
systems’, as Scott (2000) notes. GPs influence the total cost of health provision; for 
example, they generate direct costs by referring patients to secondary care or prescribing 
medication. More indirectly, GPs may influence health costs by raising the health 
standard in general, e.g. by supporting preventative care.
To influence the way health care is delivered, primary care can be either managed 
and controlled directly by, e.g., employing GPs as salaried personnel; or indirectly by 
setting financial and other incentives for self-employed practitioners. Direct control 
is difficult to achieve because it is expensive and difficult to implement, and because 
professional organisations try to preserve the independence of their members. Only in 
recent years, with the advance of information technology has performance-based pay 
become more common. The typical and by far most important approach is to set 
financial incentives and modify political and organisational constraints. The function 
of designing incentive systems has been described as a way to align the government’s 
objectives with the physician’s interests, and implies that governments as principals may 
have different interests than health care providers. The common assumption is that GPs 
are income maximisers, an objective which may conflict with the efficient provision of 
health care (e.g. by providing more services than necessary). Consequently, the design 
of such systems is closely related to the principal-agent problem. Since in the majority 
of countries with public health policies, the main instrument to shape the way health
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services are delivered is the setting of their reimbursement, most attention has been paid 
to the setting of financial incentives. Furthermore, many empirical studies find evidence 
that GPs do react to financial incentives. Another dimension of shaping GP behaviour, 
which has received more interest recently, is the promotion of patient choice. Here, 
the idea is to increase competition among GPs by increasing patient mobility. Where 
health providers are able to set prices, this may lead to increased cost-efficiency and/or 
quality; where prices are regulated, competition can motivate GPs to provide better 
quality services in order to attract and bind their patients.
Scott (2000) points out that to understand and judge policy interventions better, 
more attention has to be paid to the context of GP decisions. Factors such as patience’s 
health status are important variables in doctors’ decisions; doctors might be pressed by 
some patients to refer them and so on. Most principal-agent and econometric models 
tend to neglect such factors, and for the sake of analytical clarity or lack of data treat 
them as a residual category. The ACE model presented in this chapter will try  to better 
account for these contextual factors by using its own concept of ‘appropriate treatm ent’ 
that is assumed to be an important decision variable of doctors.
5.3 G P  B ehaviour
A central problem in designing incentive systems in health care is informational asym­
metry. The patient is no health expert and has to trust that the GP acts in his or her 
best interest. This increases the discretionary power of the GP (Grignon et al 2002). 
The GP has also an information advantage over the public insurer or government, e.g. 
with respect to the expected case mix, the necessity of certain treatments, prescriptions 
and so on. This makes it difficult to monitor and control behaviour directly or indi­
rectly. However, although information asymmetry points towards problems of moral 
hazard, there are characteristic differences to a principal-agent relationship: Health 
outcomes are difficult to measure; usually not the patient pays for the service, but 
a third party; the utility functions of patient and doctor are, to some extent, inter­
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dependent (Mooney and Ryan 1993) - an important deviation from classical agency 
theory, which assumes independence of utility functions (Ryan 1994). Another often 
mentioned factor inhibiting moral hazard is the trust characteristic of the relationship. 
The doctor-patient relationship is usually long-term, in which patients invest trust. For 
the GP, trust is capital, and he or she has an incentive to maintain it by avoiding ob­
vious profit-maximising behaviour and safeguarding the interests of the patient. If the 
patient gets a feeling of too many unnecessary treatments or consultations, he or she 
may lose trust and search for a new doctor (e.g Scott 2000; Arrow 1963).
Despite these constraining factors, the economic literature typically focuses on the 
principal-agent nature of the GP-patient and GP-regulator relationship. Under the 
assumption of self-interest and opportunistic behaviour, the question becomes which 
incentive system encourages the GP to behave in the best interest of the patient (welfare 
and quality), as well as the interest of the regulator (cost efficiency, patient welfare, and 
quality). Several authors have analysed models of health care provision in the context 
of a principal-agent problem (e.g. Marinoso and Jelovac 2003; Zweifel et al 2005; Scott 
2005; Jelovac 2001; Ma 1994; Chalkley and Malcomson 1998a;b; McGuire and Rickman 
1999), of which the most relevant will be shortly reviewed here.
Numerous econometric studies building on assumptions posited by the principal- 
agent literature have been conducted to test hypotheses about how GPs react to finan­
cial incentives. The main results of these studies are also summarised.
A nalytical approaches
Considering a health authority maximising patient welfare minus expected cost, Zweifel 
et al (2005) analyse optimal contracts. The provider utility function can be written as 
u(P,e) = P  — (7(e) — V(e). P  is the pay, C  are expected costs. The parameter e 
measures the effort to reduce these costs, and V (e) represents the loss in utility due to 
these efforts. The payment can be expressed as P  =  G +  np +  7 AT, where G is a basic 
allowance, a per capita payment p for n patients plus a share 7 of the total costs K  (i.e. 
service payment). At the one extreme, a prospective payment (capitation) system is
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described by setting 7 to zero. In this case, the provider bears all the risk. At the other 
extreme, a retrospective payment (fee-for-service, FFS) system is described by setting 
p and G to zero, so that the insurer bears all the risk.
A contract should internalise the principal’s interests in cost effectiveness. At the 
same time, the contract must still be attractive enough to be accepted by the service 
provider. Following Zweifel et al (2005), the first-best solution F B  is a payment system 
F(P) that compensates the provider’s costs, efforts to reduce costs and a reservation 
utility which the provider would achieve by not accepting the contract. This can be 
formally written as F(P) = C[eFB\ +  V[eFB\ +  u.
Varying the base model, they derive the following three typical cases with respect to 
cost efficiency: In case (1), the reference model, the provider is risk neutral, information 
is full and symmetric, and cost efficiency is the only objective. The first-best payment 
is given by E{P) =  Cleps] +  +  u, where u is the reservation utility that needs
to be fulfilled for the provider to accept the contract. For this objective, a prospective 
payment system is optimal; more specifically, a lump-sum payment with which the 
provider has to cover all costs. The insurer can set the base payment in such a way 
that it covers expected costs. In case (2), GPs are risk-adverse, and the insurer has to 
pay a risk premium. It is then more effective to take over some of the costs to reduce 
the risk premium. However, this also reduces the incentive for the provider to reduce 
costs. Case (3) assumes that the provider has more information about the expected 
case mix, and thus over expected costs. An (opportunistic) provider will claim that 
he has only the most costly case mix to obtain a higher risk premium. By increasing 
payment with costs, the provider would be encouraged to share accurate information. 
This again reduces the provider’s effort to reduce costs.
Three more cases can be derived when quality is added. Quality can be defined as the 
treatment success and the welfare of the patient. Treatment success may sometimes be 
observable. However, apart from measurement problems, it is impossible to determine 
whether a provider did not try to provide the necessary quality even if treatment was
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not successful. Extending the provider’s utility function by assuming that quality has 
a utility V  for the provider and that it comes at a certain cost C  depending on the 
effort e the form becomes U =  E(P) — C(q,e) — V(q, e). Analysing this utility function, 
they find that a provider has no incentive to provide optimal quality: Case (1) is given 
by the assumption that treatment success and quality are observable and providers are 
risk-neutral. Then, an adjusted base payment induces the provision of optimal quality, 
as long as the reservation utility of the GP is met (i.e. basically, the insurer pays for the 
desired level of quality). If treatment success is stochastic and the more risk-adverse the 
provider is, the regulator has to pay a risk premium. In this case, direct control of quality 
is the cheaper option. In case (2), treatment success and quality are not observable. 
There is a trade-off between quality and quantity: For full take-over of costs in a pure 
retrospective system, the provider has no incentive to minimise costs; hence, he can 
raise quality until his marginal utility of quality equals the marginal cost of raising 
quality. Since providers in prospective systems have incentives to reduce costs as much 
as possible, quality will be minimal. In case (3), the regulator cannot judge success and 
quality, but patients can. If providers compete for patients, then capitation payment 
is the best option. In this case, there is an incentive to attract patients by improving 
quality, while at the same time to minimise costs. If the situation is monopolistic or 
the elasticity of demand is low, again a mix of capitation and fee systems is the best 
solution.
In what follows, some more specific models of primary care are reviewed, focusing 
especially on the role patient choice plays: The models of Jelovac (2001) and Marinoso 
and Jelovac (2003) look in more detail at GPs’ clinical decisions, and how these may 
be influenced by prospective and retrospective payment systems. Levaggi and Rochaix 
(2007) extend this model and explicitly look at the role of consumer choice in this 
setting. The models of Gravelle and Masiero (2000) and Karlsson (2007) treat capitation 
systems when patients choose between GPs.
In Jelovac (2001), patients can have a minor or a major illness. The minor illness can 
be treated by the GP; the major illness must be referred to a specialist. The GP must
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first diagnose the condition. The lower his effort, the less accurate the diagnosis; as a 
consequence of low effort, the patient may be mistreated. In case that the special illness 
was diagnosed but the patient had the general illness, the patient is cured, but with an 
unnecessary, expensive treatment. In the case that the patient was diagnosed with the 
general illness and is treated by the GP, but had the special illness, the patient was not 
treated accurately and has to be treated a second time. The doctor incurs a utility loss 
by mistreatment because a second visit is assumed to be costly, and because higher costs 
are incurred by the unnecessary treatment. In this model, capitation payment induces 
the most adequate treatment, since GPs are interested in decreasing the probability of 
a second visit and in minimising the total number of treatments. As a side-effect it 
induces higher effort as this is the precondition for appropriate treatment decisions.
Building on the same model setup, Marinoso and Jelovac (2003) provide some more 
conditions when prospective payment is more efficient than retrospective. They analyse 
three different strategies available to the GP: He may refer or treat blindly and save 
the effort of diagnosing; he can diagnose with a certain effort and then either treat 
or refer based on the outcome of the diagnosis; finally, he can, under the assumption 
of asymmetric information, treat or refer irrespective of the diagnosis outcome. Since 
some cost and effort is incurred for accurate treatment, it only pays for the GP to diag­
nose accurately if the expected income is high enough. Otherwise, it is more rational to 
guess based on the expected case mix, and receive the net payment with the respective 
probability that the guess was correct. Jelovac and Marinoso argue that the right in­
centive system depends on the insurer’s objective: If welfare loss (caused by inadequate 
treatment) is high, the most efficient option is to set incentives in form of treatment 
success related fee payment. However, if the welfare loss by inadequate treatment is not 
the most important objective, capitation payment is sufficient, as it induces the GPs 
to reduce efforts, including the diagnosis effort.
Gravelle and Masiero (2000) present a game to research the question whether increas­
ing the capitation rate can induce higher quality. The model is a two-stage hotelling 
game with two doctors, and n patients. Doctors choose a level of quality; the higher
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quality the more costs are incurred by the practice. The patients’ utility function in­
cludes distance and expected quality (which is unknown to the patients initially). In 
the first round of the game, patients choose a doctor based on their utility function. In 
the second round of the game, quality is revealed, and patients compare their expecta­
tions with the actual quality. Patients may then switch to the other GP in the second 
round. If they switch, they incur some switching cost. Gravelle and Masiero find that 
higher capitation rates increase quality as it makes patients more valuable to practices, 
even if patients care much about distance. They also show that GPs have incentives 
to increase quality even if patients misjudge quality. As a result, both doctors increase 
quality as long as costs are covered.
Karlsson (2007) develops a similar hotelling game. As in the preceding model, pa­
tients choose in a first stage their GP based on distance and expected quality; after 
that, actual quality is revealed, and patients may switch to the other GP. Karlsson con­
siders additionally the search behaviour of patients. Because of the interaction effects 
between consumer search patterns and provider reactions, there may be settings where 
the optimal capitation rate is indeterminate. If costs are very low, all providers have 
strong incentives to increase quality. The more GPs do so, the stronger decreases the 
variation in the GP population. This discourages patients from searching, since there 
is not much to gain from (costly) search in a homogeneous GP population. As a result, 
the equilibrium quality may decrease even with increasing payments, because patients 
have no reason to change providers. However, this happens only with a quadratic cost 
function, and the author assumes that hyperbolic cost functions are more intuitive 
and likely. Such cost function lead to an equilibrium where quality increases with the 
capitation rate.
Levaggi and Rochaix (Levaggi and Rochaix 2007) combine the patient choice per­
spective of Gravelle/Masiero and Karlsson with the moral hazard perspective of Jelovac 
and Marinoso. Thë setup is as in Jelovac and Marinoso (2003), but additionally, pa­
tients may choose the access route to either GP or specialist themselves. Thus, GPs as 
well as patients can make mistakes in a treatment choice. They find that under perfect
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information (where the severity of illness can be judged ex-post) a gate-keeping system 
is efficient. Its efficiency can furthermore be increased by allowing patients to seek spe­
cialist care themselves, provided patients bear some of the risk in form of payments for 
mistakes. If information is imperfect and opportunistic behaviour possible, then non­
gate-keeping systems are more effective. Intuitively, this is because under capitation, 
GPs refer also mild illnesses; under FFS, GPs will first treat themselves, even if the 
condition is severe; specialists will always treat rather than sending the patient back to 
the GP. So the patient is the only actor who has an interest in the effective provision 
of care (e.g., because he or she wants to avoid unnecessary visits). Even if the patient 
makes mistakes in judgements the result is more cost-efficient.
The conclusion of this short survey is that pure capitation systems are desirable 
for cost containment, but are optimal only under very restrictive assumptions like risk 
neutrality of providers and information symmetry. Some costs should be taken over in 
form of FFS. This reduces the willingness to save costs, but also the risk premium that 
had to be paid otherwise. Takeover of costs may as well increase quality if there is no 
or little competition between providers. However, this will depend on the information 
available to the health authority. If there is competition for patients, the size of capi­
tation payments can act as an incentive to improve quality. Gate-keeping systems are 
only efficient under perfect information. Patient choice can have a cost-reduction and 
welfare-increasing effect in non gate-keeping systems, especially if payment is by FFS.
There are further, newer incentive systems in primary health care, which are not 
considered here. For example, Pay for Performance combines aspects of managed sys­
tems with financial incentives by making payments dependent on treatment priorities, 
and conditions treated. If a certain target is reached, reimbursement decreases, acting 
against over-treatment and opportunistic diagnosing. This requires much closer moni­
toring, which more recently has become possible due to the increased availability and 
usage of new information technology.
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Empirical approaches
Types o f stud ies Several empirical studies in the last 20-30 years investigated the 
influence of different remuneration schemes on GP behaviour. Much of this literature 
(until about the year 2000) has been extensively reviewed (Scott and Hall 1995; Scott 
2000; Gosden et al 2000). Most studies find a relationship between payment system 
and practice patterns. However, the validity of the results is often limited to special 
circumstances, as most of them are ‘opportunistic’ studies, taking advantage of data 
collected for other purposes. Studies where the payment scheme was changed, or new 
elements in the incentive system were introduced, were the most important studies to 
investigate the relationship between payment and GP behaviour. The most rigorous 
selection of studies was applied by Gosden et al (2000), who reviewed only studies 
based on control group comparisons (randomised control trials), time-series data or 
controlled before-and-after studies. The advantage of such designs is a better control 
of confounding variables. Scott and Hall (1995) also included cross-sectional studies, 
where it is more difficult to estimate the influence of, say, self-selection effects of GPs 
into certain payment schemes.
As most studies are described in the reviews, only the main results of the most 
influential studies, and some of the newer literature are summarised here. The major 
studies are the following:
The Krasnik study (Krasnik and Groenewegen 1992) compared two groups of GPs in 
Denmark. GPs in the Copenhagen area moved from capitation payment to a mixed cap- 
itation/FFS payment mode, while for the regional doctors, the mixed capitation/FFS 
had already been introduced. Data were collected six months before and at a 6-month 
and a 12-month period after the intervention, allowing the comparison of practice pat­
terns of the same GPs before and after the intervention.
The Hutchinson study (Hutchinson et al 1996) compared the referral patterns in On­
tario, Canada, where FFS payment was changed to a mixed capitation/ incentive-based 
payment. A control group remained in FFS; the intervention group received capitation
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payment. Furthermore, for each hospital day exceeding the mean hospitalisation rate, 
the practice had to bear a third of the hospitalisation cost. The authors compared in 
detail for different patient groups the changes in referrals to hospitals.
The Davidson study (Davidson et al 1992) compared two groups of doctors paid by 
Medicaid. The capitation group received a per capita payment, and some amount per 
service, and could keep any surpluses on savings (but had also to cover losses up to a 
certain extent). The FFS group received higher fees for certain services as compared 
to the control group (fees were about half the size).
The Hickson study (Hickson et al 1987) analysed the introduction of salary payment 
in a FFS system. The salaried doctors received a fixed income per month, the FFS 
doctors a fee for each visit. Both incomes were designed on historical consultation 
rates, thus roughly equal in height.
M ain  resu lts  With respect to referrals, evidence is mixed - some studies suggest 
an impact of the payment system, some do not. The Hutchinson study found that 
Canadian FFS doctors did not lower referrals to hospitals. Likewise, the Davidson 
study found that the number of specialist visits was greater in the FFS group than 
in the capitation group. On the other hand, the Krasnik study found a decrease in 
hospital and specialist referrals after 12 months for FFS doctors, while there was no 
significant change in the short-run (after six months). The Krasnik study also observed 
a fall in prescription renewals after FFS was introduced. This was unexpected because 
extra fees for prescriptions were introduced, so that there was no reason to reduce their 
costs.
With respect to the number of GP consultations, most studies indicate a rationing 
of visits by capitation (and salaried) doctors as compared to FFS doctors. The Hick­
son study found a lower number of visits per enrolled patient in the salaried physician 
group as compared to the FFS group. This was partially due to FFS doctors scheduling 
partly unnecessary services, to some extent, due to too few visits by salaried doctors. 
Furthermore, the Davidson study found that the number of primary-care doctor visits
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was higher in the new FFS group than in the capitation group. Moreover, other stud­
ies (e.g. Kristiansen and Hjortdahl 1992; Kristiansen and Mooney 1993; Kristiansen 
and Holtedahl 1993) found that GPs paid by FFS are more likely to provide shorter 
consultations.
Also with respect to the intensity of services provision most - although not all - 
evidence points in the expected direction. FFS increases service production, which 
is typically interpreted as the realisation of income opportunities by doctors. The 
Krasnik study found a strong increase in curative and diagnostic services after the 
change to FFS. Similarly, Kristiansen et al. found that FFS doctors are more likely to 
order tests (Kristiansen and Hjortdahl 1992; Kristiansen and Mooney 1993; Kristiansen 
and Holtedahl 1993), a conclusion that is also reached by Devlin and Sisira (2008) in 
their analysis of doctors with a mainly fee-based income in Canada. However, for 
Norway, Grytten and Sorensen (2001) find that GPs paid by FFS did not increase 
service production as compared to salaried doctors. Comparing practices with different 
list sizes, i.e. different demand, they also showed that practices with short lists have 
no higher service production per consultation to compensate income loss compared to 
those practices with higher demand (Grytten and Sorensen 2007).
Summarising, evidence is not always as theory predicts. Regarding referrals, evi­
dence is mixed; regarding the number of consultations there seems to be a clear trend 
for rationing under capitation; with respect to provider-induced demand generated by 
FFS, before-after studies find evidence for, cross-sectional studies against additional 
demand. Especially when looking at the different conclusions of cross-sectional studies 
as compared to before-after studies (especially the Krasnik study), the question seems 
rather not to be if  the payment mode influences behaviour, but how large and impor­
tant the effect is when considering the health system as a whole. Other influences such 
as rural-urban location, working hours and so on could have an impact that reduces 
the influence of the payment as a single factor to insignificant levels.
Chapter 5. The Market for Primary Care 165
5.4 P atien t B ehaviour
Whereas the insurer-doctor agency problem has been extensively studied, the patient- 
doctor relationship has attracted less attention. This relationship is characterised by 
information asymmetry - because patients are usually not good doctors, they have to 
trust their doctors and expect them to act for their benefit. Furthermore, it is often 
impossible to judge whether particular treatments are unnecessary or not, or whether 
a different doctor would have been more successful in treating a certain illness.
The common view has usually been that the patient is only interested in health, 
i.e. health status is the only variable to his utility function. There are, however, other 
dimensions in the patient utility function. For example, patients might also expect some 
non-medical aspects such as a diagnosis to rule out a dangerous illness, or obtaining 
information before surgery (Ryan 1994; Mooney and Ryan 1993). Other authors have 
stressed the role of information and the involvement of the patient in the decision 
process for treatment options (summarised by Vick and Scott (1998)).
Empirically, discrete choice experiments about the patient-doctor relationship have 
been conducted to find out patients’ preferences. Vick and Scott (1998) derive from 
the literature the following dimensions as being important for patients: Being able 
to talk to the doctor; information about the health problem; information about the 
treatment; doctor’s information and explanation; who chooses the treatment; length of 
consultation; and waiting time. They find that ‘being able to talk’ was most important 
to patients, and that ‘who chooses your treatment’ was the least important. Waiting 
times seem to be of little importance when patients can see a doctor they know. Infor­
mation about the condition and treatment were rated with similar importance in the 
middle. The dimensions in Hole’s study (Hole 2008) were given by: Waiting time; cost 
(measured as willingness to pay); warm and friendly doctor; knowing the doctor; thor­
oughness of physical examination. In this study, reassurance about the process in the 
form of a thorough medical examination turned out to be the most important. These 
findings highlight also the ‘non-functional’ aspects of the doctor-patient relationship;
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whereas technically the patient has an illness to be fixed, the doctor additionally per­
forms a social function by providing assurance or help in a general way. Thus, it might 
be that not necessarily the best doctor in clinical terms is preferred by patients, but 
maybe a doctor who spends more time with them and who gives patients a feeling of 
being taken care of. As Vick and Scott (1998) point out, convenience and accessibility 
factors such as opening hours or distance have already been found less important for 
the patient’s utility function by other authors (e.g Williams and Calnan 1991).
Surveys using actual patient satisfaction survey data find similar results. Dixon and 
Robertson (2008) find that the quality of the relationship with their doctor is the most 
important factor influencing satisfaction, while the factors with the lowest predictive 
power are waiting time and accessibility. They find that once a good relationship is es­
tablished loyalty is high. Practice change, they conclude, will probably only occur if the 
relationship breaks down, so that increased choice is not expected to increase patient 
movements significantly. This has also been observed before, although patient choice 
was not high on the agenda then. Low mobility has been attributed to unfavourable cir­
cumstances preventing dissatisfied patients from changing their GP (Gage and Rickman 
2000; Goodwin 1998; Gabbott and Hogg 1993).
Still, the impact of patient choice on the primary care system is mostly unknown. In 
the UK, for example, most evidence used to argue in favour of choice stems from pilot 
studies in secondary care. Critical authors (e.g. Appleby and Dixon 2004) state that 
most arguments in favour of choice remain rhetorical as no facts nor clear conditions are 
given. So, for example, patients in the London choice pilot studies were only allowed to 
choose if waiting time exceeded a maximum; as a result average waiting times decrease 
inevitably simply by design of the study. The impact of choice on quality was not 
measured at all. It has also been argued that actual quality improvements are less 
due to the switching of providers, but rather the image concerns of hospital managers 
(Robertson and Thorlby 2010).
Summarising, relatively much is known about stated preferences of consumers in
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health care; very little is known about actual choice behaviour or whether increased 
possibilities of patient choice will have an impact on the efficiency (e.g. reduced waiting 
times) or quality of primary care services. The available surveys as well as pilot studies 
from secondary care simply do not provide suitable data.
5.5 M odelling P rim ary Care
The preceding sections revealed that existing knowledge about the driving forces of 
efficient health care provision has some shortcomings, which are mainly the following:
-  The agency literature makes strong assumptions about doctors’ motivation. Many 
analyses treat in detail only the extreme case in which doctors are not interested in 
their patients’ welfare, or constrained by professional standards. The few articles 
accounting for joint patient and GP utility functions remain vague.
-  The empirical literature is constrained by the data available. Only a few studies 
had the opportunities to study explicitly the influence of different remuneration 
systems in longitudinal designs. Not surprisingly, some results remain incon­
clusive. For example, some studies find that capitation payment leads to more 
referrals, some find the opposite.
-  With respect to quality, there is a theoretical consensus that competition is likely 
to improve quality, especially when prices are administered (Gaynor 2006). How­
ever, the extent to which patients are willing to change providers is unknown. 
Furthermore, nothing is known about the implications for the health system as 
a whole. So far, data has mostly been collected in exceptional circumstances, as 
for example during the (secondary care) patient choice pilot studies.
A complete model of primary care can certainly not replace missing data, but at least 
simulate scenarios and highlight possible policy impacts, which in the current discussion 
remain purely theoretical or politically motivated. The computational model developed
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in the next sections will look mainly at the dimensions of quantity and quality of service 
provision. The following hypotheses inferred from the literature will be the frame for 
these scenarios:
-  Prospective (capitation) payment is likely to ration service quality and quantity. 
If patient demand reflects quality, and there is competition between GPs, quality 
may rise if the marginal capitation payment exceeds the marginal cost (strong 
empirical evidence from most studies).
-  Prospective payment is likely to induce higher than necessary rates of referral. 
This effect might be counterbalanced if effort is high. In this case, GPs want to 
attract more patients by better services; better services could be reflected by more 
appropriate treatment (no empirical evidence; the hypothesis is mainly based on 
Karlsson (2007) and Gravelle and Masiero (2000)).
-  Retrospective (FFS) payment induces in general a higher volume of services 
(supplier-induced demand hypothesis; empirical evidence from most studies). As 
competition increases, GPs are likely to increase unnecessary treatments to com­
pensate for short lists (based mainly on the supplier induced demand hypothesis 
(Zweifel et al 2005); there is only weak or even no empirical evidence (e.g. Grytten 
and Sorensen 2007)).
-  As retrospective payment induces a high provision of services by the doctor him­
self, the rate of referrals is expected to be lower than in capitation systems, i.e. 
there are no unnecessary referrals. In fact, there may be fewer referrals than 
necessary (some empirical evidence from studies).
-  Demand side induced competition by patient choice improves quality. Unsatis­
fied consumers are likely to change their GP, but then are likely to remain loyal, 
decreasing competition again. Under FFS, this can be expected to work against 
unnecessary treatments (to prevent excessive exits of existing patients). Under 
capitation, patient induced competition will reduce unnecessary referrals to at­
tract and keep patients.
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The computational model of primary care is described in the next section. The aim 
is to design it in a way that allows to investigate the hypotheses that so far have only 
been incompletely covered in existing work.
5.6 A  R einforcem ent Learning M od el O f P rim ary  
Care
The actors in the model are patients, GPs and the health authority (HA). The HA is 
setup once per simulation. Its main function is to implement the policy for a simulation 
run (e.g. by defining the value of fee and capitation payments), and to pay the GPs.
The main assumptions of this model are:
-  GPs are self-employed professionals who trade leisure and patient welfare against 
income. Costs are incurred only indirectly in terms of effort and time the GP 
invests.
-  GPs can define their maximum workload, which must be >  0.
-  There is no reservation utility of GPs. A GP must treat patients coming to him.
-  There are no exits of GPs.
-  There are no switching costs. When patients become unsatisfied with a GP, they 
may search for a new doctor without incurring any transaction or search costs.
5.6.1 Overview
Patients and GPs are distributed randomly over a grid, with x and y dimensions from 
0 . .1.
Time in the simulation proceeds in a discrete way. A time step d represents exactly 
one day. A period t is defined as a number of days. For example, a period could be a
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week (t =  7 or a month t = 30). Typically, certain decisions and updates are made per 
period, not per day.
At each day d > 1, consumers face a certain probability of becoming ill with condi­
tion When they become ill, they choose a GP based on their utility function
(see section 5.6.2). If it is their first appointment with this doctor, the GP adds 
the patient to his list list. Then, an appointment is scheduled by the GP at time 
d +  k,0 < =  k. k depends on the waiting list listwait of the GP. A GP can treat up to 
appointmentSmax patients a day. As long as the waiting list for the day is not filled 
(listwait < appointmentsmax), k =  0. After that the appointment is made for d +  1 and 
so on. k is thus the number of days until a patient is seen by the doctor.
A GP sees then up to n, n < appointmentsmax, patients per day. Depending on 
the condition a treatment is chosen. While the condition is always diagnosed correctly, 
the treatment choice is uncertain. This uncertainty is represented as a probability with 
which a doctor chooses between alternatives ‘treat or ‘refer’. For example, some severe 
illnesses must be referred - the GP has to decide to refer with probability 1. There are 
other, milder conditions for which the GP can decide either to refer or to treat himself. 
The details how this choice is made is described in section 5.6.3.
After the consultation happened, the patients receive information about the doctor 
(e.g., the effort the GP made, or the waiting time to get an appointment), which then 
enters their decision-process at the next time they become ill.
The HA pays the GPs at the end of a period. The GPs send their bills, containing 
the services they provided as well as the patients on their list, to the HA. The HA 
calculates the pay depending on the policy being implemented and sends the amount 
back to the GP. The GP then updates his utility for the period and decides his work 
plan for the next period (e.g., the number of patients to see).
In the following sections, the utility functions and decision processes of GPs and 
patients are described in detail.
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5.6.2 Patient Decisions
U tility  function  When patients become ill, they choose a GP and make an appoint­
ment. The choice of GP is based on distance dist, experienced waiting times wait, and 
experienced effort of the doctor, E. Effort is here interpreted as an indicator for the 
quality of the doctor-patient relationship, for example, the time the doctor spends per 
consultation.
A patient calculates his welfare by
Up = await + fSdist — jE .  (5.1)
To be precise, Up is the ‘inconvenience’ of the consumer, which he tries to minimise 
(minimal distance, minimal waiting time, maximal effort of the doctor). Before knowing 
a doctor, the patient has no knowledge about waiting times and effort. The function 
then reduces to Up =  ^distance.
C alcu lation  of th e  u tility  function  After the first experience, a patient can update 
his doctor information with respective values of E  and wait. Each patient maintains a 
list of GPs. The model generates and updates this list; if the list is full, but there are 
more GPs unknown to the agent, the model may replace the worst ranking GP from 
the list with a new candidate.
D ecision process Patients only consider practices if waiting time is <3 days. If 
all doctors a patient knows have a waiting time >  3 days, he chooses the closest GP. 
Patients forget the actual waiting time by reducing the experienced waiting time by 
a certain factor each following day (currently set to 2^ ) .  Thus, even if waiting time 
was long some time ago, a patient might consider visiting this doctor again. Forgetting 
is important in this model, because otherwise some practices would have no chance to 
convince dissatisfied patients to return, as patient decisions are based on experience.
Patient choice behaviour is modelled using different forms of rationality. A first 
dimension in which patients are bounded rational is in the sense that they have access
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to only a small amount of information. First, the number of doctors a consumer can 
remember is set to 3. Second, information about GPs is circulated in networks of 
consumers. The network size may vary; here networks with 2 or 5 close neighbours 
and one distant link (randomly chosen from anywhere in the landscape) have been 
generated. The idea is that in a world with small networks, information circulates less 
freely. The distant link has the function to bridge the distance among all consumers in 
the landscape so that it is less likely, but not impossible to learn about the best choices 
in the model. A second dimension of limited rationality is realised by the application of 
different choice modes. In the ‘rational’ choice mode, a patient ranks all GPs by their 
expected utility, given by the last experience (i.e. there is no discounting) and chooses 
the one which ranks highest. That is, even infinitesimal small differences are recognised 
by the agent. This is what meant with ‘rational’ - the agent utilises its computational 
power to distinguish between smallest difference in utility. The ‘probabilistic’ choice 
mode is given by simple RL. In this case, GPs represent action alternatives, and the 
expected utilities are used as the payoff p for equation 2.9 (see chapter 2) to update 
the action strengths, and hence the selection probability for choosing a particular GP. 
In the probabilistic decision mode, small differences between GPs will lead to similar 
choice probabilities.
Combining the behaviour dimensions - information availability and choice mode - 
will allow us later to relate patient behaviour to the findings from the literature review. 
For instance, it will help to investigate the difference between scenarios where consumers 
have access to more information (larger network), or make more efficient use of that 
information (by more rational decision making).
5.6.3 G P Decisions
D ecision con tex t and  constra in ts  In this model, doctors’ decisions are not influ­
enced only by their own welfare (income), but also by their patients’ welfare and nor­
mative constraints like professional standards, which prevents them from being purely 
selfish. So even if a GP has not reached his or her preferred income, he or she will
Chapter 5. The Market for Primary Care 173
not necessarily provide excessive treatment - because it is neither in the patient’s best 
interest, nor is it justifiable before himself or herself or other colleagues. If there is, on 
the other hand, room for ‘interpretation’ whether additional treatment is necessary or 
not, his own welfare may play a larger role in deciding.
The model uses a decision-theoretic approach to reflect such situated decision pro­
cesses. The central concept in this approach is the clinical condition and the related 
treatment(s). One patient can have exactly one condition m, for which exactly one 
treatment tr  exists. This is labelled a condition-treatment pair {m, tr}. The diagnosis 
is always correct, and the doctor has only some discretion about whether to apply the 
treatment or not.
The condition-treatment pair {m, tr}  determines the likelihood with which a patient 
is treated by the GP or referred to secondary care. A decision is always, to a smaller 
or larger extent, uncertain. The GP’s decision is therefore modelled probabilistically.
The condition-treatment pair specifies also the effort necessary to apply the treat­
ment, which can be seen as a sort of cost accrued by the GP when choosing the option to 
treat. Referral has no effort for the GP - treating is always more ‘costly’ than referring.
There is only small variation in the probabilities of each outcome (referral or treat­
ment) of a consultation. The upper and lower bounds of this variation are determined 
by parameter vormax, which sets the maximum deviation from an objective norm. The 
extent of the actual variation varactuai depends on the individual utility function and 
is adapted by the GP during his decision process (see below). In detail, the decision 
probabilities are calculated as follows: Each {m, tr} has a professional certainty value 
p between 0 and 1. This value indicates the certainty that tr  is the ‘appropriate’ treat­
ment for condition m; conversely, 1 —p represents the opposite. The idea is based on 
Krasnik’s operationalisation of uncertainty (Krasnik and Groenewegen 1992): Krasnik 
measured professional uncertainty as the regression coefficient of treatment and condi­
tion in the GP population. For example, a coefficient of 0.24 for a condition-treatment 
pair (or better, condition-treatment group, because some services are applied typically
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for a number of diagnoses) means that 24 % of all doctors apply this treatment if they 
diagnose the respective condition. This can be interpreted as little professional consen­
sus about whether to apply this service, as 76 % of doctors would do nothing, or refer. 
Without accounting for the empirical distribution of such certainties, the model uses 
this idea to define a ‘norm’ for each So, for example, if p =  0.24, a single GP
decides to treat a condition i with Pi,actual =  P ±varijactUai, and with 1 -pi,actual to refer.
U tility  function  The GP is seen here as a self-employed professional: The objective 
is to earn some income with minimal effort; at the same time, he cares for his patients’ 
welfare. The utility function is given by
Usp =  -  E f { n  -  D E V y .  (5.2)
The rationale behind this Cobb-Douglas type utility function is to capture the de­
creasing marginal utility that is the usual standard form of utility functions. It is 
positively influenced by total income (I) per period, total ‘leisure’ (Emax — E) per pe­
riod, and the welfare (n — D EV) of all n patients in a given period. Leisure is defined as 
the difference between maximum effort Emax and actual effort; the larger this difference 
(i.e. the smaller the actual effort E), the higher utility. A similar logic applies to the 
valuation of patient welfare: Welfare is a function of the appropriate treatment, where 
appropriateness is defined as the minimum deviation of a single patient’s treatment 
from the norm; D E V  stands for the sum of these deviations. The more patients are 
over- or under-treated, the smaller the contribution to total utility (n — D E V  becomes 
smaller). The calculation of the variables 7, E, E max and dev is described in the next 
paragraph.
C alcu lation  of th e  u tility  function  The components of the utility functions are 
computed the following way:
Income is defined as
\TR\
f  = 11 capitation T ^   ^Qjf C&TRj (5.3)
i= 0
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I denotes the list size of the GP, T R  is the set of treatments a GP may apply, and 
qi the number of times a particular service i from set TR, denoted TRi, was actually 
applied. Payment is given by a capitation fee Icapitation per patient, and the sum of fees 
of applied services.
For the calculation of leisure, the difference between the maximum possible effort 
Emax and actual effort E  is calculated. The actual effort is given by
|Ti?|
E  = nE base +  ^ 2  qiETRi (5.4)
z=0
Each service T R i  requires some effort (e.g. the time necessary to perform the ser­
vice), which is the same for every GP. However, a GP may vary the ‘base effort’ Ebase, 
0 < Ebase < 1, per patient. This base effort stands for, e.g., the time spent with the 
patient, information and explanation given during a consultation and so on. Thus, the 
lower the effort per patient, and the lower the probability of treatment, the smaller 
the effort (the more leisure) of the GP. Emax, the average maximum possible effort 
is calculated by the same formula, substituting the maximum possible values for the 
variables:
E base  1 
\TR\
n = ^ 2  % =  appointmentSmax
i= 0
1 lTRl
ETR =  \TR\ 5 3  E i(Vl +  PiVarmax)
The average maximum effort Ë tr over all possible treatments is given by the average 
maximum treatment probability p and the effort values E  for all \TR\ treatments. 
Multiplying now Ëtr  by the maximum number of patients appointmentsmax and the 
highest possible effort per patient Ebase defines the maximum possible effort a GP can 
have per day: Emax = nËTR,
The measurement of patient welfare is not well defined in the literature and difficult 
to operationalise. Evans (1976) sees the over-provision of services constrained by some
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professional or ethical standard limiting the power of the income or leisure component’s 
in the GP’s utility. Lerner and Claxton (1996) point in their analysis of utility functions 
to authors with similar arguments: Dranove (1985) argues that too aggressive provision 
of services might lead to patients leaving or reduce the number of visits. Woodward and 
Warren-Boulton (1984) state that ‘each physician derives additional utility both from 
positive consumption of the product of his leisure activities... and from providing addi­
tional care per pa tien t... up to the ‘appropriate’ amount’. Based on such arguments, it 
is assumed here that there is some norm of appropriate treatment, acknowledged by the 
professional community as well as by common-sense of patients. The assumption of the 
existence of such a standard allows the definition of appropriateness as zero deviation 
from the norm. For each patient, the absolute difference of the consultation outcome 
with the professional certainty p is computed. So to speak, this is the deviation of what 
was objectively expected to be appropriate for the patient, and what the GP actually 
did. Thus, for all individual decisions with uncertainty (0 <p<  1), there might be a 
deviation. Since the modeller cannot judge the individual clinical decision, only the 
sum of all positive and negative deviations is taken into account for defining welfare:
n  T R
D E V  = V '  V  (decisiorii — Pj)qi,j (5.5)
2=0 j=0
qitj equals 1 if treatment TRj  was applied to patient i, 0 otherwise, decisiorii equals 
1 if the patient i was treated, 0 if referred. Thus, for all patients of the GP, D E V  
approximates zero if the doctor treats always according to the norm (and if patient 
numbers are sufficiently large); values > 0 denote overtreatment (the larger the value the 
more likely treatment), values < 0 undertreatment (the smaller, the more likely referral). 
For example, if pj = 0.8, i.e. professional consensus points strongly towards treating, 
and iîp jactual = 0.5 (the doctor reduces effort by referring), then of 10 patients with that 
condition 5 are referred, and 5 treated: D E V  = 5*(1 —0.8) +  5*(0 —0.8) =  —3, whereas 
for a ‘norm-conform’ doctor it would calculate D E V  =  8 * (1 — 0.8) +  2 * (0 — 0.8) =  0. 
Patient welfare n — D E V  for the first doctor would be 7, for the second 10.
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D ecision process The GP’s decision concerns the setting of his treatment pattern 
V a c t u a l '  P a c t u a l  —  { P o , a c t u a i  • • •  P i , a c t u a l  P z , a c t u a l }  (determining the referral behaviour), 
the number of appointments per day n  (determining the workload, respectively leisure 
Emax — E  and income I) and the consultation pattern, which is the effort invested 
into the doctor-patient relationship Ebase. The GP can influence income and leisure by 
setting the maximum number of appointments and the treatment pattern (if there is fee 
income) ; and he or she can influence patient welfare by setting the treatment pattern.
Several scenarios can be generated with this set of variables. For example, some 
doctors may prefer to set Ebase low and see many patients with a high probability of 
referring them. This would be an income-maximising, effort-minimising strategy for 
a doctor without concerns for patient welfare. Furthermore, this strategy would pay 
best in environments with a large capitation component since there is no income loss 
from not treating. However, as patients can react via evaluation of Ebase, and may 
switch to another doctor, the relationship of the GP’s decision variables become non- 
deterministic.
The decisions of the GP in detail are as follows: At the end of each period the GP de­
cides about his consultation pattern and how many patients nt he wants to see each day 
in the current (beginning) period t. To do this, he ‘simulates’ the optimal configuration 
of the treatment probabilities popt for all treatments: popt =  {p0,opt • "Pi,opt • • -Pz^pt}, 
and appointments nopt, appointmentsmin < nopt < appointmentsmax for the next pe­
riod t. He uses for this the known constants (such as the capitation rate) and variables 
from last period £ — 1 as the estimates for next period. These values and constants are: 
The expected frequency of each condition; the effort values per treatment (fixed at the 
beginning of a simulation); EbaSe; the capitation rate (fixed at the beginning); list size; 
and fees per treatment (fixed at the beginning). Using these values, he searches for 
utility maximising values of the choice variables pi and nt. The search is implemented 
using a genetic algorithm. Genetic algorithms are a standard solution for function ap­
proximation, and search incrementally for value combinations that come closest to a 
fitness value (which is here simply the largest double precision number, as the largest
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possible GP utility -> oo).
Ebase is held constant during this optimisation process. So to speak, it is assumed 
that the GP sees an illness, which needs to be fixed, and that he has no intrinsic interest 
in a better doctor-patient relationship. The GP only increases effort if he or she wants 
to keep or attract new patients; i.e., he knows that patients value a good patient-doctor 
relationship, and will use this fact as a ‘marketing tool’.
Depending on how many patients are expected per day, the following actions are 
taken depending on the outcome of the optimisation procedure:
-  r i o p t  < nt_i: Set p a c t u a i  =  P o p t  and nt = nopt. In this situation, the waiting list 
is long enough, and the doctor sees no need to increase the workload. The agent 
also sets the treatment patterns to the utility-maximising pattern. Furthermore, 
if Ebase > 0, the GP decreases the base effort by 0.1 (there is no need to attract 
patients).
-  nopt > nt_i: The GP wants to have more patients than there is demand. In 
this case, the agent reacts by re-optimising the optimal treatment patterns p ' ^  
under the constraint that n  is given, and sets pactual = Popt- If Ebase < 1, the 
doctor increases Ebase by 0.1, because he or she wants to attract more consumers 
to achieve the preferred workload.
-  nopt — n t-i. In this case, the situation of the GP remains unchanged. The agent 
sets — Uf—]_, and all P a c t u a i  — P o p t -
To put this model into context with the related literature, it is a model with hidden 
action - the GP has some discretion whether to treat or refer. There is no diagnosis 
effort (i.e. no hidden information). The effort variable is used to represent aspects of 
the doctor-patient relationship; however, this does not, as in other models (e.g. Jelovac 
2001), have a relationship with the correctness of the diagnosis. Furthermore, also in 
contrast to other models, list size is not a parameter that enters the calculations of
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the GPs as for example in Grytten and Sorensen (2007). That is, in case of capitation 
payment, there is no reasoning in the agent that increasing list size by increasing effort 
can increase income. Rather, this effect would come as a side-effect only if there are 
too few patients for the doctor’s preferred workload.
5.7  S im ulations
Simulations are run focusing on different dimensions of the system. The three dimen­
sions considered are: Competition (GP density), payment system, and patient choice. 
After describing the simulation setup (section 5.7.1.1), first a comparative static per­
spective is taken by comparing results averaged over all time steps for these dimensions 
(section 5.7.1.2); then detailed results for a particular GP density are computed and 
analysed from a dynamic perspective. The dependent variables are waiting lists, refer­
rals, GP effort (as indicator for quality), and patient utility (as indicator for welfare).
5.7.1 Exploration of the M odel
5.7.1.1 Param eter Settings and Setup
Pure capitation and pure FFS are the extreme points of prospective and retrospective 
payment modes. In between these extremes, mixed systems exist. Starting with a pure 
FFS system, mixed systems are simulated by increasing the capitation rate Icapitation 
from 0 stepwise to 1, at the same time decreasing the height of fees. So when capitation 
reaches 1, fees reach 0. Three scenarios are considered: Capitation, half FFS and half 
capitation, and full FFS.
The effects of (provider-induced) competition are simply represented by simulations 
with different numbers of GPs.
The effects of patient choice behaviour is realised by running simulations combining 
small and larger contact networks with rational and probabilistic decision making as 
described in section 5.6.2: Simulations BR-3 and BR-6 are simulations with a network
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of 3 and 6 consumers, respectively, using the rational choice mode, i.e. agents collect 
information, rank it and choose the best expected GP. RL-3 and RL-6 are simulations 
with a network of 3 and 6 consumers using RL, i.e. a GP is chosen probabilistically. 
Table 5.1 summarises the model parameters for the simulations. The parameters of 
the patients’ RL action selection function (see equation 2.10) are fixed at o; =  0.1 and 
7 =  1. This is an exploration rate and update speed that enables the patient agents 
to react in reasonable time to environment changes. The previous chapters illustrate 
this extensively, a  values < 0.1 often lead to suboptimal choices. 7 =  1 leads to the 
immediate realisation of changes in the environment. Here, this is a change in the 
doctor’s treatment pattern or waiting lists, or the addition of a new GP. If 7 is too 
small, it might take long until the patient realises this change. There is no reason to 
delay such changes, as there is no noise to accommodate, as, for example, in models 
where the average reward comes from larger samples of agents.
No variations in GP and patient utility functions are analysed. The only sources of 
variations are different fees for services, Icapitation, the geographic distribution, and the 
learning mode of the patient agents. That is, any resulting differences in the simulation 
outcome will be based on homogeneous GP and patient preferences. Any inequalities, 
say, in the distribution of waiting queues, would be generated simply by the structural 
and learning properties of the model.
Most of the clinical parameters are set equally in the beginning: There are 3 con­
ditions for which the objective certainty values (p) are fixed. The base fees are drawn 
from a uniform distribution in the interval 0...1. Then, effort values for each condition- 
treatment pair e{mi)tri} are drawn from a uniform distribution in the range 
so that effort is always smaller than the fee in the beginning. These base settings are 
equal for all scenarios. Then, for each payment mode, fees and capitation rate are 
adjusted. The capitation rate also varies between 0 and 1. For each capitation rate the 
service fees are decreased by the same amount. For example, if capitation=0.5, then 
each fee is decreased by 50%, if capitation is 1, then all fees are decreased by 100 %, 
i.e. set to 0.
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Choice Pay #pat. cap. f^avg Pavg a^vg decision net.
BR-3 S-0 3000 10...250 0 0.48 0.53 0.24 rational 3
S-0.5 3000 10...250 0.5 0.24 0.53 0.24 rational 3
S-l 3000 10...250 1 0 0.53 0.24 rational 3
BR-6 S-0 3000 10...250 0 0.48 0.53 0.24 rational 6
S-0.5 3000 10...250 0.5 0.24 0.53 0.24 rational 6
S-l 3000 10...250 1 0 0.53 0.24 rational 6
RL-3 S-0 3000 10...250 0 0.48 0.53 0.24 prob. 3
S-0.5 3000 10...250 0.5 0.24 0.53 0.24 prob. 3
S-l 3000 10...250 1 0 0.53 0.24 prob. 3
RL-6 S-0 3000 10...250 0 0.48 0.53 0.24 prob. 6
S-0.5 3000 10...250 0.5 0.24 0.53 0.24 prob. 6
S-l 3000 10...250 1 0 0.53 0.24 prob. 6
Table 5.1: Overview of simulation runs. The first two columns denote scenario names used 
in the analysis.
Table 5.1 summarises the resulting simulation runs for these parameter settings.
The GP utility function was set in a way that on average GPs prefer a maximum 
workload per day below the limit of appointmentmax, and are not influenced strongly 
by patient welfare. Some sample calculations have been made on an Excel sheet to find 
parameter values for a, {3 and 7 that (on average) first increase the G P’s utility until 
workload becomes so high that utility begins to decrease. In this model, workload is 
an important endogenous variable responsible for generating variation in the outcomes. 
Setting the utility function in a way that makes changes in workload unlikely (e.g. by 
weighting income very high) will induce little variation in the workloads and thus health 
outcomes. Figure 5.1 illustrates a sample function that was generated with an average 
fee of 0.3, average effort of 0.5, and an average treatment probability of 0.5.
Patients have a simpler objective function: They value the doctor’s effort highest 
and distance the least, whereas the weight of waiting time lies between the two. The 
function is linear: The higher the effort, the smaller waiting time and distance, the 
higher utility.
Table 5.2 shows the respective parameters of the utility functions.
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Figure 5.1: A typical GP utility function (showing only the two dimensions income and 
workload) as used in the simulations.
Parameter GP Patient
UgP = I a { E m a X -  E f { n  -  D E V ) '1 U p  = a w a i t  +  /3d i s t  — 7 S
a 0.2 0.5
P 0.8 0.3
7 0.1 0.7
Table 5.2: GP and patient utility functions
Consumers become ill with probability 0.9. This is certainly unrealistic, but within 
this simple model justifiable, because time is only relevant for patients to collect expe­
riences about doctors. The value is < 1 to keep some small variation in the number 
of ill consumers each time step. Thus, more realistic lower morbidity rates and longer 
simulation runs are equivalent to higher morbidity and shorter runs. A similar technical 
reason applies for the decision cycles of GPs, which is set at a week, i.e. t = 7 (whereas 
a period of a month or several months is much more realistic - see, for example, the 
Krasnik study (Krasnik and Groenewegen 1992), which found more significant changes 
only after 12 months after the intervention) - the only function is to make the simulation 
runs more efficient by bundling the important events.
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For the comparative static view, simulations were run with 3000 consumers and 
varying GP density. The reason for this large number was mainly to be absolutely 
certain that the geographical distribution of consumers is random. Only 120 time 
steps were run. The main interest is exploring many different competition scenarios by 
increasing GP density and generating large enough samples of distribution parameters 
such as fee and effort values. To keep the time to compute the simulations manageable, 
the duration of the simulations was kept short - therefore the high morbidity rate and 
shorter decision periods described above. For the dynamic view, the number of patients 
was reduced to 1000 and only one GP density setting run, which, comparing it with 
the larger simulation, seemed to be a sufficient size. On the other hand, the number 
of time steps was increased to 750 to observe the behaviour of the model in the longer 
run.
5.7.1.2 Static Analysis
The following sections show simulation runs averaged over 121 time steps, representing 
120 days or four months. In the figures, GP density is measured as the quotient of the 
number of GPs and patients in the respective simulation.
W aiting lists
Figure 5.2 illustrates how GP density, payment system and choice mode influence wait­
ing time. Waiting lists are measured as the quotient of patients waiting for treatment at 
a time step, and all consumers in the population. Quite trivially, waiting lists decrease 
with increasing GP density in all scenarios.
Comparing the scenarios, there is a very small difference between pure capitation 
systems and non-capitation systems; there is virtually no difference between a pure FFS 
system and the mixed half-fee, half-capitation system. Furthermore, there seem to be 
some very small differences between choice modes. In the BR-6 scenario, for example, 
a GP density of 0.01 induces average waiting lists of 0.025. This value is smaller than 
the BR-3 scenario (where less consumer choice is possible), as well as all RL scenarios.
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Figure 5.2: Waiting lists (static analysis)
Referrals
Figure 5.3 shows the referral behaviour. The rate of referrals r is computed rel­
ative against the expected referrals, which is determined by the certainty value p: 
r =  i #referîZf^ t?êatments- For example, in the simulation setup the ‘objective’ treat- 
ment probability is p =  0.53 and referral probability =  1 — p =  0.47. If the doctors’ 
decisions are on average close to 0.47, then r  % 1 and vice versa. The maximum 
deviation parameter varmax was set to 0.2, so that r varies between 1.2 and 0.8.
There is a clear difference between capitation and non-capitation systems, but not 
between choice modes, r is almost constant for capitation doctors at a rate close to 1;
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they decide ‘close to the norm’. This rate does not change with increasing competition. 
This is somewhat surprising as the major instrument for capitation doctors to increase 
utility is the reduction of effort (/3 =  0.8). Patient welfare should not have such a big 
influence (7 =  0.1); one would, therefore, expect a propensity to refer closer to the 
maximum of 1.2 in all scenarios. In the FFS scenarios, the referral rate is constant at 
about 0.8 - close to the minimum possible. The incentives of the model are such that 
GPs always decide to over-treat; the rationale of an FFS agent is to maximise income 
at each consultation independent of the environment. This is plausible, as there is no 
incentive apart from patient welfare to increase the referral rate. While patient welfare 
can influence the decision of capitation doctors, resulting in appropriate treatment, this 
influence is (ceteris paribus) too weak for FFS GPs in the model.
Effort
As could be expected, effort levels (figure 5.4) increase with GP density as increasing 
effort is the main instrument for doctors to attract more patients. Shape and level 
are similar in all scenarios, although effort is ends up slightly higher in the BR models 
(~  0.9 as compared to % 0.8 in RL). Furthermore, in the BR-6 scenario under capitation 
is only very small change in effort; it starts relatively high and then remains similar.
Patient utility
More differences between the scenarios exist with respect to patient utility (figure 5.5). 
In BR-3, patient utility increases at a decreasing rate up to a level of about 0.6. It 
then remains, by and large, at this level and seems even to decrease when GP density 
increases further over % 0.063. In BR-6, the rise in utility is more constant as competi­
tion increases, and at the top with 0.7 higher than in BR-3. Utility in the RL scenarios 
is lower, but increasing almost linearly with GP density.
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Figure 5.3: Referrals (static analysis)
Summary
This overview showed on a coarse level the simulation outcomes in the dimensions GP 
density and patient choice behaviour. There are mostly no or only very little differences 
between the behaviour modes. Furthermore, the relationship between competition, 
effort and welfare is obvious - the more competition the higher quality. The following 
two main observations will be investigated in more detail in the next set of experiments:
-  Less rational choice behaviour (in the form of RL) leads to reduced effort.
-  Patient welfare increases with better information (larger networks) and more ra-
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Figure 5.4: GP effort (static analysis)
tional decision-making. There are two possibilities why this can happen - either 
BR patients switch faster to better doctors even if differences are very small; or, 
vice versa, the probabilistic choices under RL lead to increased switching (prob­
ability matching) and apparent random behaviour. In the latter case, this would 
induce doctors to reduce effort, since it does not necessarily increase list size; 
hence reducing effort could be a suitable strategy to improve GP utility.
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Figure 5.5: Patient utility (static analysis)
5.7.2 D ynam ic Analysis
The purpose of the preceding section was to cover many different parameter variations 
on an aggregate level. While the aggregate view only gives a general impression of 
the simulation behaviour, this section takes the exploratory results as a starting point 
and looks at the dynamic aspects. For this, GP density is fixed and the number of 
patients reduced to obtain results in a reasonable time. The number of patients is set 
at 1000, the number of GPs at 60. Simulations are run for 750 steps. Furthermore, 
only pure FFS versus pure capitation is compared, since the effects of minor variations 
turned out to be negligible in the model. The other parameters remain the same.
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The GP-patient ratio reflects the actual ratio in the UK. According to a 2003 OECD 
report (cited in Royal College of General Practitioners (2006)) this ratio was 65 GPs 
per 100.000 patients, of whom the average patient had three visits per year. Given the 
high probability of visiting a doctor in the simulation setup (0.9 as compared to 0.008), 
this ratio of 0.000065 can be translated into a ratio of 0.06 in the simulation, with the 
average workload of the GP remaining about the same.
W aiting lists
The development of waiting lists (figure 5.6) shows an important aspect that was not 
observable during the shorter runs of the previous simulations: Waiting lists decrease 
only at later stages of the simulation - roughly from step 250 onwards. Over all learning 
modes, the decrease is sharper for FFS; for network sizes of 6, the difference is smaller. 
Furthermore, the difference between BR and RL modes is large. Waiting lists drop 
much faster to low levels under RL. In RL-6 waiting lists are generally shorter than in 
RL-3.
Referrals
Figure 5.7 shows the referral behaviour. Here, the differences are very small and the 
rates stable. However, differences between FFS and capitation in BR-6 are smaller. 
Furthermore, variation seems to be larger in BR scenarios.
Effort
Figure 5.8 shows the effort levels. Effort increases quickly to the maximum of 1 in 
all scenarios. The rise is a little slower in the RL scenarios. Furthermore, there is - 
although very little - variability in effort levels under capitation in the RL-scenarios, 
and the level is - also only slightly - below the FFS levels.
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Figure 5.6: Waiting lists over time for a density of 0.06 GPs per patient.
Patient u tility
Figure 5.9 shows the patient utility levels. Here, there are very obvious differences 
between choice modes. The BR scenarios are very similar - neither network size, nor 
payment mode influences patient utility strongly. The difference is mainly that utility 
reaches its maximum a few time steps earlier in the BR-6 scenarios, and this even faster 
under FFS. Within the RL scenarios, patient utility is lower and varies much stronger. 
Moreover, in the RL scenarios, utility is lower and variation stronger under capitation 
than under FFS.
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Figure 5.7: Referrals over time for a density of 0.06 GPs per patient.
5.7.3 Summary of the Sim ulation R esults and D iscussion
The dynamic view highlights the driving factors in the simulation in a more detailed 
view. With regard to waiting lists, it was found that there are considerable differences 
between choice modes and payment system. With respect to patient welfare, there are 
differences between choice modes.
Table 5.3 shows some summary measures across all time steps, highlighting some 
differences between learning modes and payment systems. A variance analysis for the 
dependent variables waiting list, effort, referral rate and patient welfare has been con­
ducted; results are given in the appendix C.
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Figure 5.8: GP effort over time for a density of 0.06 GPs per patient.
Using the graphs and the results of the variance analysis, two main observations can 
be made:
In the simulations, patient choice reduces waiting times, but decreases quality: For 
waiting lists, the variance analysis shows significant differences between payment sys­
tems and choice mode (except for BR-3/ Capitation which has no significant differences 
to RL-3/ Capitation and RL-6/Capitation; this is probably due to the strong decrease 
at later simulation steps). For patient utility, the differences between choice mode 
and payment system are also significant, with two exceptions (BR-3/ Capitation is not 
different from BR-3/FFS and BR-6/ Capitation).
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Figure 5.9: Patient utility for a density of 0.06 GPs per patient.
A likely reason for these clear differences between choice modes lies in GP effort and 
patient mobility. In BR scenarios, patients remain loyal to their GPs. This results in 
high and unchanged effort levels. Since effort is strongly weighted in the patient utility 
function, this would explain the lower utility levels in the RL models. Differences in 
effort levels are small, but significant between BR and RL scenarios. Furthermore, sig­
nificant differences in effort exist between RL-6/ Capitation and all other RL scenarios. 
With respect to waiting lists, computations showed that the coefficient of variation in 
the RL-scenarios is much lower (on average 0.37) than in BR-scenarios (on average
0.44). This indicates that in BR there are some doctors with longer, and some with 
short waiting lists, while in RL, patients distribute more evenly over practices.
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scenario eforf wait referral rate patient utility
mean sdev mean sdev mean sdev mean sdev
BR-3/FFS 0.982 0.000 9.625 5.711 0.808 0.017 0.617 0.053
BR-3 /  Capitation 0.976 0.005 13.944 5.518 0.988 0.035 0.611 0.053
BR-6/FFS 0.980 0.003 11.636 4.113 0.911 0.023 0.637 0.027
BR-6 /  Capitation 0.976 0.003 14.070 6.037 0.991 0.029 0.612 0.04
RL-3/FFS 0.963 0.016 6.651 2.497 0.803 0.013 0.44 0.123
RL-3 /  Capitation 0.964 0.008 7.709 2.229 0.993 0.020 0.289 0.157
RL-6/FFS 0.960 0.010 5.145 2.304 0.805 0.020 0.454 0.155
RL-6 /  Capitation 0.956 0.015 8.666 3.330 0.998 0.020 0.287 0.189
Table 5.3: Mean and standard deviation for dependent variables, measured over 750 
time steps.
Strictly choosing the most preferred doctor thus guarantee stability in demand for 
the GPs, who in turn have a motivation to maintain quality to keep patients. Both 
demand and supply stabilise each other. As the differences between GPs are small 
(due to homogeneous utility functions fixed in the setup), RL patients tend to go £GP 
shopping’. The closer expected utility the more likely they switch. This trend is also 
obvious when computing a loyalty index (table 5.4) as the ratio of the number of visits 
at the GP most often seen by a patient and the number of total GP visits. It shows 
that patients are most loyal to their GP in FFS scenarios with rational decisions and 
small network size. In other words, limited choice and economic decisions stabilise the 
system best. For example, in BR-3/FFS 74% of all patients stayed with a single GP, 
whereas in all RL scenarios, this rate is just 30%. The difference between capitation 
and FFS in the BR models is likely due to shorter waiting lists: because capitation 
doctors have longer waiting lists, some patients become unsatisfied faster than under 
FFS and may switch. This would also be reflected by the smaller differences between 
waiting lists in BR-6 as compared to BR-3, as are the differences between loyalty values. 
Another pointer into this direction can be seen in the referral behaviour. In BR-6, for 
example, even FFS doctors tend to refer at more appropriate levels (which increases 
patient utility), rather than over-treating.
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Scenario Loyalty
BR-3/FFS 0.75
BR-3 /  Capitation 0.49
BR-6/FFS 0.53
BR-6/Capitation 0.48
RL-3/FFS 0.28
RL-3 /  Capitation 0.29
RL-6/FFS 0.29
RL-6 /  Capitation 0.29
Table 5.4: Average loyalty index of patients. The index is computed as the quotient of the 
number of visits at a most visited GP and total visits of GPs over the whole simulation.
While patient utility increases due to higher quality in BR scenarios, longer waiting 
queues develop at ‘good’ doctors, while others have only few patients. This shows the 
tension between policy goals - less choice might actually provide increase quality and 
welfare, but waiting times are likely to increase. More patient choice could reduce 
waiting lists, but also the quality of doctor-patient relationship.
In the simulations, FFS appears to reduce waiting times better than capitation: 
Looking only at the influence of payment systems, the simulations suggest that the 
FFS scenarios score better on most dependent variables than capitation scenarios.
With respect to waiting lists, the reason is that the preferred workload of FFS 
doctors is always higher (computations show that the preferred workload of FFS doctors 
is roughly twice the preferred workload of capitation doctors). As the preceding figures 
showed, they increase their utility by increasing income by treating more patients, and 
referring fewer patients. Consequently, they have on average shorter waiting lists than 
capitation doctors. This effect is not visible in early stages of the simulation; only over 
time doctors manage to decrease their waiting lists by adapting their planned workload 
week after week as their queues increase. It also explains the different speed of BR-3 
and BR-6: In BR-6 patients know more doctors (coefficient of variation for waiting lists:
0.43) than in BR-3 (coefficient of variation for waiting lists: 0.4), and thus distribute 
more evenly over the GP population. The same tendency, but on different levels, is
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obvious from figure 5.6 for the RL scenarios.
Looking at patient welfare, utility is always lower in the capitation cases - slightly 
in the BR scenarios, and more obvious in the RL scenarios. In the BR scenarios, this 
difference can easily be attributed to the longer waiting lists, which have some influence 
on utility. The large differences in RL are, however, puzzling. Certainly also here the 
longer waiting lists influence welfare negatively. The question is why level and shape of 
the curves differ so much and persistently. The pattern in the first steps is analogous 
to the BR simulations - under capitation welfare is always slightly lower. However, 
over time, the difference between utility stabilises, instead of approximating each other 
as under BR. The only remaining source of variation remains GP effort. Effort does 
vary more and is lower as under FFS, but the difference is extremely small (and not 
significant within RL-3).
Similar to the first result, this implies that FFS might be more efficient in reducing 
waiting times. Moreover, if there is high patient mobility, more FFS counterbalances 
the welfare loss due to lower effort levels.
5.8 C onclusion
Based on the results of the literature about incentive systems in primary care, an agent- 
based model was developed which attempted to address the major shortcomings of the 
traditional models: The simplifying assumptions of the agency literature where GPs are 
modelled as income-maximising firms, and the ad-hoc nature and assumptions of many 
empirical studies. In particular, the model tried to operationalise patient choice, which 
plays an important role in the political discussion, but about which only few models 
exist.
The simulations demonstrated how the impacts of possibly conflicting policy targets 
(quality and efficiency) can be analysed within one and the same model. The model 
shows that more ‘shopping for GPs’ could, while reducing waiting times, actually lead
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to lower quality and consequently, to lower patient utility. The underlying reason is 
that GPs might choose to work less in an environment they perceive as unpredictable 
and unstable. If policy values low waiting times higher, these negative effects might 
be accepted, because more shopping is likely to lead to a more equal distribution of 
patients over GPs. The simulations also showed how the interactions between payment 
system and patient behaviour might be analysed. In particular, in the light of these 
artificial results, it could be argued, that - if efficiency and quality are equally weighted 
goals - the implementation of more patient choice should be accompanied with more 
FFS-like elements.
The result of the simulations could also be interpreted in a different way. Assuming 
that policy ‘wants’ educated consumers behaving as rational as the consumers in the 
BR-scenarios, the scenarios can be used as a thought experiment of possible future 
paths. Consumers, prepared to make the best choice, search for their preferred practice. 
They want to behave rationally in the sense defined above, i.e. stick to the best GP and 
not shop around. However, differences between practices, e.g. in a certain region, are 
so small or there is not enough reliable information, that it is too difficult to distinguish 
between doctors’ quality. It becomes impossible to find the best GP (this is represented 
by the RL scenarios). As patients keep searching for better practices, quality levels fall 
because GPs see no reason why they should raise effort for non-loyal patients. Thus, 
even if policy could reach the objectives in one area - motivating consumers to exercise 
choice as a means to raise quality - the actual achievement of this goal might lead to 
unintended consequences.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis focused on adaptation in artificial agents from different angles: First, how 
simple and more complex approaches to learning and cognition can be combined in 
an ACE framework; how simple and more complex learning can be applied in various 
domains; and how a software can be engineered that covers the implementation of this 
rather diverse set of issues.
Sum m ary  o f resu lts  Chapter 2 showed that it is possible to learn about the envi­
ronment an agent lives in with very little a priori knowledge. The main idea of the 
approach presented was an incremental search for the best state-action mappings in 
the state space. Behaviour is learnt in a trial- and error fashion using reinforcement 
learning, and then by mapping the action selection probabilities to state descriptions. 
These mappings are similar to simple rules. Which descriptions are generated depends 
on their relevance, or what the agent ‘decides’ to know about its environment. This 
way, agents learn to distinguish between important and less important details of the 
world they live in. A simple experiment illustrated how the algorithm works. The 
BRA algorithm is different from many learning approaches in ACE as it combines rule 
learning and reinforcement learning in a dynamic way. BRA is a general approach, and 
it can cover a variety of approaches in the simulation literature. For example, it is very 
similar to learning classifier systems, but also able to represent very simple forms of
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learning as well.
Chapter 3 applied the algorithm to a model of statistical discrimination. The aim 
was to build a bridge between theoretical game theory and the classroom game con­
ducted by Fryer Jr. et al (2005). It was shown that the RL model is capable of 
reproducing the empirical results as well as the behavioural patterns observed in the 
experiment. A further parallel is that in both simulations and experiment discrimina­
tion is rare. In the simulations, no general rule or scenario was found that generated 
discrimination on the average. In most cases, discrimination either did not evolve, or 
disappeared in the longer run. In the samples where discrimination was observed, the 
occurrence seemed path-dependent. In particular, if employers are liberal in the begin­
ning and differences in worker productivity are persistent, employers adjust their hiring 
levels eventually and a discriminatory outcome emerged.
Chapter 4 developed a RL specification of a communication network model. In the 
base version, it became clear that RL produces similar results as theoretical predictions. 
It was furthermore shown that the simplest possible RL model is sufficient to produce 
that result. Using BRA, no plausible mapping from player names to actions was found 
that was superior than simple stimulus-response learning. Aggregate results did also 
not improve. Comparing the RL model with an experiment from behavioural game 
theory, it turned out that the model predicts the empirical results better than the 
equilibrium prediction. This result has analogies to earlier research in behavioural 
game theory, which often finds that the simplest model fit actual data and theoretical 
results reasonably well; sometimes even better than more complicated models. W hat is 
different here is that the RL connections model can state this also for the more complex 
class of network games.
In chapter 5, agents were much simpler. The purpose of the health care simulations 
was to use agent-based modelling to investigate models of a complex environment. The 
primary care sector can be seen as such complex environment. Some authors already 
made a case for applying complexity science tools in this area. The simulations looked at
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some hypotheses that were formulated and, to a certain extent, tested empirically. Fur­
ther experiments highlighted the influence of patient information and choice behaviour 
on health outcomes. The model served two purposes: First, it puts BRA, although in 
its simplest form, into the context of a more complex model. Second, it explored how 
ACE could be applied to primary care, for which no other computational approaches 
exist so far. The results showed that assumptions about patient behaviour influence the 
simulation result considerably. The main result here is that more consumer choice can 
lead to worse health outcomes, as doctors have no incentives to provide personalised 
services to non loyal consumers. Since most debate about the benefits of consumer 
choice in health care is still driven by ideology, often based on improvable facts about 
the benefits of competition, an ACE model may be a starting point for a more rigorous 
analysis of arguments in this area.
L im ita tions The motivation of this work was to generate aggregate outcomes (some­
times also described with the term ‘emergence’) like discrimination, health outcomes or 
network structures by adaptive algorithms. The nature of complex systems and some 
definitions were introduced in the introduction (see definitions 1 to 3). Of the three 
presented definitions, the aspects covered in this work matches only the first two. The 
agents were goal directed (utility optimisers) and reacted to changes in their environ­
ment; they are not active planners in order to achieve some (sub-)goals, which would 
require at least some representation of plans and goals as well as capabilities to reason 
about them. For the type of models discussed in this thesis, this is not necessary. More 
precisely, the overall approach taken here is based on simple types of learning. The basis 
of this approach has been tied to existing concepts of bounded rationality. However, 
there are cases where more complex models of cognition and goal-directed behaviour are 
necessary. For instance, as Gilbert (2006) mentions, agents in team environments may 
need to hold cognitive models about their colleagues and develop strategies to improve 
the performance of the team as a whole. Although BRA provides a simple cognitive 
representation in the form of rules and symbolic state descriptors, it cannot handle such 
cases. For example, a network game with farsighted players as, e.g., in Watts (2002)
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or Deroian (2003) is already difficult to represent with BRA, as agents would need an 
idea of what networks might form, how other agents are likely to act and so on.
The BRA approach is thus useful for classification problems or where cases can be 
translated into such classifications - hence it has a close relationship to classifier sys­
tems. The discrimination game in chapter 3 is a representative application - employers 
have to classify two types of worker agents and behave accordingly. In other domains, 
classification may simply be not necessary. For example, the primary care model in 
chapter 5 can formally be modelled with the framework, but since there are no classifi­
cation problems to solve, the mechanism reduces to simple RL. From a different angle, 
chapter 4 showed that where classification (based on the labels of players) is a model 
option, it might simply not add anything to the quality of the model result.
Another limitation of this thesis is its relationship to empirical validation. The 
models of chapters 3 and 4 were only loosely coupled to experiments from behavioural 
game theory. The main interest was to develop models with learning agents and to use 
BRA framework for this. The primary care model in its current form is too general 
to be fitted to existing data. More work to assemble the necessary data and to fit the 
model structure to it is required first.
F u tu re  w ork Future work should therefore focus on two aspects: The empirical 
validation of the implemented models, and the development of richer applied models to 
make better use of the BRA features. Looking back at the main criticisms presented 
in the introduction, these are probably two conflicting goals. The richer the model, the 
more likely the results produced with it are less general, and that it is only one of many 
models with which the empirical fact can be explained.
Looking at validation, the following paths are possible: In the area of network 
games, more models for similar games with endogenous network structures can be de­
vised where experimental data is already available; the comparison with Conte et al 
(2009) is an initial step into this direction. Model parameters could be calibrated in 
a way that produces a minimal deviation from the actual, empirical outcome. This is
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certainly more difficult in a health care model that is inherently related to real-world 
processes. Here, a main path will be the collection of appropriate data, e.g. on regional 
levels, using this data first for the specification of input parameters (geographical dis­
tribution, preferences, consumer types, etc.), and only then for comparing artificial 
with real results (e.g., comparison of mobility rates, GP lists, waiting lists, etc.). To 
what extent this procedure is possible depends on the availability of data. Another 
aspect of calibrating the model to actual health systems is to map the various levels 
of real health systems better and to model the consequences that arise from there. 
The model restricted health provision to individual doctors, however, different organ­
isational forms exist. For example, GPs are organised on the practice level; Primary 
Care Trusts (PCT) organise practices and so on. Furthermore, the model deliberately 
modelled GPs as self-employed; nevertheless, GPs could act also (partially) as firms. 
So, under the PCT scheme, GPs can invest their surpluses into their practices. This 
adds another dimension to the utility function not covered in the model.
As empirical validation can add to the quality of the models discussed in this thesis, 
so could more complex models make use of the features of BRA. For instance, rule 
learning could be added to the primary care model: Patients can learn to distinguish 
dynamically between doctors for different illnesses and build rules which doctors or 
specialists to consider under different conditions. Conversely, doctors might learn rules 
in which area they want to specialise, depending on the demand for certain health 
services. With this, a model of provider specialisation could be built.
Appendices
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Appendix A
A Scalable ACE Simulation 
Software Framework
A .l  In troduction
This section describes the software framework with which the simulations in the previous 
chapters have been implemented.
The major features of the framework gsim (for ‘generic simulation framework’) are: 
An interface for setting up a model in a declarative way (e.g. objects and attributes, 
agent behaviour rules); an application programming interface (API) which can be used 
to plug model-specific programmable components; and the possibility to run many 
simulations simultaneously or distribute a large simulation across a cluster of computers 
without the need to modify any model code.
The motivation to develop this system was to find a middle way between the flex­
ibility of a programming language, and out of the box simulation tools. It is a more 
specialised framework than simulation toolkits such as Swarm (Swarm 2010), Ascape 
(Ascape 2010), MASON (MASON 2010) or Repast (Repast 2010), because it not only 
provides a simulation infrastructure (e.g., a scheduler or tools for generating graphs) 
and a set of libraries useful for implementing models (e.g., genetic programming or
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network libraries). It provides an integrated set of behaviours and learning mechanisms 
that can be configured and require only little programming. Another area where gsim is 
different from other simulation software is its approach to scalability. In domains such 
as Artificial Life, distribution of simulations is usually based on algorithms that dis­
tribute the landscape agents live on efficiently. Large simulations are then partitioned 
in a way that most communication happens locally, minimising the message traffic over 
the network which is the most serious bottleneck of distributed simulations (see section 
A.3.2.1 for more details). Only few general distribution approaches not being based on 
topography exist. For RePast, for example, distribution has been implemented with the 
Terracotta framework in the RePast Symphony project (The Repast Symphony Project 
2010), (Terracotta 2010), or with the High-Level-Architecture (HLA), a specification 
for parallel systems (e.g. Minson and Theodoropoulos 2004; Cicirelli et al 2009). For 
a model to become distributed, such approaches require the additional implementation 
or configuration of the objects that are to be distributed over the cluster, or even a 
redesign of single-machine programs, gsim proposes a different method which abstracts 
from framework-specific programming and configuration.
This appendix describes the central components and software architecture of the 
framework: Section A.2 presents how models are described (sections A.2.1 to A.2.2) 
and behaviour specified (sections A.2.3 and A.2.6). Section A.3 describes the software 
architecture from a more technical and point of view, including a description of how 
the system is scaled up to a distributed version (section A.3.2).
A .2 M odel R epresentation  S ystem  
A.2.1 The Frame Principle
Frames are a central concept of AI for knowledge representation and were first described 
by Minsky (Minsky 1975). It is an approach to represent classes of objects on different 
levels of abstraction, down to their concrete realisations as objects.
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A frame can be defined as a schema that describes an entity or a class of entities by 
a collection of attribute-value pairs in a hierarchy of such schemata. Attributes have 
variable character; they provide ‘slots’. The slots can take a specific value (’fillers’) 
to describe a more concrete entity. Attributes may be thought of having any type of 
filler, such as number or strings, but in particular, other frames. Complex structures 
and relationships can be generated by nesting frames into each other (similar to object- 
oriented concepts).
A central feature of the frame concept is inheritance. Entities of the same type can 
be more or less specialised depending on their position in the hierarchy. On the higher, 
abstract levels of a hierarchy, frames typically specify only very general information, 
such as the type of slots they contain and the possible fillers for these slots. On lower, 
more concrete levels, slots may be filled by more specific value ranges and default values. 
Default attribute values describe a typical object of a class. For example, a vehicle can 
be characterised by having a number of wheels. A car is a certain class of vehicle, which 
has typically four wheels, so that using number 4 as a default filler would be a sensible 
choice.
While frames describe classes of entities at different levels of abstraction, actual 
realisations of these classes are called ‘instances’. An instance describes an existing 
object with referral to its frame, for example ‘the green car with four wheels’.
Using as an example the frame firm, figure A .l illustrates this concept, deriving 
concrete firms from it.
In figure A.l, the top level frame describes the possible values entities of the type 
firm can have. On a more concrete level, media and transport firms can be distinguished 
by applying default fillers. On the instance level, concrete firms are created from the 
default frames. In gsim, this process is labelled ‘instanciation’ to distinguish it from 
instantiation in object-oriented programming.
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« s p e c ia l is a t io n »
« in s ta n c ia tio n »
<instan 'je> M edia-F irm -1
- < a lln b u le> p ro d u c ls : n e w s  p a p e rs
- < a ttn b u tc> size : sm all
- <atti ibu te> foundation  y e a r - 1986
< in stan ce> M ed ia-F n m -2
-  < a ttn b u te> p rc d u c ts . b o o k s
-  < a ttrib u lo > sizo  sm all
-  < a ttrib u te> fo u n d atio n  y e a r  2 0 0 0
< fram e> T R A N S P O R T  FIRM
- < slo t> p ro d u c ts - c a rs ,  a irc ra fts
-  <s1ot>size: sm all, m ed iu m , largo
- <slo t> foundat!on  y e a r  n u m b e r
<fram e>M ED IA  FIRM
-  < slo t> p ro d u cts : n e w s  p a p e rs ,  b o o k s
- < slo t> size . sm all, m ed iu m , larg e
-  < slo t> foundation  y ea r: n u m b er
<fram e> FIR M
- < s lo t> p ro d u cts : c a rs ,  a irc ra fts , food, n ew  p a p e rs ,  b o o k s
- < slo t> size . sm all, m ed 'u m , larg e
- < slo t> foundation  y ea r: n u m b er
Figure A.l: Knowledge representation in gsim.
T he  fram e m odel in  gsim  gsim entities are organised by lists of attributes and list 
of further frames. For simplification of the implementation, both types of entities are 
kept separate. Attributes are simple name-value pairs, and cannot contain frames.
Entities are managed in their own environment, which implements the schema hi­
erarchy and manages value changes within that hierarchy. For example, if a default 
value further up in the inheritance is changed, this change is propagated down to all 
inheriting frames and all instances of that frame. Any entity in gsim must be created 
via this environment. The environment defines two special top-level frames: agent-class 
and object-class. Any concrete simulation model must inherit from these entities.
As in the base concept, frames describe the possible value ranges and default values, 
gsim makes some restrictions on the hierarchies that can be generated. Only agent 
classes may contain further frames; object classes are simple containers for attributes. 
Attributes can be of different types: numerical attributes accept any numbers; string 
attributes any string value; intervals define a value range by a minimum and maximum 
value; similarly, set attribute defines a list of allowed fillers.
Figure A.2 illustrates the agent-class. It only specifies frames for the behaviour 
and adds some default attributes (e.g. the attribute that contains the operator of a
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AgentClass
State-action-
mappingRule
Expansion
Behaviour
Condition Action
Figure A.2: The base agent frame in gsim (attributes are omitted).
condition); any other attributes and object classes would be added depending on the 
simulation model. The behaviour itself is given again by nested frames. A behaviour 
consists of a set of rules, which are composed of conditions and refer to actions. The 
details are given in the following section A.2.2.
During the process of instanciation, frames serve as a template for generating ob­
jects. Initially, the frame attribute defaults are used for the concrete values in the 
instance’s attributes. Similarly, default objects may be generated. After the instances 
are generated, the default values may then be overridden with instance-specific values, 
or varied randomly (the prototype implementation provides utility classes for this).
Thus, a large range of models can be described with such a generic representation, 
and agent populations easily be generated and modified. Models specialise the generic 
classes by adding new attributes and further frames. If a simulation requires it, the 
addition or deletion of attributes on the instance level is possible as well.
Due to the regularity of the representation, it is possible to specify a simple language 
that declares the objects of a model, which at the same time is capable of specify some
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simple dynamics by defining rules operating on these descriptions. The following section 
A.2.2 presents this language and illustrates how it is applied to generate the actual 
programs that execute agents in gsim.
A .2.2 Formal D escription as Language
This section specifies the gsim entities and dynamics with the help of a simple language. 
The notation is based on the Backus-Naur (BNF) form, a notation used to express 
context-free grammars. Context-free grammars are often used in Computer Science to 
describe the syntax of programming languages by production rules of the form V  —ï w t 
where V is a non terminal symbol and w is a string consisting of terminals and/or 
non-terminal symbols. Non-terminal symbols are enclosed in brackets ‘o ’. Terminal 
symbols are character strings (enclosed in quotation marks). The character ‘|’ denotes 
a logical ‘or’. An asterisk V  denotes (zero or more) repetitions. The operator 
denotes a production rule where the expression on the left-hand side is replaced with 
the expression on the right-hand side. Subsequent replacements will thus resolve to a 
sequence of terminal symbols. The operator ‘:= ’ denotes a production of the left-hand 
side to the expression on the right-hand side (examples are given in section A.3.2.4). 
Expressions in the following paragraphs are valid also for the succeeding paragraphs,
i.e. definitions in preceding sections are not redefined when referenced in later sections 
(e.g. character).
C om m on term in a l sym b o ls
character : : "a" I "b" I 11 c" I "d" I 1 e" I "f " | "g" I
"h" | "i" | "j" | "k" | "1" | "m" | "n" I
"o" | "p" | "q" | "r" I "s" | "t" | "u" |
"v" I "w" | "x" I "y" I "z"
digit : : "0" I "1" I "2" I "3" I "4" | "5" I "6" I "7" I "8" I "9" ;
Fram e d efin ition
<frame> = <entity-name> [<frame>*] <frame-list>* 
<domain-attribute-list>*
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<entity-name>
<list-name>
<frame-list>
<domain-attribute-list>
<domain-attribute>
<domain-attribnte-name>
<domain-attribute-type>
<set-type>
<numerical-type>
<numerical-interval-type>
<string-type>
<filler>
<string-default-value> 
<numerical-default-value> 
<interval-default-value>
:= character*
:= character*
:= <list-name> "("<entity-name>")" <entity-name>*
:= <list-name> <domain-attribute>*
:= <domain-attribute-name>
<domain-attribute-type>
:= character*
:= <set-default>| <numerical-default> |
<numerical-interval-default> | <string-default> 
= "Set" <filler>* <string-default-value>
= "Numerical" <numerical-default-value>
= "Numeri callnterval"
<interval-def ault-value>
= "String" <string-default-value>
= character*
= character*
= digit*
= digit* digit*
As described above, frames are containers for attributes and further frames. Domain 
attributes describe the type and default values of concrete attributes such as string- or 
numerical attributes. Domain attributes and contained frames are organised in lists. 
These lists may specify the type of object they contain by referring to the name of 
the entity it is allowed to contain instances of. Frames can inherit from an arbitrary 
number of parent frames. Inheritance can create naming conflicts, for example, lists 
and entities with the same name in different parents. These conflicts are not resolved,
i.e. unless a particular frame is referenced, it is undefined which object is returned on 
the lowest level.
In stan ce  d efin ition
<instance>
<attribute-list>
<attribute>
<attribute-name>
<attribute-type>
<set-type>
= <entity-name> <frame> <attribute-list>*
= <list-name> <attribute>*
= <attribute-type> <attribute-name>
= character*
= <set-type>I <numerical-type> I
<numerical-interval-type> I <string-type> 
:= "Set" <string-value>*
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<niimerical-type>
<numerical-interval-type>
<string-type>
<string-value>
<numerical-value>
"Numerical" <numerical-value> 
"Numericallnterval"
<nximerical-value> " - " <numer ical-value> 
"String" <string-value> 
character* 
digit*
An instance is a concrete entity that can be generated by a frame. Any attributes or 
contained instances must comply with the type and domain-attribute restrictions set 
by its frame. An instanciation of a frame has a reference to its frame, and is accessible 
at any time during the life cycle of an instance.
O b ject class d efin ition
<obj ect-class> := <entity-name> <frame> <domain-attribute-list>*
Object-class is a top-level object in gsim. It is a derivation of a frame that restricts 
the elements contained in that frame to attributes. An object class may define an 
arbitrary number of domain attribute lists that describe the particular entity to be 
modelled.
O b ject d efin ition
<object> := <entity-name> <obj ect-class> <attribute-list>*
Analogous to instances, all gsim objects are derived from and refer to its defining 
object class.
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A g en t class defin ition
<agent-class>
<object-class-list>
<behaviour-class>
<action-class>
<action-j ava-class> 
<reactive-rule-class>
<adaptive-rule-class>
<condition-class>
<domain-attribute-spec> :
<obj ect-class-spec> :
<expansion-class> :
<max-nodes> :
<update-interval> :
<revaluation-probability>: 
<revisit-costfraction> :
<reward-variable-class> :
<constant-class> :
<numerical-operator> :
<operator> ::
<entity-name> <frame>* <obj ect-class-list>* 
<domain-attribute-list>* <behaviour-class>
<list-name> " ("<entity-name>")1 <object-class>* 
<entity-name> <frame> <action-class>* <max-nodes> 
<update-interval> <revaluation-probability> 
<revisit-costfraction>
<reactive-rule-class>* <adaptive-rule-class>* 
<entity-name> <frame> <frame>* <action-j ava-class> 
character*
<entity-name> <frame> <condition-class>* 
<consequent-class>
<entity-name> <frame> <condition-class>* 
<expansion-class>* "->"<consequent-class>* 
<reward-variable>
<entity-name> <frame> [<domain-attribute-spec> 
<numerical-operator>
[domain-attribute-spec||<constant>]] I 
[<obj ect-class-spec> <operator>
[<constant> I <obj ect-class-spec> |
<attribute-spec>]]
<list-name>"/"<domain-attribute-name>"/"
<attribute-value>
<entity-name> <Frame> <object-class-list>"/"
<entity-name>" : : "<list-name> "/" <domain-attribute-name>1 /" 
<attribute-value>I<object-class-list>"/"<entity-name> 
<list-name>"/1 <domain-attribute-name> I 
<object-class-list>"/"<entity-name>::
<list-name>"/"<domain-attribute-name> 
digit* 
digit* 
digit* 
digit*
<domain-attribute-spec>* 
digit* | character*
" = "  | »  > »  |  i i > = ii | i i  < i i | i i < = ii
<numerical-operator> I "EXISTS" I "NOT EXISTS"
Agent-class is the top-level agent frame in gsim, and all models have to derive their 
agents from this frame. Agent-class specifies further frames for describing the base of
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agent behaviour, e.g. in conditions and actions.
A g en t d efin ition
<agent>
<object-list>
<behaviour>
<action>
<reactive-rule>
<adaptive-rnle>
<condition>
<attribute-spec>
<object-spec>
<expansion>
<reward-vaxiable>
:= <entity-name> <agent-class>* <obj ect-list>*
<attribute-list>* <Behaviour>
:= <list-name> <object>*
:= <entity-name> <behaviour-class> <action>* <max-nodes> 
<update-interval> <revaluation-probability> 
<revisit-costfraction>
<reactive-rule>* <adaptive-rule>*
:= <entity-name> <action-class> <instance>* <action-j ava-class> 
:= <entity-name> <reactive-rule-class> <condition>*
<consequent>
:= <entity-name> <adaptive-rule-class> <condition>*
<expansion>* "->"<consequent>* <rewaxd-variable>
:= <entity-name> <condition-class> [<domain-spec> 
<numerical-operator>
[domain-sped I<constant>]] I 
[<object-spec> <operator>
[<constant> I <object-spec> I <attribute-spec>]]
:= <list-name>"/"<attribute-name>"/"
<attribute-value>
:= <entity-name> <object-class-spec> <object-list>"/" 
<entity-name>": :"<list-name>"/"<attribute-name>"/" 
<attribute-value>|
<object-list>"/"<entity-name>
:= <list-name>"/"<attribute-name>
<list-name>"/l,<entity-name>: :
<list-name>"/"<attribute-name>
:= <attribnte-spec>*
Agent is the instanciation of an agent class, analogously to the frame-instance rela­
tionships described in the previous sections.
A .2.3 Agent Behaviour
A behaviour groups different types of rules, which realise the different cases of the 
framework described in chapter 2: Behaviour for full CBR or LCS-type learning, be­
haviour implementing simple RL (element adaptive-rule), and deterministic behaviour
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in the form of if-then rules (element reactive-rule). Technically, all behaviour is based 
on production rules, having zero up to an unlimited number of conditions, and one or 
more consequents. Conditions are simple first-order logic predicates using operators 
like equal or smaller, and the existence-operators exists/not exist. The BRA algorithm 
is applied by specifying optional ‘expansion’ descriptors. These descriptors specify the 
set of symbols and operators that constitute the prepositional set £  in definition 4, 
i.e. the initial condition symbols on which the rule generalisation and specialisation 
mechanisms work.
Conditions are patterns referencing attributes or objects of the agents. They specify 
object and attribute value combinations that trigger the action part of the rule, for 
example, ‘for all objects x with attribute y greater z do . . .  ’. Here lies the major 
benefit of the language specification: It is a directive that generates patterns that serve 
as the input for the production rule system.
Actions modify the state of the agent or initiate a conversation with other agents. 
Model implementations must provide an action implementation extending the frame­
work java class gsim. engine. b ehaviour. Sim Action. Actions may have a dynamically 
changing arbitrary number of arguments referring to agent objects and attributes. 
These arguments are specified on the frame-level. By this, it is possible to program 
a general action, and apply the action to a large number of unknown, dynamically 
changing object instances and/or attributes. For example, an action ‘Sell’ can imple­
ment the selling of an object in an agent’s product list. Instead of programming an 
action ‘Sell product X’, referring to a product instance, a general action for ‘Sell a 
product’ can be implemented and parameterised with the object-class that the product 
list holds. At runtime, the rule engine will determine the product to be sold based on 
the condition and pass it as actual parameter to the action.
The following paragraphs describe the gsim rule system in more detail.
R ules The core of the simulation system is the rule engine, based on the rule system 
Jess (Sandia Labs 2010). Depending on the agent’s current state, the pattern matcher
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determines which rules are to be fired. The pattern matcher searches objects in the rule 
engine’s knowledge base and finds those combinations that match the objects described 
in the condition part. In gsim, the knowledge base is constituted by the part of the 
agent’s state (defined as the objects and attributes of the agent) that is referred to in 
the behaviour specification.
In a model specification, rules are typically specified on the frame level. The state to 
be evaluated is given by the terms <object-class-spec> and <domain-attribute-spec>. 
Pattern matching in case of an <object-class-spec> follows the rule: For all objects 
of type <frame-name> with attribute < attribute-name> and value < attribute-value> 
execute < consequent> [java-class]. Several terms of < object-class-spec> and <domain- 
attribute-spec> can be combined in one condition, and are interpreted as connected 
with a logical ‘and’. During runtime, objects and attributes are bound to variables. The 
variable names are given by the names of the respective frame and domain-attributes. 
If instances or attributes of the same type are referenced several times in <object-class- 
spec> and <domain-attribute-spec>, they are bound to the same variable. This way it 
is guaranteed that consequents are only triggered by concrete values of the same entity, 
and not arbitrary combined instances that are found in the knowledge base.
From this pattern matching and variable binding logic three characteristic cases of 
how and how often rules may become activated can be distinguished: In case (1) an 
unparameterised consequent is fired as many times as instances in the condition are 
matched; in case (2) an unparameterszed consequent is fired only once independent of 
the concrete matches; and in case (3) a parameterised consequent is matched once by 
binding the action parameters to the variables in the condition. The following examples 
illustrate these cases:
1. A simple action may be activated many times depending on the objects in a list.
agent-class := Agent obj ect-class-list-1 (obj ect-class-1) behaviour-class-1
behaviour-class-1 := BehavionrClassl rule-class-1
rule-class-1 := RuleClassl condition-class-1 -> action-class-1
action-class-1 := DoSomethingClassl executable.class.java
Appendix A. A Scalable ACE Simulation Software Framework 216
object-class-l := AssetClassl domain-attribute-list-1 
condition-class-1 := ConditionClass1 object-class-list-l/object-class-1: : 
domain-attribute-list-l/AssetAttribute-1 = 0
This behaviour specifies a rule class that activates the rule instance of RuleClassl 
any time the Asset Attribute-1 of objects in the instance list of obj ect-class-list-1 
equals 0.
2. The previous case means that an identical action is executed solely depending on 
the number of objects in the list. As long as the list does not always contain a 
singleton instance, this is probably not desirable. Usually, it will be enough (or 
even required) that the rule is fired only once. For this, the E X I S T S  may be 
used. Using the specification declared in case (1), this behaviour becomes:
behaviour-class-2 := BehaviourClass2 rule-class-2
rule-class-2 := RuleClass2 condition-class-1 condition-class-2-> action-class-2
condition-class-2 := ConditionClass2 obj ect-class-list-1/obj ect-class-1: : 
domain-attribute-list-l/AssetAttribute-1 EXISTS
This rule first tests whether the attribute exists and is 0. Technically, it restricts 
the exists-test to those attributes with value 0, which is redundant but has the 
effect that the rule is only fired once.
3. If there can be more than one object in a list, the model typically implies seman­
tically that an action is activated for that particular object - e.g., ‘if the product 
is green, sell it’. Using again the declarations given above, this case is given by 
the following specification:
behaviour-class-3 := BehaviourClassS rule-class-3 
rule-class-3 := SalesRule condition-class-3 -> action-class-2
action-class-2 := Sell object-class-l SellAction.java 
condition-class-3 := ColourCondition object-class-list-l/object-class-1: : 
domain-attribute-list-l/AssetAttribute-1 = 1
In this example, the action has been parameterised with objects of type object- 
class-l (which could, say, represent a product, and the attribute a code for a
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particular colour). Since the condition refers also to objects of type object-class­
ic the object instance matching the condition is bound to the same variable as 
the object instance passed to the action SellAction. The SellAction implementa­
tion then knows which object actually matched the condition, and do something 
appropriately with that object (e.g., sell it).
A dap tive  R ules Adaptive rules are extensions of the simple rules described in the 
preceding paragraph and are used to implement the different types of learning described 
in chapter 2. Instead of one consequent, there are several, and the action to be executed 
is selected probabilistically. The condition-part remains the same as in a simple rule.
Simple RL is given if there is no condition, and at least two consequents are specified. 
Some action is always selected, and the reinforcement, given by <reward-variable>, is 
updated.
CBR is given if at least one condition is specified and at least two consequents are 
specified. RL then applies then only in certain situations.
CBR becomes dynamic when the expansions element is specified. < expansions 
refers to an attribute in the agent or one of its objects. This attribute must be of type 
Cnumerical-intervals or <set-attributeS to define the value range within the state- 
space partitioning algorithm works.
In the current implementation, the value ranges of < expansions elements have to 
be fixed at setup-time; the disadvantage of this is that, as mentioned in 2, the expansion 
process may operate on attribute ranges that are irrelevant (for example, an initial value 
range 0-1000, where only values 0-10 can occur during the simulation). This makes the 
implementation sensitive to the setup and the expected values. It is, however, quite 
easy to extend the current mechanism to a more dynamic mode which is capable of 
integrating new values and value ranges as they appear during a simulation, making 
the algorithm more robust. The idea is as follows:
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-  If no tree is developed at all: Simply add the root node with one value or value 
range: If the attribute is a set-attribute, add exactly the category. If it is numer­
ical, construct an interval (e.g. for a value x, construct a range from x — x/2  to 
x  +  x/2,  or simply from x  to x).
-  If more than one level is developed: Select a child of the base rule at the deepest 
expanded level. Add the new category to this node, or construct a new interval 
if the attribute is numeric. Up to the root rule, add to all predecessors of the 
modified rule the new category or modify the interval in an analogous way. The 
state value of the modified nodes remains the same, i.e. the existence of the new 
value does not affect current evaluations. As the new value is connected by an ‘or’ 
to the existing terms in the condition, this can be interpreted as a null hypothesis 
that the new value does not influence the well-being of the agent at the current 
time step.
Parameters controlling the execution of the algorithm (e.g. the cost of visiting 
nodes, the maximum allowed number of expansions and so on) are given by <max- 
nodes> (parameter % in chapter 2), <update-interval> (p in chapter 2; v is currently 
fixed with round(p — \p)),  <revaluation-probability> {p in chapter 2) and Crevisit- 
costfraction> (( in chapter 2). These parameters are specified only once per agent, 
since they specify properties of an agent’s mind.
The < reward-variable> (parameter p in chapter 2) element specifies which attribute 
is used as a reward for the reinforcement learner. Typically, a model will modify this 
variable as the result of a change in the agent’s state. The rule engine is responsible for 
mapping this value into the action reward and later select an action accordingly.
The following example describes an adaptive rule that uses the attribute player-type 
as the variable partitioning the state space, and the current payoff of the player as the 
reward variable:
agent-class = PDAgent player-list (player-name) attribute-list behaviour-class
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player-name
behaviour-class
pi-rule-class
action-class-1
action-class-2
expansion-class-1
= PDPlayer domain-attribute-list-1 
= PDBehaviourClass pd-rule-class
= PDAdaptiveClass expansion-class-1 -> action-class-1, action-class-2 
= Cooperate models.pd.Defect 
= Defect models.pd.Cooperate 
= ExpansionClassl player-list/player-name: :
domain-attribute-list-l/NameAttribute-1 = A|B|C|D attribute-list/payoff
The rule engine will use the four possible attribute values A B C or D to construct the 
initial rule: ‘player-type^ (A or B or C or D)’, and create specialisations during the 
simulation, e.g. ‘player-type= (A or B)’. Depending on the actual reward structure, 
selection probabilities will vary for different specialisations as described in detail in 
chapter 2.
The expansion mechanism takes a path in which identical descriptors are gener­
ated at different sections of the tree (this might be the case if there are at least two 
attributes). Then the order at which the rules get activated is random. Whichever 
rule is fired first is executed; the execution of any other rules in the same time step is 
suppressed.
A .2.4 A gent Com m unication
Agent interaction is essential to agent-base models. In gsim, interactions require explicit 
communication via messages. An agent A wanting to interact with agent B sends a 
message with some content, which may trigger some activity in agent B. Agent B sends 
a message back. In a minimal communication act, this message ends the interaction, 
but also might trigger further actions in agent A, who may continue talking to B and 
so on. This is called a communication protocol. Each protocol is executed within a 
single time step. Agents act without delay; that is, when the message is delivered, the 
receiving agent reacts immediately.
As in any discrete simulation engine, gsim agents act sequentially. This means 
that if agent B’s turn is after agent A, agent B might change its state during the 
communication, but before it is actually its turn in the normal execution order, gsim
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does not request or provide any rules that handle the case where this conflicts with the 
model logic. The modeller has to ensure in the implementation that such side-effects 
are avoided or controlled. During implementation of the models it was usually enough 
to apply state- and reward updates before a cycle of activity, gsim’s scheduling method 
allows to partition agents into different roles which are executed separately (the roles 
are given by extending agent classes; the actions of each extension is executed in its 
own cycle). This way, the modeller can configure quite atomic units of work to ensure 
a correct order of actions and corresponding state updates.
As all agent activities are initiated by a rule consequent, communication protocols 
can technically be seen as an action. The protocol is provided by the modeller, extending 
some classes of the framework, and specifying it as the consequent of a rule, gsim then 
takes care that the messages are delivered appropriately to the involved agents.
A .2.5 Other Com ponents
gsim provides the possibility to integrate custom procedures in the form of special 
agents, which are called Application Agents (e.g. for data collection or broadcasting 
messages to the whole agent population). Application Agents have access to the com­
plete model state, and are called before and after the execution of a time step. They 
are, in principle, helper classes and thus not represented as frames and instances, but 
are simple java classes that can be extended by the modeller.
A .2.6 Interfaces
In the previous section, gsim was described in terms of a context-free grammar. Based 
on examples. This section shortly describes two actual interfaces that have been built on 
this idea in the prototype. Modellers can use either the java application programming 
interface (API) or XML files to specify a model. It is furthermore required to use and 
extend certain classes of the framework to be a runnable gsim application, e.g. action 
implementations.
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A n XM L exam ple Listing A .l shows how an agent definition is set up using the 
XML interface. It is part of a prisoner’s dilemma model in which agents have several 
visible tags, and may learn to discriminate based on this information.
Listing A.l: XML example
< a g e n t  n a m e =  "  P D A g e n t  "  e x t e n d s = "  G a m e A g e n t 1 !  >
< a t t r i b u t e - l i s t s >
C l i s t  n a m e = ” p r o p e r t i e s 1 5 >
< S e t  n a m e - " o w n - 1 a g "  d e f a u l t = ! , B L U E * 1 >
< v a l u e > B L U E < / v a l u e >
< v a l u e > G E E E N < / v a l u e >
< / S e t >
< / l i s t >
< l i s t  n a m e = " i n t e r n a l - s t a t e " )
< S e t  n a m e = l ! c u r r e n t - s t r a t e g y , !  d e f a n l t = "  " >
< v a l u e > C o o p e r a t e < / v a l u e >
< v a l u e > D e f e c t < / v a l u e >
< / S e t >
< N u m e r i c a l  n a m e = " p a y o f f "  d e f a u l t = l ! 0 "  / >
< / l i s t >
< / a t t r i b u t e - l i s t s >
< o b j e c t - l i s t s >
< l i s t  n a m e = ! i c u r r e n t 1 t y p e = < 1  P l a y e r "  / >
< l i s t  n a m e = " k n o w n - t a g s "  t y p e = ” T a g "  / >
< / o b j e c t - l i s t s >
< a v a i l a b l e - a c t i o n s >
< a c t i o n  n a m e = " D e f e c t "  / >
< a c t i o n  n a m e = M C o o p e r a t e "  / >
< / a v a i l a b l e - a c t i o n s >
< r l - n o d e s >
< r l - n o d e  n a m e = " R L - l " >
< c o n d i t i o n - n o d e s >
< c o n d i t i o n - n o d e  p a r a m = " k n o w n - t a g s / T a g : :  d e s c r i p t i o n / c h a r a c t e r i s t i c "  o p =  
" E Q "  v a l n e = " c n r r e n t / P l a y e r : : l i s t / c o l o n r "  / >
< e x p a n d - n o d e  p c i r a m = " k n o w n - t a g s / T a g :  d e s c r i p t i o n / c h a r a c t e r i s t i c "  / >  
< / c o n d i t i o n - n o d e s >
< a c t i o n - n o d e s  r e f - " D e f e c t , C o o p e r a t e "  / >
< d e f a u l t - r e w a r d  v a l u e = l l O .  5 "  / >
< s e l e c t o r  v a l u e = " s o f t m a x "  / >
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C f u n c t i o n  v a r i a b l e = " i n t e r z i a l - s t a t e / p a y o f f "  u p d a t e - l a g = ' U "  a l p h a = " 0 . 0 8 "
/> : :-k ;:
<discount value="0.05" />
: < a v e r a g i n g  d i s c o u n t - ' 0 .  / >
</rl-node> I- .
</rl-nodes>
</ a g e n t >
< o b j e c t s >
: 1  X o b j e c t  n a m | S ! p i g M : > f ; :
es c r ipt i on " >
<Set n&ae="characteristic" default="BLvE" >
< v a l u e  >  B L U E  < 7  v  a l u  e  >  .
<  v a l u e > G R E E N < / y a l u e  >  : ; : :
< v a l u e > Y E L L O W < / v a l u e >
< / S e t >
< / l i s t >
< / o b j e c t >
< o b j e c t  n a m e = " P l a y e r " >
< l i s t  n a m e = " l i s t " >
< S t r i n g  n a m e = " n a m e "  d e f a u l t = " s t e p h a n "  / >
< S e t  n a m e = " c o l o u r "  d e f a u l t = " B L U E "  >
< v a l u e > B L U E < / v a l u e >
< v a l u e > G R E E N < / v a l u e >
< / S e t >
< / l i s t >
< / o b j e c t >
< / o b j e c t s >
< a c t i o n s >
< a c t i o n  n a m e = " D e f e c t "  c l a s s = " m o d e l s . p d . D e f e c t i o n "  / >
< a c t i o n  n a m e = " C o o p e r a t e "  c l a s s = " m o d e l s . p d . C o o p é r â t i o n "  / >
< / a c t i o n s >
< s y s t e m - a g e n t s >
< s y s t e m - a g e n t  n a m e = " P a i r i n g G e n e r a t o r "  c l a s s = " g s i m . s i m . a g e n t . g a m e a g e n t s .  
F u l l l n f o r m a t i o n P a i r i n g G e n e r a t o r "  / >
< / s y s t e m - a g e n t s >
Listing A .l describes an agent with several attributes in the < attribu tes> section 
and objects in the <objects> section. An agent is described by its name and colour. 
It has two object lists. The list ‘current’ is a singleton list containing the current other 
player (the selection of which is implemented in the 1PairingGenerator ’ Application-
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Agent which responsible for matching players). The known-tags list is also singleton, 
and makes the tags defined for the simulation known to the agent. Its attributes can 
then be referenced in the behaviour part as variables. The java implementation of the 
actions is given in the concluding <actions> tag. The agent has an adaptive rule. The 
three attributes of the expansion element <Tag> can be expanded into six different 
combinations. Following the variable binding rules described in the previous section, 
of the different rules that may exist during runtime, only that rule is activated where 
the characteristic attribute equals the colour of the current player. The reward variable 
is given by the attribute ‘internal-state/ payoff’. The reward is updated in a separate 
cycle: PDAgent has is an extension of ‘GameAgent’, the reward is updated in the 
GameAgent role (not displayed here).
A PI Listing A.2 indicates how the example lines in listing A .l would be implemented 
programmatically.
Listing A.2: API example
Core core = gsim.core.CoreFactory.getInstance0 . createCore();
DefinitionEnvironment env = core.createC'PrisonersDilcr.r.:a"} new java.util. 
AgentClassIF gameAgent = env.createAgentClass(" G a m e A g e n t " ) ;
AgentClassIF pd = env.createAgentClass("PDAgent", "GameAgent");
ObjectClass tag = env.getDbjectClass("Tag"); 
pd.defineObjectList("known-tags", tag);
DomainAttribute payoff =
new DomainAttribute("payoff", AttributeConstants.NUMERICAL);
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p a y o f  f . s e t D e f  a u l t ( " 0  n ) ;
p d . a d d A t t r i b u t e ( " i n t e r n a l - s t a t e " ,  p a y o f f ) ;
D o m a i n A t t r i b u t e  o w n T a g  =  n e w  D o m a i n A t t r i b u t e ( " o w n - t a g ” ,  A t t r i b u t e C o n s t a n t s .
SET);
p w n f a g .  a d d F i % ^ j ^ 0 0 E 0 ( ^ ; : - :
o w n T a g . a d d F i l l e r ( " B L U E " ) ;  ;
o w n T a g . s e t D e f a u l t ( " B L U E " ) ;
p d .  a d d A t t r i b u t e ' . (  " p r o p e r t i e s "  - ,  - d o m a i n A t t ) . : ; .  ^
jljjj 1Ï . p
B e h a v i o u r I F  b e h a v i o u r  =  p d . g e t B e h a v i o u r ( ) ;
R L A c t i o n N o d e l F  r l  =  b . c r e a t e R L A c t i o n N o d e ( " R L l " ) ;
C o n d i t i o n l F  c o n d i t i o n  =  r l . c r e a t e C o n d i t i o n ( " k n o w n - t a g s / T a g : d e s c r i p t i o n /  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " ,
" c u r r e n t / P l a y e r : : l i s t / c o l o u r " ) ;
E x p a n s i o n l F  e x p a n s i o n  =  r l . c r e a t e E x p a n s i o n ( " k n o w n - t a g s / T a g : d e s c r i p t i o n /  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " ) ;
A c t i o n l F  c o n s e q u e n t !  =  b . c r e a t e A c t i o n ( " C o o p e r a t e " ,  " m o d e l s . p d . C o o p e r a t e " ) ;  
A c t i o n l F  c o n s e q u e n t 2  -  b .  c r e a t e A c t i o n C ' D e f  e c t "  ,
" m o d e l s . p d . D e f e c t " ) ;
r l . a d d O r S e t C o n d i t i o n ( c o n d i t i o n ) ;  
r l . a d d O r S e t E x p a n s i o n ( e x p a n s i o n ) ;  
r l . a d d D r S e t C o n s e q u e n t ( c o n s e q u e n t ! ) ;  
r l . a d d O r S e t C o n s e q u e n t ( c o n s e q u e n t 2 ) ;
b e h a v i o u r . a d d O r S e t R L A c t i o n N o d e ( r l ) ;
p d . s e t B e h a v i o u r ( b ) ;
e n v . a d d A p p l i c a t i o n A g e n t ( " M a t c h e r " ,  " g s i m . s i m . a g e n t . g a m e a g e n t s .
F u l l l n f o r m a t i o n P a i r i n g G e n e r a t o r " ) ;
H e r e ,  t h e  m a i n  i d e a  i s  t h a t  t h e  a t t r i b u t e s  ( w h i c h  a r e  s i m p l e  n a m e - v a l u e  p a i r s )  o f  
t h e  a g e n t  a r e  r e f e r e n c e d  b y  s t r i n g s  d e f i n i n g  w h e r e  t h e y  a r e  l o c a t e d .  T h e  b e h a v i o u r  i s  
t h e n  c o m p o s e d  b y  p a s s i n g  t h e s e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  T h e r e  i s  n o  d i r e c t  p r o g r a m m i n g  m o d e l ,  
a s ,  s a y  c o n d i t i o n .  s e t L e f t H a n d S i d e  ( t a g O b  j  e c t ) ,  e t c .  T h e  g s i m  r u l e  p a r s e r  t r a n s l a t e s  t h e  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  i n t o  a n  e x e c u t a b l e  J e s s  p r o g r a m .
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A .3 Software A rch itecture
The main logic of gsim is implemented in the representation system. It provides the 
classes and interfaces necessary to build and run a model. The representation system 
itself is part of larger software architecture that provides the infrastructure for running 
simulations (section A.3.1.1), and its extension to a distributed simulation system for 
handling large simulations (section A.3.2).
A .3.1 Base system
The base system describes the standalone software environment for running gsim mod­
els.
A .3.1.1 A rchitecture and D esign
Three layers can be distinguished. Here, the basic responsibilities and functionality of 
each layer is shortly described.
Access layer This layer serves as the entry point and connects the modeller with the 
definition and simulation layer. The modeller defines and creates models either using 
the gsim API, or via the XML interface. After defining the model in the environment, 
the model can be simulated. The reference to the SimulationManager component is 
obtained via the gsim API. The SimulationManager provides control method to start, 
stop, pause or resume simulations. It is also possible to register event listeners that 
handle events like the end of a simulation. Furthermore, the SimulationManager com­
ponent is used to access the current state of a simulation (i.e. all agents at time t).
D efinition layer This layer contains the implementation of the representation system 
as described in section A.2. All frames and instances are maintained in their own 
environment. The environment handles relationships and inheritance. For example, if 
an agent-class is modified in the API, the environment propagates the changes to all 
subclasses and instances of this frame.
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Sim ulation  layer This layer transforms the data structures of the representation 
system into runnable code. The most important aspect of this is the translation of the 
declarative structures into a rule-based program. Furthermore, it contains the scheduler 
which executes the simulation in discrete time steps. The SimulationContainer com­
ponent provides a possibility to repeat a model several times. For this it creates the 
specified number of model instances and schedulers (up to a maximum number of paral­
lel threads) and queues the remaining instances. It notifies the SimulationManager after 
the execution of the model has finished. It is possible to partition a large simulation 
over a number of delegates running in their own threads to speed up execution.
By default, gsim uses a database to store simulation data. Accessing the storage is 
manged by data handler classes. The modeller configures the data source, and provides 
extension classes of the data handlers that insert the data into the database. The 
framework calls these handlers with the configured database connection. It is also 
possible not to use a database.
Figure A.3 illustrates the components.
A .3.1.2 Im plem entation
The standalone system is implemented in the Java Programming language, version 
1.6. The core is the behaviour system that generates executable code from the rule 
descriptions, for which the rule engine Jess (Sandia Labs 2010) is used. The standalone 
system does by itself not require a database. For the model implementations of this 
thesis, PostgreSQL has been used.
A .3.2 D istributed system  
A .3.2.1 Basic D esign Questions
Scaling up a standalone environment raises a number of questions and implications 
usually not relevant for standalone social simulation systems:
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Figure A.3: gsim base architecture. Arrows denote both flows of control and object references.
S ynchronisation  Social simulations are typically run sequentially and synchronously. 
This means that exactly one agent is executed at a time, and each agent has at any 
time the same information about its own and its environment’s state. Remaining with 
this mode of execution limits the benefits of a distributed execution of a model, since 
all nodes in a cluster have to be synchronised, and performance might even degrade 
because of the coordination overhead. In some types of models, it is possible to proceed 
with different parts of the simulation in their own time, with no or only eventual 
synchronisation. This approach is useful if the agents are mostly independent and can 
be executed without much influence on other agents, or if clusters of interdependent 
agents can be identified and be separated on distinct nodes. Such concepts have been 
applied in distributed Artificial Life simulations where agents are located on a two­
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dimensional gird, and often act isolated and communicate rarely. It seems unsuitable 
for many social simulations, since social systems inherently require communication, 
interaction and shared information. Moreover, social simulations do not always require 
a geographical environment.
Being a general framework, distributed gsim does not provide special synchroni­
sation algorithms for asynchronous execution. The only fundamental assumptions it 
builds on are (1) agents share the same time, and (2) that the perceivable environment 
state is identical for all agents. The framework guarantees that these conditions are 
satisfied at any time during the simulation. Synchronisation itself happens indirectly 
by configuring how messages are sent through the system, which is described in the 
following paragraph.
M essaging The synchronisation of the overall state of a simulation has consequences 
for the communication of agents in a distributed system. Since gsim explicitly makes 
no assumptions about the distribution of agents over the physical nodes, most agent- 
to-agent communication travels over the network. One option to implement commu­
nication is (1) to send many small messages (e.g. for every single agent, messages are 
transmitted immediately over the network to the receiver) and achieve a high degree of 
parallelism. The disadvantage is a potential message overload and nodes becoming too 
busy just processing messages. The system could even become slower than standalone 
systems because the time to process messages exceeds the benefits of parallel processing. 
In case of the other extreme (2), all messages produced on one node could be bundled, 
so that nodes communicate across the network, but not single agents. This approach 
minimises communication, but also limits the benefits of parallel execution since most 
agents located on one node have to wait for all agents on other nodes, even for those 
who are not directly interacting with them.
The gsim approach is a solution between these extremes. Messages between agents 
are bundled. The modeller can configure how many messages are collected before being 
sent off, or switch the mechanism off. In the latter case, all messages of the node are
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collected and sent over the network only after all agents in the node have (case (2)). 
Case (1) is achieved by setting the bundling threshold to 1, which results in each agent 
message being immediately dispatched to the receiver.
In any distributed system, messages can get lost; servers break down or similar 
network failures occur, gsim does not provide a recovery mechanism, and also no 
built-in security to prevent failures due to communication or computation overload. 
Only some basic configuration parameters allow to control the workload, for example, 
the maximum number of concurrently running simulations, and the size of simulation 
partitions. An optimised configuration depends on the cluster the framework is running 
on, and has to be tuned by the modeller. As an illustration, on a cluster with two nodes 
with Pentium IV processors, a restriction to 30 parallel small simulations was found to 
be a reasonable upper limit.
D a ta  collection Data collection in standalone applications typically iterates over 
agents in the agent container, computes statistics of interest and displays it either to 
the user, or stores it in files or a database. In a distributed system, this data has 
to be collected from different nodes and sent over the network before computations 
are possible. This may lead to performance or memory problems for large data sets. 
Using a database, gsim provides a configurable caching mechanism that delegates the 
computation of statistics to a separate thread or even node. Each node stores its 
current state in a database table, while a dedicated thread reads the data and can then 
do computations on it. This is not visible to users, so that no particular attention has 
to be paid whether data of only a few dozens or several thousand agents is collected.
A .3.2.2 Architecture and D esign
In the distributed version, the components of the standalone simulation system are 
replicated over a cluster of servers. Some central services exist uniquely in the cluster: 
The simulation clock, a resource manager controlling the number of parallel executing 
simulations, and a central registry for configuration entries and the IP addresses of
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the servers currently available in the cluster. The nodes of the cluster are coordinated 
by a mixture of direct remote procedure calls and messages where parallelization is 
important.
Environment and model container objects act as master. Instead of handling agents 
themselves, they delegate calls to the appropriate delegate, either directly, or by sending 
a message to the cluster:
-  The Environment master receives a request from the access layer to create a 
number of agents, and the number of delegates to be created. The master then 
creates the delegates and allocates the same number of agents to each of them.
-  When a simulation is started, the SimulationContainer receives a reference to 
the Environment master and creates one or more (if more than one model run is 
requested) master models.
-  The Model master holds a reference to the Environment master. It creates the 
runnable agents and distributes them to number of delegates defined by a partition 
size parameter.
In general, gsim uses direct (remote) references and synchronous calls where possible 
and asynchronous messaging only during runtime. In the setup stage, most commu­
nication happens directly. Furthermore, some administrative tasks during a run can 
be calls by reference. Fetching the simulation state, for example, happens by (remote) 
referencing the Model delegates on the different nodes. To prevent too heavy memory 
usage, the state can be loaded in chunks. Sometimes, remote calls are not feasible 
anymore. For example, data collection for a very large simulation is time intensive and 
should be forked into a separate thread on a dynamically chosen node in the cluster 
(otherwise the simulation proceeds very slowly just for computing statistical informa­
tion). Communication with this process happens via messages over a special channel, 
as it is not known where the process is located.
Asynchronous processing is used for the following cases:
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-  Coordinating the several master and slaves: Time in the cluster proceeds synchro­
nised. The Model master is responsible for assuring that a whole model instance is 
proceeding at the same time. The Model master receives a signal from the global 
clock and sends a message to its delegates requesting the execution of the next 
step. Each delegate sends back a finished-message after executing all its agents.
-  Agent-to-agent communication: Agent-to-agent communication follows a config­
urable protocol to achieve a compromise between message processing load and 
serialisation of action sequences. More precisely, the protocol follows the follow­
ing steps: An agent starting a conversation sends a starting message. The model 
delegate collects these messages until the bundling threshold is reached or all 
agents have produced their messages. The delegate then sends the messages to 
the cluster. All nodes in the cluster receive the message bundle and filter out 
those messages that address agents located at them. The receiving delegate then 
immediately executes the agents’ responses and collects them. When the thresh­
old is reached, or at latest after the last agent has responded, the messages are 
again distributed over the network. The response message content may be null 
when the receiver agent ends the conversation or contain an answer if the protocol 
consists of several steps. In the latter case, the sending of messages continues until 
all conversations are ended (by sending null content). This usually also ends the 
execution of a step.
-  Accessing the current state: The Model master is accessible by system agents 
supplied by the modeller. Several methods to enquire about the current state 
exist, for example, retrieving all agents in a simulation. To access the global 
state, the master sends a state-request message to all delegates and waits until it 
has received the expected number of answers. The result can then be returned to 
the requesting client.
-  Data caching: For large simulations, the model delegates dump their current 
state into a database cache. Whenever data handlers are called to process the 
simulation state, the Model master sends a message containing the data handler
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and the reference to the cache entries to a message receiver, which does the actual 
computation. At the same time, the master can proceed with the simulation.
A .3.2.3 Im plem entation
A central feature of the system is that it builds on available standards and open source 
frameworks. In particular, it uses the Java Enterprise Edition (JEE) specification (Sun 
Corporation 2010c) that has become a widely used standard for distributed applica­
tions using the programming language Java. JEE is the general notion for several sub­
specifications - for example, the Servlet API for building dynamic web-applications; 
a messaging specification for synchronous and asynchronous communication over the 
network; or Enterprise Java Beans for (synchronous) remote procedure calls. Sev­
eral open-source software projects implement these standards and are provided in an 
application server. For distributed gsim, the famous open source application server 
JBoss (The JBoss Community 2010a) was chosen. While earlier JEE versions had the 
reputation of being very complex and difficult to manage, in recent years substantial 
modifications have been introduced simplifying development significantly. Software en­
gineering principles like Aspect Oriented Programming or dependency injection (e.g. 
Irwin et al 1997; Nene 2005) follow a philosophy of inversion of control. The result 
is that much infrastructure and low level work that formerly had to be implemented 
or configured by the developer is now provided by the application server provider. As 
a consequence of these developments, it has become much easier and straightforward 
to extend a single-machine software to a distributed system with minimal effort for 
developing the necessary infrastructure.
gsim is a very pragmatic approach. The idea was to minimise own developments and 
to find a way of utilising existing open-source software to the largest extent possible. 
This allowed the researcher to implement the system alone. The following paragraphs 
shortly describe the components provided by the application server, and the major 
features and steps that have to be implemented to extend from the standalone to a 
distributed version of the software.
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Standards and technologies used
E n terp rise  Jav a  B eans (Sun C o rp o ra tio n  2010a; E JB ) EJB is a technology 
based on the Java standard for remote method invocation, using the Remote Method 
Invocation protocol (Sun Corporation 2010d; RMI). In RMI, code is divided into server 
code and client code. A special compiler generates stubs and skeleton classes that 
handle the receiving and dispatching of method calls depending on the underlying 
network protocol. EJB builds on this base technology, simplifies its use, and provides 
additional features and services that are common to distributed applications, such as 
transaction handling or session management (e.g. by passivating or removing objects).
Jav a  M essaging Service (Sun C o rp o ra tio n  2010b; JM S ) JMS is a specification 
of a messaging middleware. JMS can be used for both synchronous and asynchronous 
messaging; in gsim the asynchronous mode is the most important, since the major 
motivation is to achieve parallel execution and loose coupling of server nodes. At the 
core of a JMS system is a server to which message producers and message consumers 
connect, i.e. it is a centralised system where the server handles the receiving and 
distribution of messages. Communication can be point-to-point or topic based. In 
the point-to-point model, one message producer sends messages to a queue, which are 
consumed by exactly one listener. In the topic model, several consumers listen to 
incoming messages. In gsim, mostly the topic approach is used. For example, the 
central clock service publishes step messages to which all running models react, or 
the Model master sends coordination messages to a single topic to which all delegates 
are connected. Because JMS is centralised, scalability is limited. The more messages 
are produced (e.g. by adding new nodes and/or running more models in parallel), 
the higher the load on the server, and the system may slow down or even run out of 
memory, gsim uses JBoss messaging, a clustered JMS server that distributes the load 
over all participating nodes, so that the messaging load may increase in parallel with 
the number of servers.
Appendix A. A Scalable ACE Simulation Software Framework 234
JB oss Cache (T he JB oss C om m unity  2010b) is a proprietary service based on 
JGroups (JGroups 2010). J Groups is a toolkit for multicast communication and can be 
used to create groups of processes on different computers that coordinate by sending 
messages. It provides various features such as group member detection and membership 
events such as notification about joined, left or crashed members and similar services. 
A major advantage of the toolkit is that the node names or IP addresses need not be 
known in advance. JBoss Cache uses this protocol for a distributed caching mechanism. 
The cache is, in principle, a tree structure that can be discovered in the local network, 
and into which information can be stored by the group members. In gsim, this service 
is used to register new nodes as they enter the network, unregister them when they are 
killed, remark their current load (used by gsim to distribute the workload), and to store 
related cluster-wide information.
PostgreSQ L  (PostgreSQ L G lobal D evelopm ent G roup  2010) By default, a 
PostgreSQL database system is used to store persistent data. The JBoss application 
server requires a database for JMS. gsim also stores data relevant for simulations in the 
database, for example, information for handling the scheduling of simulations, caching 
the simulation state, etc. Moreover, models typically store their data into a database, 
for which the same database can be used.
Extension of the base architecture
The main idea of gsim is to provide the same API to the modeller independent of 
the standalone or clustered mode. Where the system runs is configured by a single 
parameter. Of course, if the simulation is very large, the modeller has to take this into 
account when designing data access methods, how to parameterise parallel execution 
and so on.
From an implementation point of view, different implementations for the environ­
ment, simulation container and model containers, as well for the messaging component 
are provided. Their realisation is now based on EJB and JMS technologies.
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The main difference exists with respect to the management of a distributed simula­
tion:
The cluster consists of n  nodes. In each node, the same version of gsim is deployed. 
New nodes may be added dynamically. Removal, however, is more critical when simula­
tions are running as gsim does not provide a failover mechanism for running simulations. 
Messages or objects in the cluster may get lost and prevent the finishing of simulations.
There is one central service that controls the scheduling of simulations by setting an 
upper limit of parallel running models. It also provides the simulation clock (a service 
that issues messages at a certain interval), gsim server jobs, and their dependent objects 
(environment, simulation containers, model masters and delegates), are controlled by 
the server. If the user does not explicitly destroy objects created by him on the server, 
the server does this after a specified idle-timeout.
Simulations run asynchronously and autonomously in the server. The user sends a 
simulation model as a batch job and may disconnect. The server executes the simulation 
on the modeller’s behalf. Reconnect to access or control the simulation is, therefore, 
also handled via JMS, since the references to the remote objects on the server are lost 
once the user disconnects.
Figure A.4 illustrates the architecture of the distributed system. To the environment 
and model components, delegates are added. The delegates are distributed over the 
available nodes in the cluster. Communication and control are mediated via the JMS 
server. The client API may then be located on a different computer.
A .3.2.4 Exam ples
The previous section made clear that perfect parallelization is difficult to achieve with 
the minimal (and restrictive) assumptions gsim makes about the location and com­
munication structures of the agents. A messaging procedure has been presented that 
compromises between messaging overhead and maximal parallelization. Comparing 
simulations in distributed and standalone mode showed that the distributed version
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F igure A.4: D istributed architecture. W hite areas m ark client components, gray server 
components. Server side components are distributed over n nodes, splitting representation and 
runtim e over possibly n physical locations. Communication happens indirectly via messaging 
(JMS), or directly via remote m ethod invocations (RMI). RMI connections typically create 
and control object references, while JMS connections control simulation events (arrows).
outperforms the desktop application at any stage, and th a t computing time increases 
at a flatter rate as the number of agents grows.
Figure A .5 illustrates this with a toy model with minimal communication. In the 
model, agents meet other agents and play a prisoner’s dilemma. The communication 
act consists of sending each time step n messages from a central coordinator agent to 
n agents telling each single agent with which player they interact. Action happens in 
an isolated way, i.e. there is no agent-to-agent communication.
An example for a more complex simulation, including the sending of many messages
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Figure A.5: Simulation examples I. In this example, the number of servers is constant as the 
number of agents increases.
is the GP model of chapter 5. First, a model with over 3000 complex agents was hardly 
possible to run on a single machine with 2 GB of working memory. The results of 
chapter 5 were obtained (depending on availability) with up to five nodes. Figure A.6 
shows some more comparative example runs with 1000 patient agents on one to four 
nodes. It shows first an increase in performance as the second and third nodes are 
added. However, the benefit of the fourth nodes diminishes. A likely reason for this 
is the relatively small number of agents, so that additional communication begins to 
outweigh the benefits of further load distribution.
The game simulations of chapters 3 and 4 represent a different use case of the sys­
tem. The number of agents was very small (20 at maximum). Distributing the agents 
of single simulations on the cluster would not speed up the simulations (communica­
tion overhead), but the distributed version was used to execute the numerous required 
repetitions in parallel. In this scenario, agent communication remains local as in the 
standalone system, but coordination of the repetitions is realised over the network (the 
SimulationContainer creates several Model masters on different nodes), speeding up the 
simulation process.
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Figure A.6: Simulation examples II. In this example, the number of agent is held constant, 
and servers added.
A .4 C onclusion
This appendix described the architecture and implementation of a software framework 
for simulating agent-based models. The framework was used to implement all models 
described in this thesis. The location of the source code of the framework as well as 
the models is listed in appendix D.
At its core is the implementation of the BRA algorithm described in chapter 2. Mod­
els using individual learning methods can easily build on this mechanism to implement 
deterministic behaviour, simple RL, and complex rule learning.
The software provides also the technical infrastructure to scale the system up, thus 
enabling the simulation of many thousand agents in reasonable time scales. It provides 
an API that abstracts from the fact whether the software is run in distributed or 
standalone mode. This makes it relatively easy to transform simple models into large- 
scale simulations.
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These two features distinguish the gsim approach from most available modelling 
frameworks (e.g. Repast 2010; Ascape 2010; Ciofïi-Revilla et al 2004), which often re­
quire both the implementation of behaviour strategies as well as a re-implementation of 
parts of the model to distribute it (e.g. Cicirelli et al 2009; Minson and Theodoropoulos 
2004).
Appendix B
Details of the Statistical 
Discrimination M odel
The following tables show some summary measures for the simulation runs of model 
variants I and II (chapter 2, section 3.5.2).
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Table B.l: Average discrimination in model variant I. Discrimination is defined as the differ­
ence between employment levels of the high and low employment group. Each row represents 
averages of 5 simulation runs.
6/(0) avg. st. deviation maximum minimum
discrimination
0.0789 0.0587 0.0596 0.1603 0.0130
0.1275 0.0352 0.0236 0.0626 0.0071
0.1571 0.0452 0.0441 0.1031 0.0013
0.1681 0.0393 0.0249 0.0687 0.0031
0.1762 0.0829 0.0514 0.1367 0.0239
0.2192 0.0495 0.0324 0.0849 0.0078
0.2301 0.0380 0.0406 0.1086 0.0077
0.2317 0.0510 0.0535 0.1374 0.0005
0.2339 0.0356 0.0158 0.0600 0.0225
0.2435 0.0472 0.0401 0.1079 0.0145
0.2559 0.0493 0.0193 0.0703 0.0184
0.2610 0.0451 0.0233 0.0710 0.0098
0.3064 0.0592 0.0421 0.1285 0.0140
0.3119 0.0449 0.0157 0.0657 0.0272
0.3305 0.0433 0.0661 0.1604 0.0044
0.3567 0.0461 0.0157 0.0701 0.0280
0.3610 0.0573 0.0228 0.0772 0.0193
0.3708 0.0267 0.0243 0.0692 0.0108
0.3855 0.0529 0.0386 0.1121 0.0199
0.4076 0.0444 0.0320 0.0817 0.0073
0.4191 0.0476 0.0279 0.0674 0.0005
0.4337 0.0299 0.0124 0.0446 0.0137
0.4469 0.0502 0.0335 0.0933 0.0092
0.4558 0.0330 0.0308 0.0862 0.0113
0.4604 0.0714 0.0565 0.1533 0.0042
0.4767 0.0189 0.0214 0.0555 0.0008
0.4839 0.0450 0.0124 0.0595 0.0272
0.5245 0.0246 0.0246 0.0638 0.0024
0.5348 0.0306 0.0242 0.0687 0.0055
0.5465 0.0741 0.0612 0.1466 0.0108
0.5647 0.0261 0.0156 0.0476 0.0098
0.5679 0.0421 0.0305 0.0713 0.0018
0.5773 0.0235 0.0188 0.0564 0.0084
0.5827 0.0260 0.0287 0.0751 0.0046
0.5996 0.0506 0.0256 0.0893 0.0201
0.6188 0.0542 0.0421 0.1212 0.0114
0.6191 0.0259 0.0141 0.0451 0.0068
0.6233 0.0634 0.0475 0.1189 0.0105
0.6505 0.0296 0.0141 0.0480 0.0106
0.6817 0.0589 0.0316 0.0928 0.0209
0.6836 0.0373 0.0242 0.0770 0.0125
0.6991 0.0314 0.0300 0.0636 0.0014
0.7021 0.0477 0.0211 0.0626 0.0113
0.7066 0.0291 0.0151 0.0532 0.0165
0.7667 0.0443 0.0496 0.1320 0.0154
0.7964 0.0360 0.0340 0.0796 0.0056
0.8396 0.0419 0.0362 0.0847 0.0018
0.8561 0.0294 0.0228 0.0548 0.0023
0.9041 0.0572 0.0398 0.1164 0.0057
0.9314 0.0352 0.0198 0.0545 0.0096
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Table B.2: Average discrimination in model variant II. Discrimination is defined as the 
difference between employment levels of the high and low employment group. Each row 
represents averages of 5 simulation runs.
avg. st. deviation maximum minimum
discrimination
0.1542 0.0263 0.0244 0.0637 0.0035
0.1585 0.0654 0.1112 0.2622 0.0003
0.1933 0.0247 0.0125 0.0426 0.0090
0.2738 0.0757 0.0984 0.2484 0.0096
0.2756 0.0301 0.0244 0.0622 0.0119
0.2865 0.0296 0.0242 0.0667 0.0113
0.3075 0.0410 0.0332 0.0848 0.0067
0.3484 0.0386 0.0229 0.0632 0.0125
0.3554 0.0625 0.0545 0.1423 0.0031
0.3716 0.0372 0.0473 0.1213 0.0076
0.3885 0.0505 0.0368 0.0901 0.0016
0.4104 0.0563 0.0701 0.1776 0.0073
0.4139 0.0781 0.0796 0.1984 0.0075
0.4276 0.0343 0.0387 0.0787 0.0007
0.4339 0.0391 0.0383 0.0966 0.0029
0.4495 0.0186 0.0080 0.0259 0.0066
0.4572 0.0515 0.0422 0.1231 0.0167
0.4672 0.0521 0.0460 0.1271 0.0180
0.4713 0.0386 0.0225 0.0650 0.0132
0.4782 0.0379 0.0296 0.0744 0.0094
0.4865 0.0489 0.0397 0.1141 0.0079
0.5001 0.0709 0.0633 0.1408 0.0044
0.5063 0.0348 0.0173 0.0563 0.0194
0.5112 0.1344 0.0853 0.2577 0.0166
0.5113 0.0418 0.0198 0.0743 0.0224
0.5244 0.0410 0.0545 0.1366 0.0067
0.5260 0.0425 0.0172 0.0610 0.0240
0.5451 0.0555 0.0658 0.1717 0.0149
0.5465 0.0193 0.0288 0.0698 0.0005
0.5519 0.0662 0.0780 0.1802 0.0004
0.5677 0.0552 0 .0 3 3 2 0.0932 0.0102
0.5778 0.0822 0.0626 0.1657 0.0127
0.5910 0.1112 0.0355 0.1583 0.0806
0.6219 0.0460 0.0242 0.0719 0.0155
0.6301 0.0774 0.1135 0.2753 0.0003
0.6482 0.0473 0.0462 0 .1 0 3 2 0.0009
0.6610 0.0534 0.0439 0.1032 0.0065
0.6624 0.0347 0.0158 0.0564 0.0184
0.6634 0.0824 0.0841 0.2266 0.0146
0.7107 0.0397 0.0393 0.1045 0.0042
0.7779 0.0765 0.0526 0.1291 0.0033
0.7954 0.0384 0.0331 0.0936 0.0082
0.8031 0.0904 0.0774 0.1834 0.0067
0 .8 2 8 4 0.1032 0.0746 0.2125 0.0320
0.8290 0.0603 0.0325 0.0934 0.0251
0.8431 0.0484 0.0382 0.1089 0.0140
0.8574 0.0202 0.0199 0.0554 0.0093
0 .8 5 8 8 0.0479 0.0216 0.0771 0.0198
0.9208 0.0459 0 .0 2 4 7 0.0749 0.0218
0.9312 0.1099 0.1208 0.3141 0.0232
Appendix C
Variance Analysis for the Primary
One way ANOVA, computed with OpenStat.
Variable labels for the group variables (variable name is scenario):
1 - BR-3/FFS
2 - BR-3/Capitation
3 - BR-6/FFS
4 - BR-6/Capitation
5 - RL-3/FFS
6 - RL-3/ Capitation
7 - RL-6/FFS
8 - RL-6/Capitation
ONE WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
Dependent variable is: wait, Independent variable is: scenario
SOURCE D.F. SS MS F PR0B.>F OMEGA SQR.
BETWEEN 7 4144.04 592.01 29.74 0.00 0.30
WITHIN 458 9117.10 19.91
TOTAL 465 13261.14
M odel
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MEANS AND VARIABILITY OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR LEVELS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
GROUP MEAN VARIANCE STD.DEV. N
1 9.63 32.61 5.71 60
2 13.94 30.45 5.52 60
3 11.64 16.91 4.11 60
4 14.07 36.44 6.04 60
5 6.65 6.31 2.51 60
6 9.22 15.94 3.99 60
7 5.15 5.31 2.30 60
8 8.81 12.13 3.48 60
TOTAL 9.98 28.52 5.34 466
TESTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE
Hartley Fmax test statistic = 6.86 with deg.s freem: 8 and 59.
Cochran C statistic = 0.23 with deg.s freem: 8 and 59.
Bartlett Chi-square = 91.64 with 7 D.F. Prob. > Chi-Square = 0.000
FISHER’S (PROTECTED) LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE TEST
OUP MEAN GROUP MEAN DIFFERENCE FISHER LSD SIGNIF
9.626 2 13.944 4.319 1.601 YES
9.626 3 11.636 2.010 1.601 YES
9.626 4 14.070 4.445 1.601 YES
9.626 5 6.652 2.973 1.698 YES
9.626 6 9.224 0.402 1.601 NO
9.626 7 5.146 4.480 1.608 YES
9.626 8 8.810 0.815 1.608 NO
2 13.944 3 11.636 2.308 1.601 YES
2 13.944 4 14.070 0.126 1.601 NO
2 13.944 5 6.652 7.292 1.698 YES
2 13.944 6 9.224 4.720 1.601 YES
2 13.944 7 5.146 8.798 1.608 YES
2 13.944 8 8.810 5.134 1.608 YES
3 11.636 4 14.070 2.434 1.601 YES
3 11.636 5 6.652 4.984 1.698 YES
3 11.636 6 9.224 2.412 1.601 YES
3 11.636 7 5.146 6.490 1.608 YES
3 11.636 8 8.810 2.826 1.608 YES
4 14.070 5 6.652 7.418 1.698 YES
4 14.070 6 9.224 4.846 1.601 YES
4 14.070 7 5.146 8.924 1.608 YES
4 14.070 8 8.810 5.260 1.608 YES
5 6.652 6 9.224 2.572 1.698 YES
5 6.652 7 5.146 1.507 1.704 NO
5 6.652 8 8.810 2.158 1.704 YES
6 9.224 7 5.146 4.078 1.608 YES
6 9.224 8 8.810 0.414 1.608 NO
7 5.146 8 8.810 3.665 1.614 YES
NOTE! Familywise error rate may be greater than alpha
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ONE WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
Dependent variable is: effort , Independent variable is: scenario
SOURCE D.F. SS MS F PROB.>F OMEGA SQR
BETWEEN 7 0.04 0.01 59.99 0.00 0.47
WITHIN 458 0.05 0.00
TOTAL 465 0.09
MEANS AND VARIABILITY OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR LEVELS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
GROUP MEAN VARIANCE STD.DEV. N
1 0.98 0.00 0.00 60
2 0.98 0.00 0.01 60
3 0.98 0.00 0.00 60
4 0.98 0.00 0.01 60
5 0.96 0.00 0.02 60
6 0.96 0.00 0.01 60
7 0.96 0.00 0.01 60
8 0.95 0.00 0.02 60
TOTAL 0.97 0.00 0.01 466
TESTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE
Hartley Fmax test statistic = 115294120037.52 with deg.s freem: 8 and 59. 
Cochran C statistic = 0.31 with deg.s freem: 8 and 59.
Bartlett Chi-square = 1608.00 with 7 D.F. Prob. > Chi-Square = 0.001
FISHER’S (PROTECTED) LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE TEST
tOUP MEAN GROUP MEAN DIFFERENCE FISHER LSD SIGNIF
1 0.980 2 0.976 0.004 0.004 NO
1 0.980 3 0.980 0.000 0.004 NO
1 0.980 4 0.976 0.004 0.004 YES
1 0.980 5 0.963 0.017 0.004 YES
1 0.980 6 0.960 0.020 0.004 YES
1 0.980 7 0.960 0.020 0.004 YES
1 0.980 8 0.955 0.025 0.004 YES
2 0.976 3 0.980 0.004 0.004 YES
2 0.976 4 0.976 0.000 0.004 NO
2 0.976 5 0.963 0.013 0.004 YES
2 0.976 6 0.960 0.016 0.004 YES
2 0.976 7 0.960 0.017 0.004 YES
2 0.976 8 0.955 0.021 0.004 YES
3 0.980 4 0.976 0.004 0.004 YES
3 0.980 5 0.963 0.017 0.004 YES
3 0.980 6 0.960 0.020 0.004 YES
3 0.980 7 0.960 0.021 0.004 YES
3 0.980 8 0.955 0.025 0.004 YES
4 0.976 5 0.963 0.013 0.004 YES
4 0.976 6 0.960 0.016 0.004 YES
4 0.976 7 0.960 0.016 0.004 YES
4 0.976 8 0.955 0.021 0.004 YES
5 0.963 6 0.960 0.003 0.004 NO
5 0.963 7 0.960 0.003 0.004 NO
5 0.963 8 0.955 0.008 0.004 YES
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6 0.960 7 0.960 0.001 0.004 NO
6 0.960 8 0.955 0.005 0.004 YES
7 0.960 8 0.955 0.005 0.004 YES
NOTE! Familywise error rate may be greater than alpha
ONE WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
Dependent variable is: referral_rate, Independent variable is: scenario
SOURCE D.F. SS MS F PROB.>F OMEGA SQR
BETWEEN 7 3.46 0.49 884.98 0.00 0.93
WITHIN 458 0.26 0.00
TOTAL 465 3.71
MEANS AND VARIABILITY OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR LEVELS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
GROUP MEAN VARIANCE STD.DEV. N
1 0..81 0..00 0..02 60
2 0..99 0..00 0.,04 60
3 0..91 0..00 0..02 60
4 0..99 0..00 0.,03 60
5 0..80 0..00 0..01 60
6 0..99 0..00 0..02 60
7 0..81 0..00 0..02 60
8 1..00 0..00 0..02 60
TOTAL 0,.92 0..01 0..09 466
TESTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE
Hartley Fmax test statistic = 7.24 with deg.s freem: 8 and 59.
Cochran C statistic = 0.28 with deg.s freem: 8 and 59.
Bartlett Chi-square = 70.53 with 7 D.F. Prob. > Chi-Square = 0.000
FISHER’S (PROTECTED) LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE TEST
OUP MEAN GROUP MEAN DIFFERENCE FISHER LSD SIGNIF
0.808 2 0.988 0.180 0.008 YES
0.808 3 0.910 0.102 0.008 YES
0.808 4 0.991 0.183 0.008 YES
0.808 5 0.804 0.004 0.009 NO
0.808 6 0.995 0.187 0.008 YES
0.808 7 0.805 0.003 0.009 NO
0.808 8 0.999 0.191 0.009 YES
2 0.988 3 0.910 0.078 0.008 YES
2 0.988 4 0.991 0.003 0.008 NO
2 0.988 5 0.804 0.184 0.009 YES
2 0.988 6 0.995 0.007 0.008 NO
2 0.988 7 0.805 0.183 0.009 YES
2 0.988 8 0.999 0.011 0.009 YES
3 0.910 4 0.991 0.081 0.008 YES
3 0.910 5 0.804 0.107 0.009 YES
3 0.910 6 0.995 0.085 0.008 YES
3 0.910 7 0.805 0.105 0.009 YES
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3 0.910 8 0.999 0.089 0.009 YES
4 0.991 5 0.804 0.187 0.009 YES
4 0.991 6 0.995 0.004 0.008 NO
4 0.991 7 0.805 0.186 0.009 YES
4 0.991 8 0.999 0.008 0.009 NO
5 0.804 6 0.995 0.191 0.009 YES
5 0.804 7 0.805 0.002 0.009 NO
5 0.804 8 0.999 0.195 0.009 YES
6 0.995 7 0.805 0.189 0.009 YES
6 0.995 8 0.999 0.004 0.009 NO
7 0.805 8 0.999 0.194 0.009 YES
NOTE! Familywise error rate may be greater than alpha
ONE WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
Dependent variable is: utility_l, Independent variable is: scenario
SOURCE D.F. SS MS F PROB.>F OMEGA SQR.
BETWEEN
WITHIN
TOTAL
7
7992
7999
152.53
104.23
256.76
21.79 1670.86 
0.01
0.00 0.59
MEANS AND VARIABILITY OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR LEVELS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
GROUP MEAN VARIANCE STD.DEV. N
1 0.62 0.00 0.05 1000
2 0.61 0.00 0.05 1000
3 0.64 0.00 0.03 1000
4 0.61 0.00 0.04 1000
5 0.44 0.01 0.11 1000
6 0.29 0.02 0.16 1000
7 0.45 0.02 0.16 1000
8 0.29 0.04 0.19 1000
TOTAL 0.49 0.03 0.188000
TESTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE
Hartley Fmax test statistic = 47.98 with deg.s freem: 8 and 999.
Cochran C statistic = 0.34 with deg.s freem: 8 and 999.
Bartlett Chi-square = 5811.61 with 7 D.F. Prob. > Chi-Square = 0.001
FISHER’S (PROTECTED) LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE TEST
GROUP MEAN GROUP MEAN DIFFERENCE FISHER LSD SIGNIFICANT?
1 0.616 2 0.611 0.006 0.010 NO
1 0.616 3 0.638 0.021 0.010 YES
1 0.616 4 0.612 0.005 0.010 NO
1 0.616 5 0.440 0.177 0.010 YES
1 0.616 6 0.289 0.327 0.010 YES
1 0.616 7 0.454 0.162 0.010 YES
1 0.616 8 0.287 0.330 0.010 YES
2 0.611 3 0.638 0.027 0.010 YES
2 0.611 4 0.612 0.001 0.010 NO
LO 
in 
to 
to 
h-
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2 0.611 5
2 0.611 6
2 0.611 7
2 0.611 8
3 0.638 4
3 0.638 5
3 0.638 6
3 0.638 7
3 0.638 8
4 0.612 5
4 0.612 6
4 0.612 7
4 0.612 8
5 0.440 6
0.440 7
0.440 8
0.289 7
0.289 8
0.454 8
0.440 0.171
0.289 0.322
0.454 0.157
0.287 0.324
0.612 0.026
0.440 0.198
0.289 0.348
0.454 0.183
0.287 0.351
0.440 0.172
0.289 0.323
0.454 0.158
0.287 0.325
0.289 0.151
0.454 0.014
0.287 0.153
0.454 0.165
0.287 0.003
0.287 0.168
rate
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 YES
0.010 NO
0.010 YES
NOTE! Familywise error may be greater than alpha
Appendix D
Software and M odels
Executable software and source code of the models can be downloaded from the URLs 
on the following page.
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